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Abstract 
 
 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology to identify objects or people automatically 
and has received many applications recent years. An RFID tag is a small and low-priced device 
consisting of a microchip with limited functionality and data storage and antenna for wireless 
communication with the readers. RFID tags can be passive, active or semi-active depending on the 
powering technique. In general passive tags are inexpensive. They have no on-board power; they 
get power from the signal of the interrogating reader. Active tags contain batteries for their 
transmission. The low-cost passive RFID tags are expected to become pervasive device in 
commerce. Each RFID tag contains a unique identifier to serve as object identity so that this 
identity can be used as a link to relate information about the corresponding object. Due to this 
unique serial number in an RFID tag it is possible to track the tag uniquely.  The challenge raised by 
the RFID systems for certain applications is that the information in it is vulnerable to an adversary. 
People who carry an object with an RFID tag could be tracked by an adversary without their 
knowledge. Also, implementation of conventional cryptography is not possible in a low-cost RFID 
tag due to its limited processing capability and memory limitations.  
 
There are various types of RFID authentication protocols for the privacy and security of RFID 
systems and a number of proposals for secure RFID systems using one-way hash functions and 
random number. Few researchers have proposed privacy and security protocols for RFID systems 
using varying identifiers. These are secured against most of the attacks. Due to varying identifiers 
they also include the recovery from desynchronization due to incomplete authentication process. 
However, due to the hash function of the identifier if one authentication process is unsuccessful, an 
adversary can use the responses in the subsequent phase to break the security. In this case the 
adversary can use the response for impersonation and replay attack and also can break the location 
privacy. Some protocols protect privacy and security using static tag identifier with varying 
responses so that they can work in pervasive computing environment. Most of these protocols work 
with computationally expensive hash functions and large storage. Since 2001 a number of 
lightweight protocols have been proposed by several researchers. 
 
This thesis proposes seven protocols for the privacy and security of the RFID systems. Five of them 
use a hash function and a static identifier such as SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EMAP.  These 
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protocols are based on challenge-response method using one-way hash function, hash-address and 
randomized hash function. The protocols are operable in pervasive environment since the identifier 
of the tag is static. Another protocol named ESAP also works with static identifier but it updates the 
timestamp that is used with another random number to make the response unidentifiable. The 
protocol GAPVI uses varying identifier with hash function to ensure privacy and security of the tag. 
It is based on challenge-response method using one-way hash function and randomized hash 
function RFID system.  Another proposed protocol EHB-MP is a lightweight encryption protocol 
which is more suitable for low-cost RFID tag because it does not require comparatively more 
computationally expensive hash function. Since 2001 Hopper and Blum developed the lightweight 
HB protocol for RFID systems, a number of lightweight protocols have been proposed by several 
researchers. This work investigates the possible attacks in the existing light weight protocols HB, 
HB+ and HB-MP of RFID systems and proposes a new lightweight authentication protocol that 
improves HB-MP protocol and provides the identified privacy and security in an efficient manner 
for pervasive computing environment. The validity and performance of the hash-based protocols are 
tested using analysis; simulation programs and some cases mathematical proofs have been given to 
prove the protection particularly from the special man-in-the attack in the EHB-MP protocol. 
 
Finally this research work investigates the privacy and security problems in few most potential 
application areas that are suitable for RFID implementation. The areas are e-passport, healthcare 
systems and baggage handling in airport. Suitable RFID authentication protocols are also proposed 
for these systems to ensure the privacy and security of the users. 
 
This thesis uses the symmetric cryptography for privacy and security protocols. In the future 
asymmetric protocols may be an important research consideration for this area together with 
ownership transfer of the tag could be a potential work area for research.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1     Background and Motivations 
 
The objectives of this chapter are to introduce the research area and problem of the research work 
regarding effective protocols for Privacy and Security in RFID Systems Applications, in terms of 
the motivation, outline of the deliverables, contributions and to provide an overview of the structure 
of the thesis. 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is used in many applications such as in automation of 
automobiles, animal tracking, highway toll collection and supply-chain management [Garfinkel et 
al. 2005]. Large organizations like Wal-Mart, Procter and Gamble, and the United States 
Department of Defence are deploying RFID as a tool for automation of their supply chains [Jules 
2006] and  in civil and mining operations for tracking of equipment [Atkins et al. 2010]. RFID 
technology is also being used in infant management system. RFID security systems are deployed to 
locate wandering patients, and protect against infant abduction attempts [Saad and Ahmed 2007] 
and can also be used in healthcare management for tracking medical waste [Atkins et al. 2009]. The 
reduction in the cost of RFID and improvement in standardization it is becoming widespread in 
business use and emerging as the successor of optical barcode. 
 
The main type of RFID tag is known as Electronic Product Code (EPC) tag which is standardized 
by an organization called EPCglobal Inc. [EPCglobal 2005]. RFID is a technology to identify 
objects or people automatically. An RFID system consists of three components: tag, reader and 
back-end database (Want 2005). An RFID tag is a small and extremely low-priced device consisting 
of a microchip with limited functionality and data storage and antenna for wireless communication 
with the readers. An RFID tag transmits data in the air in response to the interrogation by an RFID 
reader. RFID tags can be passive or active or semi-active depending on the powering technique. In 
general passive tags are inexpensive. They have no on-board power; they get power from the signal 
of the interrogating reader. Another type of tags called active tags contains batteries, whose 
batteries power their transmission. Active tags can initiate communications and have read ranges of 
100 meters or more. Active tags are comparatively larger in size, more expensive. RFID readers are 
devices used to read or write data from or to RFID tags.   
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Low-cost passive RFID tags are expected to become pervasive device in commerce due to its 
suitability in the application of automation. Each RFID tag contains a unique identifier to serve as 
object identity so that this identity can be used as a link to relate information about the 
corresponding object. Due to this unique serial number in an RFID tag it is possible to track the tag 
uniquely.  The challenge raised by the RFID system is that the information in it is vulnerable to an 
adversary. When a person carries an object which is RFID tagged this could be tracked by an 
adversary without their knowledge [Garfinkel et al. 2005]. Implementation of conventional 
cryptography is not possible in a passive RFID tag due to its limited processing capability and 
memory limitations [Prabhu et al. 2005].  
 
Some researchers have proposed privacy and security protocols for RFID systems using varying 
identifiers [Henrici and Muller 2004, Lee et al. 2005, Song and Mitchell 2008]. These are secured 
against most of the attacks. Due to varying identifiers they also include the recovery from 
desynchronization due to incomplete authentication process. However, due to the hash function of 
only the identifier alone if one authentication process is unsuccessful, an adversary can use the 
responses in the subsequent phase to break the security. In this case the adversary can use the 
response for man-in-the middle attack and also can break the location privacy. Some protocols 
protect privacy and security using static tag identifiers with varying responses so that they can work 
in ubiquitous environment. The main challenges using RFID technology are to ensure all the 
privacy and security protections in the protocols.  
 
The thesis is based on the following motivations: 
 
 Due to the decreased cost of RFID and improvement in standardization it is becoming 
widespread in business use and emerging as the successor of optical barcode. Due to this 
unique serial number in an RFID tag it is possible to track the tag uniquely.  However, it 
is infeasible to use conventional cryptography in passive RFID tags due its extremely 
limited processing and memory limitations. So it is important and challenging to design 
a new efficient and effective protocol for RFID systems to address the privacy issues. 
 The U.S. government has mandated adoption of e-passports by the 27 countries in the 
Visa-Waiver Program in 2006 [Jules et al. 2005]. Other nations like Japan and most of 
the nations of Western Europe together with some other countries are involved in this 
project. These passports follow the guidelines of the International Civil Aviation 
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Organization (ICAO), an organisation run by the United Nations with a mandate for 
setting international passport standards from Document 9303 [ICAO 2005]. The 
guidelines recommend the inclusion of RFID chips, microchips capable of storing data 
and transmitting it in a wireless manner into a passport. However the RFID data in the e-
passport is not fully protected from attacks of adversary. 
 In the medical environment, the security and privacy problem will be crucial to RFID 
based medical applications. The privacy issue with tagged patient cards involves the risk 
of exposing the information, such as trace of personal location, information of personal 
health and clinical history. Through the tag the private data of a person can be tracked 
and the personal information can be captured which could be a violation of privacy 
under the Data Protection Act 1998. In the standard health level seven (HL7), the 
standard for customizing and detailed privacy mechanism has not yet been specified 
(Lee and Kim 2007). 
 Many researchers proposed authentication protocols for the protection of privacy and 
security of the RFID systems. However these protocols require privacy, security and 
efficiency enhancements.  
 The privacy and security of the RFID systems in group-based ubiquitous systems are 
considered in many authentication protocols.  Existing group-based authentication 
protocols use hash functions and random numbers and have either privacy and security 
problems or efficiency problems. It is an important research issue to propose new 
protocols to enhance the systems in both privacy and efficiency. 
 Group-based ubiquitous protocols are not suitable for the systems for a small system 
where there is no group. This also has problems to ensure privacy due to the common 
secret for all tags in a group as the secret is shared by many people. Therefore it is 
important to design an authentication protocol to ensure the privacy and security for 
individual tag with lower storage, computation and communication cost. 
 The alternative approach of the ubiquitous protocols use hash function with varying 
identifier and secret value. However, existing protocols requires privacy, security and 
efficiency enhancement.  
 As the low-cost RFID tags have limited storage, computation and communication 
capabilities recently light-weight encryption based protocols are being proposed by 
many researchers. However the challenges in these protocols are to ensure the privacy 
and security efficiently and effectively with minimum error and lower storages. 
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1.2 Aim and  Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the current privacy and security problems of RFID systems 
and propose protocols with effective and efficient privacy and security properties for the different 
RFID applications. The objective of the research is to propose new protocols to address the privacy 
and security issues in RFID systems for low-cost RFID tags and is achieved as follows: 
 
 To identify the challenges through literature review with the relevant fields of RFID 
systems, application, privacy and security problems and the basic cryptographic 
techniques that can be used in low-cost RFID systems. 
 To investigate the existing protocols for privacy and security of RFID system. 
 To develop new protocols for RFID privacy, security and safety to improve efficiency 
and reliability. 
 To develop simulation software and carry out experiment using the simulation software 
based on the   developed   protocols. 
 To evaluate the performance of the developed protocols against other privacy and 
security protocols in terms of potential benefits effects to justify the adoption of 
proposed work.  
 To propose architectures for the implementation of the developed protocols in real life 
application like healthcare systems and e-passport. 
 
1.3 The Design Issues 
 
The design issues of this research are privacy, security and efficiency of the systems.  It will 
consider the privacy and security problems in various applications like healthcare systems, e-
passport and luggage handling in airport. 
   
The privacy and security issues: There are several privacy and security issues in RFID systems. 
These issues are information leakage, location privacy, impersonation and replay attack, message 
interception or denial of services, forward and backward traceability. 
 
The efficiency issues: For efficiency issue storage cost, communication cost and computation cost 
are considered.  For storage cost both the tag and the databases are considered.  Typically reader 
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does not store the database information. In some cases the reader can also have some storage to 
store the tag information. Communication cost is the size of the information transferred between the 
reader and the tag.  The computation cost refers to the function and mathematical and logical 
operations required in both the tag and the database. 
 
Another issue is the suitability in the implementation in applications. Different applications have 
different privacy and security requirements. The structures of the data are also different and used in 
various applications and this also influences on the design of the privacy and security systems.  
 
The design objective is to propose new authentication protocols to ensure the privacy and security 
of the RFID systems with less storages and computations. 
 
1.4  Research Outcomes 
 
To achieve the objectives identified in section 1.2, this research leads to the following outcomes: 
 
 A report/survey results on current issues of privacy and security problems in RFID system 
and in wireless technology. 
 A report on the different types of the existing protocols for privacy and security of RFID 
system indicating their limitations.  
 New protocols and systems for RFID privacy and security to improve the existing protocols 
for use in wireless technology.  
 Evaluation of the proposed protocols in terms of efficiency and reliability against other 
privacy and security protocols. Potential benefits and effects of the adoption of proposed 
system will also be evaluated using simulation and storage requirement calculations. 
 Uses of the proposed protocols in different applications. 
 Dissertation 
 5 Conference papers and two journal papers.  
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1.5 Statement of Ethics 
 
Many ethical issues are considered in any research works. This research work will follow the all 
ethical guidelines outlined by the ethical guidelines of Staffordshire University. The following 
guidelines are considered in this research. 
 Accreditation: Due accreditation will be given to the individuals and organizations whose 
work have been cited via proper references. In this research Harvard referencing is used.  
 No plagiarism: Plagiarism is the act of using the ideas, thoughts, pictures, theories, words, 
or stories of some other person as your own. Plagiarism is both an illegal and punishable 
act. It is ensured that no plagiarism is done in any level in this research.  
 Confidentiality: Confidentiality should be maintained when private data are used for any 
research purpose. No private data are used for this research. So No confidentiality issues 
were considered for ethical issues. 
 Collection of Data: Data collection is an important aspect to conduct a research. When data 
is collected from any person or an organization it should be taken care that the collected 
data is essential and pertinent to the research purpose. No data collection is required from 
any individual(s) or organization(s) for this thesis.  
 Informed consent: Informed consent is required if data are required to collect from them 
from individual (s) or organization(s). This thesis does not require data collection so 
informed consent is not applicable. 
 Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs): NDAs are required to sign at the request of industrial 
collaborations that provide data set(s) for validation purposes or offered professional 
insights for the research. However this thesis does not require any datasets for validation 
purposes. 
  
1.6  Research Process 
 
This section presents an overview of research design and methodology. It includes the different 
research methods, strategies and a technique used in the area of computing and illustrates the 
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research philosophy and methodology that was adopted in this thesis. All the research works can be 
viewed as a process which has a number of stages that should be followed to reach the goal of the 
research. Research process is referred as ‘onion’ by [Saunders et al. 2007]. It has six layers as 
shown in Table 1-1. Each layer is presented as a stage in the research process.  The research onion 
and its layers are shown in Figure 1-1.  Figure 1-1 also shows the philosophy, approach, strategies, 
choices and techniques adopted in this research as shown in dotted block. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                   
 
Figure 1-1: The research ‘Onion’ [Sounders et al. 2007] 
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Table 1-1 The Research ‘onion’ in Tabular Form [Saunders et al. 2007] 
 
 
 
1.6.1 Research Philosophy 
 
To carry out any research work it is essential to know the essential fundamental assumptions about 
the way in which one views the world. Research can be explained, measured and classified at 
different levels. The most basic level is to classify the research from a   philosophical view which is 
described by the research process ‘onion’ model as depicted in Figure 1-1. There are various types 
of research philosophies such as positivism, realism, interpretivism and pragmatism [Saunders et al. 
2007].  
 
Positivism states that knowledge has to be objectively based from depicting a logical inference from 
observable, measurable and verifiable facts. Positivism typically implements clear quantitative 
approach for investigating phenomena based on statistical factors. Positivist approaches include 
case study research and other research where there exists evidence of formal propositions, 
quantifiable measures of variables, hypothesis testing and illustration of conjectures about incident 
from the sample to a known population [Mayer, 1977]. 
 
1.6.2 Research Approach 
 
There are various types of approaches to accomplish and evaluate a research work.  The approach 
depends on the research context and nature of the work. There are mainly two types of research 
approaches: deductive and inductive [Saunders et al. 2007].  The deductive research approach does 
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in a top-down process where it begins with the development of a theory relating to the research, 
subsequently by the making of the hypotheses for testing, gathering of observations to deal with the 
hypotheses, and then the validation of the hypotheses with the utilization of the specific data.  On 
the other hand, inductive research approach performs in a bottom-up fashion, starting with the 
observation, followed by the detection of patterns and regularities, construction of a tentative 
hypothesis, and then the development of a general conclusion based on the former analysis. The two 
approaches are shown in Figure 1-2. 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-2:  Deductive versus Inductive Research [Trochim 2001] 
 
1.6.3 Research Strategy 
 
Research strategies can be classified in different ways. Each strategy can be adopted for 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research [Yin 2003]. Part of these approaches fits into the 
deductive research approach and other parts in inductive research approach.  Literature suggests that 
the most common categories of research methods are qualitative and quantitative research methods 
[Kumar 2005]. Qualitative research methods were firstly adopted in the social sciences to facilitate 
researchers to study social and cultural phenomena [Myers, 1977]. These types of methods look for 
the collection of data in the shape of written or spoken words, and do not usually include any 
numerical measurements. Examples of qualitative data sources include documents, texts, 
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interviews, questionnaires and participants observation. There are four main strategies are in the 
qualitative research: action research, case study research, ethnography and grounded theory.  
 
Alternatively, quantitative research methods are suitable where quantitative measures of the 
variables of interest are possible, where hypothesis can be constructed and verified, and where 
inferences can be made [Moore 2006, Creswell 2003].  Quantitative research methods were at first 
adopted in the fields of natural sciences for studying natural phenomena [Kumar 2005]. These 
methods collect data which is in a numerical form and can be analyzed using table, various charts of 
data and histograms etc. Some of the examples of quantitative data sources are laboratory 
experiments, statistical returns, census data and structured surveys. There are two main strategies in 
quantitative research methods: experiments and surveys. 
 
1.6.4 Choices 
 
The way in which one chooses to combine quantitative and qualitative techniques and procedures is 
referred to as research choice. Typically quantitative and qualitative methods and procedures do not 
work individually.  In selecting the research methods it can use a single data collection technique 
and corresponding analysis procedure called mono method or use multiple data collection technique 
and procedure for the answer of the research question (multiple methods).  If a mono method is 
chosen it will combine either a single quantitative data collection technique or a single qualitative 
data collection technique [Saunders et al. 2007].   The term multi-method refers to combinations of 
more than one data collection technique with associated analysis techniques, but this restricted 
within either a quantitative or qualitative research methods.  Mixed methods approach is the general 
term for when both the quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques and analysis 
procedures are used. For example in a series of semi-structured interview it requires both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
 
1.6.5 Time Horizons 
 
Time is an important issue in any research work. The studies can be classified in two ways: cross-
sectional studies and longitudinal studies. Cross-sectional studies happen at a single point in time 
and including a slice or cross-section. Typically longitudinal studies happen over a period of time. 
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The research conducted in a longitudinal approach because in order to enable coverage of relevant 
data and information which a cross-sectional study does not provide. This will likely include a fair 
analysis of the literature to identify the problems in existing RFID privacy and security systems. A 
longitudinal time horizon is therefore considered more appropriate for this research.  
 
1.6.6 Techniques and Procedures 
 
Data can be divided into primary and secondary data. Normally in research both primary and 
secondary data collection methods are used. 
 
The primary data refers to the data which is obtained for the first time and used specially for the 
current research. Primary data can be collected through surveys, interviews, brainstorming and 
seminars etc. Primary data are more accommodating as it contains latest information in a 
convenient way. In fact, the researchers can ask the questions that are set to elicit the data that will 
help them with their study. The researchers can collect the data for specific purpose. 
 
On the other hand secondary data refers to the collection of data which has been collected and used 
by other purpose than the current research work. In secondary data information relates to the past 
periods. Secondary data can be collected from various sources such as academic journals, 
conference research papers, books, industry library and reports, private or public organizations etc. 
For example, survey reports or secret records collected before by a business group can offer 
information that cannot be obtained from original sources. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Chapters 
 
The thesis has eight chapters and Figure 1-3 shows the structure of the chapters. The chapters of the 
thesis are organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the aim and objectives of the research and introduces the motivations, 
outcomes and statement of ethics. It also outlines the research methods carried out for different 
types of research works. It includes research philosophy, research approach, research strategy, 
techniques etc. 
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Chapter 2 introduces an overview of the RFID systems. It gives an overview of the components of 
the RFID Systems RFID tag, reader and database. It classifies the RFID tags according to various 
physical and logical properties. It also describes the standards of the RFID tags proposed by 
different organizations. This chapter focuses on some applications of RFID systems for automation.  
It also identified the privacy, security and performance of RFID systems. It also outlines the general 
security and cryptographic techniques. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the existing privacy and security protocols of the RFID systems. There are 
various approaches to ensure the privacy and security protection of the RFID systems. It explains 
the various physical and logical approaches for the protection of the RFID systems from the 
adversary.  It also classifies the various RFID authentication protocol according to privacy and 
security architecture. It identifies the various advantages and problems of the existing authentication 
protocols in different application scenarios. 
 
Chapter 4 presented the proposed new protocols for privacy and security of RFID Systems. It 
proposes four protocols using hash function, hash address, random numbers. It uses two random 
numbers in tag side and the reader side. The protocols of this chapter use static identifiers to 
implement the privacy and security of RFID systems in the ubiquitous environment.   It proposes 
two types of protocols. It uses group-based protocols for a big system where the tags are classified 
into the various departments so that it can be easy to manage and control.  In this case the privacy 
and security is also managed in a group. It also proposes authentication protocol for a system where 
the privacy and security is fully implemented individually in each tag.   
 
Chapter 5 presented a new protocol for the privacy and security of the RFID system using static 
identifier and hash function. However it uses a timestamp instead of a random number in the reader 
side and one random number in the tag side. It also compares the advantages of the using the 
timestamp for a random number in privacy and security of the RFID system.   
 
Chapter 6 proposes a new protocol for the privacy and security of the RFID systems using varying 
identifier and secret. It also uses hash function and random numbers to ensure privacy and security. 
It presented the recovery of the identifier due to any incomplete authentication process for any 
reason. 
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Chapter 7 proposes a new protocol using light-weight encryption technique. Light-weight 
encryption technique mostly uses bitwise xor operation or other simple bitwise operations that are 
suitable for low-cost RFID tag. This chapter identifies the problems in the existing light-weight 
RFID authentication protocols and proposes a new protocol to overcome the privacy and security 
problems efficiently and effectively.      
 
Chapter 8 selects three real life scenarios that are potentially important candidates to use RFID 
systems for automation and improved management. The areas are hospital, e-passport and baggage 
handling in the airport. This chapter shows the possible privacy and security threats in these 
applications and proposes RFID authentication protocol suitable for the systems. 
 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions and summaries of the main findings of this research work. It also 
recommends future works to improve the privacy and security protection of the RFID system. 
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Figure 1-3:  Structure of the Thesis 
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Chapter 2   Introduction to RFID Systems and 
Privacy and Security Issues 
 
 
2.1  Introduction to RFID System     
 
The objectives of this chapter are to introduce an overview covering the RFID systems, its privacy 
and security problems and also that are used in computer networks and information systems. In 
privacy and security section it includes different types of privacy and security threats in RFID 
systems. 
 
Radio Frequency Identification is a technology to identify objects or people automatically. An 
RFID system consists of three components: tag, reader and the back-end database [Want 2005, Lee 
et al. 2005]. A typical RFID system is shown in Figure. 2-1 and the characteristics of the RFID 
system outlined as follows: 
 
 
 
   
Figure 2-1:  Typical RFID System Components 
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2.1.1  RFID Tag 
 
An RFID tag is a small and extremely low-cost device having a microchip with limited processing 
capabilities, data storage and antenna for wireless communication with readers. The microchip is 
used for processing data, to modulate and demodulate radio signals, and to store and processes 
information and is sometimes referred to as a ‘transponder’. Sometimes the term `tag' is used for its 
simplicity. An RFID tag transmits data in the air in response to the interrogation by an RFID reader. 
Memory on tags may be of different types such as read-only, write-once read-many, or fully 
rewritable [Weis et al. 2004]. 
 
2.1.2      RFID Reader  
 
RFID readers are devices to read or write data from or to RFID tags. It is also called a transceiver or 
interrogator. The readers query to a tag to obtain information from the tag. The readers interrogate 
tags for their contents using an RF interface. The readers typically contain internal storage, 
processing power, sometimes an interface to the back-end databases to offer some other additional 
functionality [Weis et al. 2004]. The readers may use tag data as a look-up key into a database 
storing product information, tracking logs, or key management data [Weis et al. 2004]. 
 
Readers should be able to identify a particular tag, from among a collection of many tags. During 
this identification process, multiple tags responses may interfere with each other. It requires an anti-
collision algorithm. The algorithms may be probabilistic or deterministic. A familiar probabilistic 
algorithm is the Aloha scheme [Bing 2002, Metcalfe and Boggs 1976] used in Ethernet local area 
networks. In the case of RFID system, RFID tags avoid collisions with other tags by responding to 
the queries of the readers at random intervals. At the time of a collision, the perpetrator tags wait for 
other tags for longer and random interval before trying again. Higher densities of tags will result in 
a higher collision rate and degraded performance.  
 
The binary tree-walking scheme is a simple deterministic algorithm that can be used in RFID 
system. In this system, a reader queries all the tags for the next bit of their ID number. If the reader 
detects a collision in any position it implies that at least two tags have different bit values in that 
position of the ID. The reader will then send a response bit to indicate which tags should carry on 
with the protocol and which should stop giving response. Each selection of bit represents a branch 
to choose in a binary tree. The leaves of the tree represents thee tag ID numbers. Assuming the tags 
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have unique IDs, after walking to a leaf in the tree, a reader has addressed a particular tag. The 
advantages of binary tree-walking are that it has simple tag operation and can efficiently broadcast 
only the bits of an ID to address any tag. 
 
2.1.3  RFID Middleware and Database 
 
RFID middleware is a new breed of specialized software that sits between the RFID readers and the 
enterprise applications [Prabhu et al. 2005]. It is in charge of converting low-level RFID hardware 
information into useable event information.  The main purpose of the middleware is to process data 
from the tags collected by the readers used in the systems, or to write ID numbers and data to the 
tags while the assignment is done of these tags for attaching to the individual items. The 
middleware is responsible for the translation of machine information into information related to tag 
events.  This event specially indicates that it has detected a tag.  The minimum information that the 
middleware reports, is the tag ID.   This may contains other information like reader ID, Date/time 
stamp etc. The middleware give a standard communication mechanism for the readers and the tags. 
The reason is that it gives a higher-level communication system for the computer information 
systems and applications with the RFID infrastructure without the knowledge of lower level issues 
to communicate with the RFID hardware [Banks et al. 2007].   Some RFID systems can handle 
other events like status of the tag memory, tag sensor information, tag battery level, tag position, tag 
info zone, tag out of zone etc.  
 
The middleware has other benefits. It can provide a single mechanism to communicate with 
different RFID infrastructures [Banks et al. 2007].   For example, the system can communicate with 
both the active tag and passive tag system. This tremendously reduces the IT resources 
requirements.    
 
2.2   Classification of RFID Tags 
 
RFID tags can be classified in three ways. Classification is based on 
1. Powering techniques  
2. Processing capacity 
3. Operating frequency 
4. Memory Type 
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2.2.1  Powering Techniques  
 
RFID tag can be passive, semi active or active depending on the powering technique.  
 
 Passive Tags: In general passive tags are inexpensive. They have no on-board power; they 
get power from the signal of the interrogating reader. Power is provided by the reader. The 
reader creates radio frequency wave that induces in the antenna a tiny but sufficient 
electrical current to activate the tag [Banks et al. 2007]. When the tag comes near the range 
of the reader’s radio frequency wave field, it uses the energy to power up its internal 
components. It can then communicate with the reader.  The advantages of these types of tags 
are that they are low cost (3p), very small in size and require no internal power supply. It has 
drawback that the range of operation is very short for example a few meters. The antenna 
configurations vary widely based on the application of the tag. Different configurations 
work differently based on the environment in which the tag will be used. Passive tag can 
operate in many frequency bands.  Low-Frequency (LF) tags operates in 124 kHz to 135 
kHz, have a traditional range up to half a meter. High-Frequency (HF) tags operate in 13.56 
MHz have range up to a meter or more. Ultra High-Frequency (UHF) tags operate at the 
frequencies of 860 MHz to 960 MHz; have a read range up to 10 meters.  
 
 Active Tags: Active tags have on-board power. It is powered by its own battery for the 
operation of the tag over a period of time. The active tags beeps at a specified intervals. The 
life of the battery in active tags is determined by the frequency of the beeps. The battery life 
is shorter for the tags having higher beeping frequency. These tags are constantly beeping 
and so there is no requirement to be within the power field of the reader to be detected. The 
advantage of these types of tags is that the signal strengths of the active tags are much more 
than the passive tags and can be read from a further distance [Banks et al. 2007]. An active 
tag can be detected from 1.5 km away from the reader in an open-field environment with no 
minimum interference. There are few disadvantages of the active tags. First, the cost of the 
active tag is much higher than the passive tag. The active tags must have a self-contained 
power source. Therefore the cost of the tag is depended on the cost of the battery, which is 
itself is usually more than the cost of a passive tag. Second, the size of the active tag is much 
bigger that the passive tag. It is because the battery takes space in the active tag. This 
increases the size of the active tag dramatically. Another problem is that the uses of the 
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active tags are bounded by the life of the batteries that power them. When batteries go down 
it cannot communicate with the reader. Active tags can initiate communications and have 
read ranges of 100 meters or more. Active tags are expensive and costing some $20 or more. 
 
 Semi-Active Tag: The uses of active tags are limited by the life of the batteries and frequent 
‘beaconing’ reduces the life of the battery. A semi active tag overcomes these problems. It is 
a combination of a passive and an active tag. The passive component of the tag is energized 
by the reader when they enter into the electromagnetic field of the reader. When it is 
energized, it triggers the active component of the tag to send an RFID signal. Then battery is 
only used when it is activated by the passive components of the tag.  After a predetermined 
amount of time it goes to sleep mode thus saving battery life [Banks et al. 2007]. The range 
of the semi-active tag is higher than the passive tag.   
 
2.2.2  Processing Capacity 
 
According to processing capacity, RFID devices can be classified into two broad categories, 'dumb' 
and 'smart'.  
 
 Dumb tag: A dumb tag has no significant processing capacity and typically a dumb tag 
would be considered as a passive tag. The unique identifier of the tag will be a small fixed 
length value, typically 10 or 16 hexadecimal digits long. The memory capacity is also very 
small- for example a few hundred bytes to a maximum of around 2KBs [Laurie 2007]. In its 
simplest implementation, a tag listens for a radio signal, and sends a signal of its own as a 
reply [Thornton et al. 2006]. More complicated systems may transmit a single letter or digit 
back to the source, or send multiple strings of letters and numbers [Thornton et al. 2006]. 
 
 Smart tag: A smart tag has processing capability and typically this would be a semi or active 
tag. It has on-board processors and is typically capable of doing cryptographic operations 
[Laurie 2007]. It usually has larger memory capacity of 32 KBs or more, and is capable of 
performing authentication before allowing access to the stored data for the valid users 
[Laurie 2007]. This tag may also have the capabilities to encrypt the data used in 
communications with session keys to avoid snooping or data injection attacks [Laurie 2007]. 
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2.2.3  Operating Frequency 
 
The operating frequency is the electromagnetic frequency by which a tag communicates with a 
reader and it also may be used to obtain power. Passive tag can operate in many frequency bands. 
The electromagnetic spectrum within which RFID systems typically operate is commonly divided 
into low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), ultra-high frequency (UHF), and microwave [Glover 
and Bhatt 2006].  Low-Frequency (LF) tags operates in 124 kHz to 135 kHz, have a traditional 
range up to half a meter. High-Frequency (HF) tags operate in 13.56 MHz have range up to a meter 
or more. Ultra High-Frequency tags operates at the frequencies of 860 MHz to 960 MHz, have a 
read range up to 10 meters. For UHF the dominant standard will be likely to be Class-1 Gen-2.  
 
Due to the different properties of different frequencies these are used in different applications 
according to the requirements. Lower frequency signals are more suitable to travel through water, 
while higher frequencies can carry information at higher rates [Glover and Bhatt 2006]. Higher 
frequency signals are typically also easier to read at a distance.  
 
2.2.4  Memory Type 
 
Another category of RFID tags is that RFID tags may be either read-only (RO) or read-write (RW). 
The memory space can be used as writable and non-writable data storage. Tags can be 
manufactured as read-only, write-once read-many, or fully rewritable. Depending on the types of 
tag, tag programming is done at the manufacturing level or at the application level. The RO tags can 
only be read by the reader and the communication between the tag and the reader is unidirectional. 
RW tags provide the capability of both reading information from the tag and writing information to 
the tag at any time. The tag has a memory space to store information it requires and sent to it from 
the reader [Banks et al. 2007]. The size of the memory space varies from few bytes to hundreds of 
KB.  
 
2.3  RFID Standard 
 
There are different vendors for RFID solutions with different methodologies for communications 
between the readers and the tags. All the vendors had their own mechanism claimed to be the best 
for their purpose. However, it raises an important problem when they like to communicate with 
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each other. As a result the readers and tags from different vendors may not communicate with each 
other. It was a barrier for the growth of a large scalable RFID system.  To facilitate the rapid growth 
of RFID systems several organizations have attempted to create a single standard of 
communication. Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Auto-ID lab and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) have provided a platform for the RFID providers and the 
users to create a standard for inter-industry RFID communication. These standards deal with many 
aspects of the communication of the RFID systems such as how the tags and the readers 
communicate with each other and what data is given by the RFID system to the consumer 
applications [Banks et al. 2007]. 
 
2.3.1  EPC Standard 
 
The main form of RFID tag is known as Electronic Product Code (EPC) tag which is standardized 
by an organization called EPCglobal Inc [EPCglobal 2005]. The Electronic Product Code standard 
was developed by the Auto-ID centre at MIT with the collaboration of academic and industry 
personnel. It is now administered and managed by EPCglobal Inc. The standard provides a 
mechanism to uniquely identify every product for manufacturing. The Universal Product Code 
(UPC) ensures only the mechanism to uniquely identify the type of the product. The EPC ensures 
the identification of every instance. As there are a large number of products manufactured in the 
world the protocol must uniquely identify every instance from the large number of diverse products.  
To do this, the EPC standard divides the manufacturer and product number in a way that is compact 
and sensible [Banks et al. 2007]. Figure 2-2 shows an example of an EPC coding scheme. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2:  EPC-based Information 
 
EPCglobal Inc. has specified six categories of RFID tags class-0 to class-5. Table 2-1 shows an 
overview of the classification of tags based on their power characteristics, read ranges, memory 
capabilities, communication protocol, and peripheral systems. Class 0 to Class 3 is usually for 
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passive tags.  Active tags are specified by Class 4. Class 5 is reserved for the reader and the active 
tag that can read information from other tag. 
 
Table 2-1 EPC Tag Classifications (Reprinted from GS1 US) 
 
 
 
2.3.2  ISO Standard 
 
International Standard Organization (ISO) provides different types of industry standards. This 
organization is made up of over 140 members from over 90 nations. ISO also is working with RFID 
for its standardization. This standard also defines the communication protocol of RFID components, 
data elements and data interfaces for dealing with RFID information [Banks et al. 2007]. 
 
2.4  Passive Tag Memory Layout 
 
Passive tags stores various information like unique identifier, current state and user defined data etc. 
Tag memory is logically divides into four banks. Each bank has 0 or more memory words as shown 
in Figure 2-3. The memory banks are reserved, electronic product code, tag identification and user 
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memory banks. Figure shows the layout of data in a set of four memory banks on the tag. A logical 
memory map is also shown in Figure 2-4 [EPCglobal, 2005]. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Tag Memory Layout 
 
Reserved memory: The reserved memory bank contains the Kill and Access passwords if 
passwords are implemented on the tag. A reader must know the appropriate password to issue a Kill 
command. If a tag does not implement Kill or access password, the tag logically operates as zero 
valued passwords that are permanently locked for read/write.  
 
EPC memory: The EPC memory contains a StoredCRC at memory addresses 00n to 0Fn and a 
StoredPC at 10n to 1Fn.   The StoredCRC is 1 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC-16) field. It is 
used to validate the data in EPC memory bank.  StoredPC is the Protocol Control field. For EPC 
compliant tags, this code is an EPC as defined by EPCglobal. This field can also hold other types of 
codes by the data format defined by the manufacturer [EPCglobal, 2005].     
 
TID memory: Tag identification (TID) memory banks contain an 8-bit ISO/IEC 15963 allocation 
class identifier at locations 00n to 07n.  It associates the tag with the type or manufacturer of the tag. 
It contains information for an interrogator to uniquely identify the custom commands and optional 
features that a tag supports [EPCglobal, 2005].  
 
 
 
Bank 3 
Bank 2 
Bank 1 
Bank 0 
User 
TID 
EPC 
Reserved 
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00n 
Word 0 of Block 0 0Fn   
    
MSB                       LSB 
   
Bank 11 
 
User      
Bank 10 TID             TID[15:0]    
TID[31:16] 
Bank 01 EPC                           220n Optional XPC_W2[15:0] 22Fn 
Bank 00 Reserved                210n Optional XPC_W1[15:0] 21Fn 
    
MSB                       LSB 
   
EPC[15:0]  
       
              30n Access Password[15:0] 3Fn                20n EPC[N:N-15] 2Fn 
             20n Access Password[31:16] 2Fn                10n StoredPC [15:0] 1Fn 
              10n Kill Password[15:0] 1Fn                00n StoredPC [15:0] 0Fn 
              00n Kill Password[31:16] 0Fn                                         
 
 
Figure 2-4: Logical Memory Map [EPCglobal, 2005] 
 
User memory: This is user-defined data. It allows user-specific data storage. This is where read or 
write operations may be performed [Banks et al. 2007]. The size of the memory depends on the 
requirements and determined by the manufacturer. 
 
                      
2.5  Radio Frequency Regulations 
 
The radio frequency (RF) spectrum used for different applications is not infinite. If multiple devices 
attempt to use the same frequency or frequencies close to each other, there might be an interference 
among them. This interference might disrupt the transmissions of all the applications. To avoid the 
collisions among the radio frequencies it should be regulated. Most countries have a governmental 
organization to regulate the radio frequency spectrum in their countries. For example in the United 
States the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for RF regulation and in 
Europe the European Telecommunications Standards Institute oversees the RF regulation. Though 
the RF frequency is regulated by the countries with their own regulations but there are frequency 
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ranges that are widely adopted around the world.  The spectrum is regulated by the frequency 
ranges and is sliced into thousand of regulated frequencies for different purpose [Banks et al. 2007].  
 
To regulate the range of frequencies, restriction is imposed for who can use that range. There are 
rules for most regulated frequencies regarding the maximum broadcasting power in watts, the type 
and size of the antenna can be used.  EPCglobal maintains a living document for the current RF 
regulations status in the UHF spectrum. Table 2-2 shows a part of the information from that 
document. It has five columns: “Country”, “Frequency”, “Power”, “Technique” and “Status”. The 
“Status” column means the current state of RF regulation in that country.  
 
Table 2-2 Telecommunications Regulation Status for EPC-Complaint Tags 
 
 
2.6  An RFID Chip and a Barcode 
 
An RFID chip or tag is like a wireless barcode. It contains a silicon microprocessor and an antenna 
usually in size and form like an ordinary adhesive label. It can be as small as a grain of sand, and 
can be embedded in a paper [Hitachi 2003]. An RFID tag traditionally used as a label carries no 
internal source of power. It is simultaneously powered and read by a radio-emitting scanner. In an 
ideal case, an RFID tag is readable through obstructions at a distance of up to several meters. RFID 
systems give a powerful advantage over the optical barcode. Barcodes require line-of-sight contact 
with readers. However, RFID tags do not require line-of-sight contact and can work without precise 
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positioning (Jules 2006). This characteristic facilitates a new dimension of automated object 
recognition. RFID readers can read tags at rates of hundreds per second. For instance, an RFID 
reader in a warehouse door can scan stacks of passing crates with high accuracy. It may eliminate 
the requirement of the employees at the checkout in supermarkets. Once RFID-tagging is 
widespread, a customer might be able to roll a shopping cart full of items by a point-of-sale scanner 
that would ring them up without human intervention – and automatically mediate payment as well. 
This vision extends to the factory and warehouse as well, where RFID could enable automated 
inventory-taking and ultimately even robot-guided item selection and assembly.  
 
A barcode specifies the type of object on which it is embedded. For example “This is a pen of X 
brand.” An RFID tag can do more than this. It transmits a unique identification number that can be 
distinguished from a large number of manufactured objects. For example “It is a pen of X brand, 
with code number 01546875734.” The unique serial number in RFID tags can be used as indexes in 
a database having much transaction information of individual items. 
 
2.7  Uses of RFID Technology 
 
RFID was first used in the Second World War to detect and distinguish between the aircrafts of 
friend and foe. Today, RFID is used in a wide variety of applications [Garfinkel et al. 2005] and 
some examples are outlined as follows: 
 
 Proximity cards: RFID is used as contactless card for building access.  
 
 Automatic toll collection:  One of the most interesting uses of RFID technology is the toll 
collections by highway authorities in many metropolitan areas from travellers. One example 
of the most popular systems is E-ZPass. It was first used widely in New York. E-ZPass is 
based on a 921.75 MHz semi-passive tag.  The read range is several meters and it has a shelf 
life of about five to seven years. The tag in the moving car can be read by the reader to debit 
accounts. The system can read the tag in the cars moving up to 100 miles per hour. It can be 
further used for traffic monitoring and other applications. Several million US consumers are 
now using these tags nationwide [Garfinkel et al. 2005]. 
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 Automobile Industry:  RFID technology in automobile industry is used for various 
purposes. The most rapidly grown application of RFID technology is the automobile or 
vehicle immobilizer. RFID is also very suitable for the assembly and manufacturing process 
of the automobiles. In manufacturing process RFID can serve in different phases like for 
flexible and agile production planning, spare parts, and inventory management. It automates 
the whole assembly process where a significant cost reduction is achieved. It also offers 
improved services to the automobile users for more efficient replacement part ordering and 
automated generation of maintenance reminder.   
 
 Automobile immobilization: In these systems, the car key contains a passive RFID tag that 
the steering column authenticates, thereby enabling vehicle operation.  A typical antitheft 
system would flash the headlights and produce a sound if there any unauthorised attempt to 
open the car without a key [Banks et al. 2007]. The tags are usually programmed by the 
manufacturer as read only and cannot be altered when in use. Some tags consist of 
cryptographic information to communicate between the key and the sensor. Typically 
Immobilizers have a short read range of 5 cm and operate in the low-frequency end of the 
electromagnetic spectrum between 125 and 134.2 KHz, and cost a few dollars each. This is 
widely used to reduce auto theft by as much as 50 percent. These systems are perhaps the 
best-known examples of RFID application that contributes to a measurable end-user benefit 
[Garfinkel et al. 2005]. 
 
 Payment systems: RFID tags are used in credit card-like payment tokens that have a unique 
identification number. A reader transmits the identification number through the network and 
a server computer adjusted payment in the consumer’s account. To protect from 
unauthorised users, some systems implement a simple challenge–response protocol. Texas 
Instrument’s Speedpass pay-at-the-pump system is one of the popular examples, introduced 
in Mobil stations in the mid-1990s. Few years ago, the European Central Bank considered 
using RFID tags into currency [Garfinkel et al. 2005].  
 
 Animal tracking: To enable tracking, recovery, and management organizations and 
individuals are increasingly providing pets, livestock, exotic animals, and endangered 
species with RFID tags [Garfinkel et al. 2005]. In the US, many owners are implanting 
RFID chips in their pets. In August 2000, the Los Angeles City Council implemented the 
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implantation of RFID tag to the pet animals from the city’s animal shelters at a cost of 
US$15 per animal. The shelter has reader and database to store of all the tag information 
used for the pets. Using this database lost animals can be found easily by a shelter and can 
be returned to the owners. RFID chips are also being increasingly used into ear tags attached 
to cattle. Another interesting example is researchers have tracked dolphins and other marine 
animals using a radio transmitter combining with a GPS receiver that can be picked up by 
satellite.  
 
 Manufacturing:  Manufacturing is a very complex process. It requires that the right 
materials arrive at the right place at right time. It also requires that it receives the right 
process – and the manufacturing process itself is done correctly. Barcode, RFID and vision 
systems have been used in manufacturing to identify items, processes and ensure product 
quality since long time.  
 
 Security: Access to secure areas is already being controlled through the use of variety of 
Automatic Identification and Data Collection (AIDC) technologies. Bar codes, RFID, and 
biometrics are the main technologies used for this purpose.  
 
 Inventory management: RFID is being used in many sections of inventory management 
[Garfinkel et al. 2005]. RFID tags are being used in packaging of consumer goods at the 
factory. Subsequently it is being used to track packages when they are put on a truck or boat, 
travel in a foreign country, pass through the supply chain, distribution, and ultimately arrive 
at their destinations. Tags can guarantee that products manufactured and sold in one place 
are not mistakenly placed to another. In addition, “smart shelves” using RFID readers could 
incorporate with inventory systems, tracking all commodities and informing store personnel 
when things are misplaced. RFID tags could be used for after sale service to ensure that 
consumers actually bought the right items that they’re trying to return or have serviced.  
 
 Libraries: RFID is suitable for fast and automatic tracking of items. This feature is suitable 
to applications for library automation. The RFID technology is slowly replacing the 
barcodes on library items such as books, DVDs, CDs etc. The barcodes need line-of-sight 
contact to be scanned and they are easily deteriorated by use. In addition they cannot 
perform multiple scan at the same time. On the other hand, RFID technology permits 
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autonomous checkouts where the patron only passing under library’s batters is identified and 
so are the books that are identified. The system can also automatically check if an individual 
can borrow the books and updates library’s database. 
 
 Passport: Different countries are now using RFID-enabled passports. The International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has circulated specifications for RFID-enabled 
passports and other travel documents [ICAO 2005, Jules et al. 2005]. 
 
 RFID in Hospital: Healthcare is assumed to be the very big potential area for RFID 
implementation [Ericson 2004]. In general, the healthcare industry has been investing in the 
field of Information Technology (IT) to improve patient safety, to reduce operating costs 
and RFID is expected to become critical to healthcare organizations achieving these two 
goals. Some medical institutes and hospitals are starting to perform small-scale RFID 
experiment projects. The application of RFID in healthcare is in its child state. Healthcare 
industries expect that RFID can help to save costs and improve patient safety. Many of them 
started at first with tracking and managing their equipment. For automation RFID is being 
used in many hospitals [Wang et al. 2006].   
 
In future, in a world when RFID tags will be extensively used by most of the shopping items, many 
remarkable things might be possible with this tag [Jules, 2006] and some possibilities are outlined 
as follows: 
 
 Smart appliances: Nowadays RFID is being used in many shopping items like garments, 
package of foods and other necessary items. These tags can be further used by the home 
appliances more smartly. During the washing of cloths in a washing machine it might select 
wash cycles automatically by using the information in the RFID tag attached with the 
garments. It may avoid damage to delicate fabrics. Refrigerator might warn when the food 
has expired and there is only few remaining cartons are there. It could even transmit a 
shopping list automatically to a home delivery service [Jules, 2006].  
 
 Shopping: RFID tag is easier to read and track than barcode. Customers could check out by 
rolling carts of the shop at the terminals very quickly. It would be possible that these 
terminals without human intervention count the items, calculate the cost, and charge the 
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customers’ RFID-enabled payment devices. It then also possible that customers could return 
items using the RFID tag without receipts. Also the tags may be used as indices into 
database records, and help the retailers to track the pedigrees of defective items [Jules, 
2006].  
 
 Interactive objects: Recently mobile phones are using RFID tags to interact with different 
objects. Customers could interact with RFID-tagged objects through their mobile phones to 
perform many actions. A consumer could scan a movie poster to display show times on her 
phone. A consumer can also obtain information about the products by waving the phone 
over it [Jules, 2006].  
 
 Medication compliance: In future RFID can be used to facilitate medication compliance. 
Research at Intel and the University of Washington [Fishkin et al. 2003] used RFID for this 
purpose. As researchers demonstrated that, an RFID-based medicine cabinet could be used 
to verify that medications are done timely. RFID assures to bring incredible benefits to 
hospitals [Fishkin and Lundell 2005]. 
 
2.8   Privacy Problems in RFID Application 
 
RFID has unique privacy and security problems because people cannot understand when the tag is 
read by the adversary. Further the tag and the reader can be covertly embedded in the environment 
[Garfinkel et al. 2005]. There are various RFID applications that have various types of privacy and 
security problems. Some of these are outlined as follows:   
 
 RFID Privacy Problems in Medical Service: In the medical scenario, privacy and security 
problems are vital to RFID-enabled medical application. In RFID mobile phone model, the 
user holds the small RFID reader implanted in the phone. Then the user can use the reader to 
request information from the tag attached to the patient. The reader then sends the 
information to the back-end database. The database then gives the requested information to 
the reader and displays it to user. In case of the location sensitive RFID reader, this can be 
used for the increased customer safety.  This can also be used for negative purpose to break 
customer privacy [Lee and Kim 2007]. The privacy issue with tagged patient card has the 
threat of revealing the information, such as trace of individual location, information of 
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personal clinical and health history. In the standard health level seven (HL7), the standard 
for customizing and detailed privacy mechanism is not yet provided. HL7 is an international 
non-profit organization that develops international healthcare informatics interoperability 
standards. Lee and Kim [2007] propose a privacy mechanism for RFID in healthcare 
system. The authors analyzed the privacy requirements for the ubiquitous service. In order 
to ensure privacy in this process, a mechanism of encryptions and decryptions of the 
outgoing data from tag and server has been proposed. However, these methods may have 
limitations to give service in the ubiquitous application environment. Additionally, if the 
information can be decrypted successfully, all information will be available to unauthorised 
users. For this reason, a method is proposed by the authors that protect the privacy in the 
ubiquitous system using a personal privacy policy in order to administer information more 
flexibly and securely as well as overcome the problems discussed previously. In order to 
protect privacy of the patient, all of the information of the patient should be managed by 
privacy aware system. In addition, unique serial number in the RFID tag of the patient can 
be used outside of the hospital for any emergency medical service or other hospital service.  
 
 RFID Privacy Problems in E-passport: E-passports are vulnerable to information leakage 
of their contents without the knowledge of the passport holder. The short read range of the 
e-passport is also not free from some threats. Clandestine readers could be placed in shops 
or entrances to buildings. These types of readers would enable for appropriate surveillance 
of e-passports. E-passport contains personal data that a passport holder does not like to 
disclose to an unauthorised reader. There are many security threats are identified in e-
passport due to the uses of the RFID [Jules et al. 2005].  The identified security threats are 
clandestine scanning, clandestine tracking, skimming and cloning, eavesdropping, biometric 
data-leakage, cryptographic weaknesses. The details will be discussed in the application and 
implementation chapter 8. 
 
 RFID Privacy Problems in Supply Chain: RFID enables improved inventory 
management, better shipping and gaining productivity, reduces levels of the safety stock, 
and significantly reduces inventory losses due to shrinkage [Dimitriou 2005]. However, 
RFID technology has also caused major security problems. An industry spying may 
eavesdrop RFID signals to gather inventory information; cloning of tag which may cause 
significant loss to supply chain partners. The inventory information has financial significant 
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for business organization and their competitors. As RFID based supply chains systems are 
becoming widespread, it is important to solve the security problems in a cost-effective 
approach without lessening the efficiency of supply chain management due to the 
introduction of RFID technology. The privacy and security in RFID technology can be 
classified into corporate information security threats which mainly affect corporations inside 
the supply chain, and personal privacy threats which mainly affects individual consumer 
outside the supply chain [Garfinkel et al. 2005]. The security concern in supply chain 
management is that the inventory of store labelled with unprotected tags may be monitored 
by the unauthorized readers of the business competitors [Gao et al. 2004]. Another privacy 
issue is that persons may be tracked by RFID tags attached on the objects carried by the 
persons. Also, even if the responses of tags are encrypted, the tag carrier can also be 
identified and tracked by the fixed encrypted code [Gao et al. 2004]. 
 
2.9   Privacy, Security and Performance Goals in RFID Systems 
 
The privacy and security concerns are the major drawback of the RFID technology. In RFID 
systems various types of attacks can be identified. Attacks against the RFID systems opened the 
door for the construction of traditional and modern security systems, ranging from signal jamming 
to challenge-response based authentication. It is just as likely that RFID will continue to inspire 
progress in security and privacy research in the future, as it has done for decades. 
 
This section gives an overview of the primary privacy and security requirements of RFID systems 
and the traditional mechanisms to fulfil those requirements. It also categorizes the existing 
weaknesses of RFID systems so that a better understanding of RFID attacks can be achieved. 
 
2.9.1  Objective of the Adversary 
 
In an RFID system the objectives of the adversary and each attack can be different. It is important 
to identify the potential targets in order to understand all the possible attacks. The target can be to 
disrupt the complete system or only a section of the entire system. Sometimes just to track any or 
part of the system.  A large number of information systems focus solely on protecting the 
transmitted data. However, when designing RFID systems, additional objectives, such as tracking or 
data manipulation should be considered. An adversary may introduce wrong information in the 
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database to make it inoperative. Some attacks, such as the active jamming attack, are inherent in the 
wireless technology employed. Other attacks focus on eliminating physical access control, and 
ignore the data. Some involve identity stealing from legitimate e-passports, and etc. 
 
2.9.2  Privacy and Security Requirements 
 
To provide privacy and security for a system, it is essential to identify the possible threats and risks 
to that system. These can be used for privacy and security requirements. From this, protection 
measures to the threats and residual risks can be identified and applied [Aissi et al. 2006]. In this 
section, two main classes of threats to RFID systems privacy and security are investigated 
separately.  
 
2. 9.2.1   Privacy in RFID Systems 
 
Privacy is an important concern in RFID systems. The information transmitted between the tag and 
the reader can be disclosed and at least the location can be tracked by the adversary if the system is 
unprotected. There are two major privacy issues which are as follows: 
 
 Tag Information Leakage: A person can hold different types of tags. Some of the tags 
could contain personal data and the private information that the tag bearer does not wish to 
disclose. Examples are diagnostic and health information of an individual, a title of a CD or 
book and expensive product etc. However, the revelation of information arising during the 
transmission of various personal data details without the knowledge of the tag bearer [Lee et 
al. 2005]. In typical RFID system, a tag is a unique identifier that transmits information to 
the reader. At this stage there is a chance of information leakage and to protect an RFID 
system there needs to provide privacy control so that unauthorized readers are unable to 
access the tags [Ohkubo et al. 2003]. 
 
 Tag Tracking: When a tag transmits any information to a reader, an adversary may try to at 
least distinguish it from other responses and consequently could determine the location of 
the user. If the signals of an RFID tag can be linked to each other or can be distinguished 
from those of other tags, then the tracking of a tag could be possible by the adversaries 
[Weis et al. 2004]. 
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2.9.2.2  Privacy Requirements 
 
To protect the RFID systems form the privacy attacks from various adversaries the system   should 
meet the following privacy requirements in order to defend from the two threats outlined. 
 
 Tag Information Privacy: The tag information can be extremely sensitive for some users. 
The RFID systems should be able to resist tag information leakage. If the information 
transmitted is in plaintext and is not authenticated properly there is a chance of information 
leakage. To protect from such a threat, the RFID systems should be designed in such a way 
that only the authorised users are able to get the information from a tag. 
 
 Tag Location Privacy: If a tag can be tracked from its response then the location of the 
user can be known and can be tracked. RFID systems should be able to protect the tag from 
tracking attacks. If responses from tags are anonymous, then the problem of tracking the 
RFID tag by unauthorized users can be overcome. 
 
2.9.3  Security in RFID Systems 
 
The communication process between a reader and a tag is not reliable due to the possible attacks of 
an adversary. Communication processes between a tag and a server in an insecure wireless channel 
are vulnerable to eavesdropping. There are various security threats to RFID systems. 
 
2.9.3.1  Attack Model 
 
The possible attackers are divided into two groups, as follows. 
 
 Weak adversary (WA):  A weak adversary (WA) is a malicious body that can monitor and 
manipulate communications between a reader and a tag, but cannot compromise the targeted 
tag. 
 Strong adversary (SA): A strong adversary (SA) is a malicious entity that has the ability to 
compromise a targeted tag, in addition to the capabilities of a weak attacker. 
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Threats by a strong adversary as well as a weak adversary should be considered in RFID protocol 
design, because the internal data in a tag memory are liable to exposure as a result of side-channel 
attacks [Avoine and Oechslin 2005, Lim and Kwon 2006]. These attacks are based on side channel 
information that can be obtained from a system carrying out cryptographic computations [Bar-El 
2002]. Side channels give information on internal computations through measurement, for example 
by monitoring variations of power consumption, time taken to perform calculations, or from 
external radiation. Side channel attacks use such information to capture the secret key the system is 
using [Bar-El 2002]. Security threats to RFID systems can be classified into weak and strong 
attacks in line with the adversary types. 
 
2.9.3.2  Weak Attacks 
 
There are various attacks that can be classified as weak attacks. The following attacks are some of 
the weak attacks [Avoine, G 2005, Jules 2006, Weis et al. 2004]. 
 
 Tag Impersonation: In this attack an adversary without knowing the secrets could 
impersonate a target tag to a server. It could also communicate with the server rather than 
the tag and be authenticated as the valid tag [Weis et al. 2004]. 
 
 Cloning: To detect counterfeit products in RFID application is very important. An 
adversary can counterfeit a tag to imitate the tag similar to any tag of a valuable item. In 
order to avoid counterfeiting, RFID tags should be protected from cloning. An adversary can 
clone a valid tag if it knows the secret value of the tag and its authorized reader [Dimitriou 
2005, Duc et al. 2006]. 
 
 Replay attack: An adversary could replay data exchanged between a tag and a server 
without being detected, thus accomplishing a successful authentication between a server and 
a tag [Dimitriou 2005]. 
 
 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack: An adversary could interfere with the communications 
transmitted between a tag and a server [Jules 2004]. 
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 Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack: An adversary could block the transmission of messages 
between a tag and a server. This attack could cause the server and the tag to lose 
synchronisation. An example of DoS attack is that, the server updates its secret values but 
the tag does not; thus, they would not be able to authenticate each other anymore [Weis et 
al. 2004]. 
 
2.9.3.3  Strong Attacks 
 
There are various attacks that can be classified as strong attacks. A strong adversary may be able to 
perform both the strong attacks and weak attacks.  The following attacks are some of the strong 
attacks [Avoine, G 2005, Lim and Kwon 2006, Ohkubo et al. 2003]. 
 
 Backward Traceability: If the internal state of the tag is known then it can help to identify the 
tag interactions of past communications of the tag. An adversary may trace past transactions 
between a server and a compromised tag using the known internal state. The past information of 
a tag may permit tracking of the tag user's past behaviour [Ohkubo et al. 2003]. 
 
 Forward Traceability: If the internal state of the tag is known then it can help to identify the 
tag interactions of future communications. An adversary might be able to trace future 
transactions between a server and a compromised tag using knowledge of the internal state of 
the tag [Lim and Kwon 2006].  
 
 Server Impersonation: In this attack if an adversary knows the internal state it might be able to 
impersonate a valid server to a tag using this state of the tag. If the adversary could impersonate 
a server to a tag, it could request the tag for its secrets and to update the secrets. Then the real 
server and the tag would be desynchronised, and unable of doing successful communications 
[Song 2008]. 
 
2.9.3.4  Security Requirements 
 
The security requirements are identified for RFID systems to protect from the threats of the weak 
and strong adversary. These are the security goals that should be guaranteed by protocols. 
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 Resistance to Tag Impersonation: Without knowing the internal secrets of the tag an 
adversary could impersonate the tag to a server. The RFID systems should be designed in such 
away that without knowing the secret of a tag an adversary should not be able to impersonate a 
tag. 
 
 Resistance to Replay attack: Security must be ensured against replay attacks so that an 
adversary should not be able to use the information exchanged between a tag and a server, thus 
accomplishing a successful authentication between the server and the tag. 
 
 Anti-cloning: It is important to detect counterfeit objects in RFID systems. To avoid 
counterfeiting, RFID tags should be unalienable. If an adversary knows the shared secret key of 
the tag and the authorized reader it can clone the tag. So, to protect the system form cloning 
attack, protocols should not disclose the secret key.  
 
 Resistance to MitM attack: An adversary could intrude into the messages exchanged between 
a server and a tag to intercept the exchanged data and inject false information. An adversary 
should not be able to manipulate messages and inject false information sent between a server 
and a tag without compromising a tag. 
 
 Resistance to DoS attack: In DoS attack an authorized entity is prevented from accessing the 
authorized resources. Blocking of transmitted messages between a tag and a server should not 
cause the server and the tag unable to communicate successfully. In order to ensure successful 
communication between a reader and its authorized tags, it should be guaranteed that an 
adversary cannot desynchronize them. 
 
 Backward Un-traceability: The communication between the server and the tag should be 
backward untraceable. An adversary should not be able to trace past transactions between a 
server and a tag, even if it compromises the tag. 
 
 Forward Un-traceability: The communication between the server and the tag should be 
forward untraceable. An adversary should not be able to trace future transactions between a 
server and a tag, even if it compromises the tag. 
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 Resistance to Server Impersonation: If an adversary could compromise a tag using the 
knowledge of the internal state it might be able to impersonate a legitimate server to the tag and 
could request a tag for its secrets to update its shared secrets. An adversary should not be able to 
impersonate a server to a tag, even if it compromises that tag.  
 
2.9.4  Performance Requirements 
 
An RFID tag is a tiny and extremely low-cost apparatus containing a microchip with very limited 
functionality and some data storage with antenna for wireless communication with readers. It 
cannot use complex cryptographic algorithms that require powerful processing capability to provide 
privacy and security because tight tag cost requirements put limits on the resources in tag-side. 
 
RFID schemes should consider the following performance issues. 
 
 Storage Capacity: The tag has a very limited storage capacity. So the volume of data stored 
in a tag should be minimised because of tight tag cost requirements [Weis et al. 2004]. 
 
 Computation: The processing capability of a tag is also very limited. Due to the limited 
power of the tag the complexity of tag computations should be minimised [Weis et al. 
2004]. 
 
 Communication: The bandwidth of the tag is also limited. The volume of data that each tag 
can transmit per second is also limited. So the number and size of messages exchanged 
between a tag and a reader should be minimised [Weis et al. 2004]. 
 
 Scalability: The server should be able to handle increasing amounts of data for a large 
amount of tags. It should have the capability to handle a large number of tags. It should also 
be able to identify multiple tags using the same radio channel [Avoine and Oechslin 2005]. 
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2.10   Security and Cryptographic Techniques 
 
2.10.1   Security 
 
This chapter introduces general communications security and cryptographic primitives. It contains 
the basic concepts of computer security and categories of cryptography. 
The computer security means the protection of information and property from theft, corruption, or 
natural disaster, while allowing the information and property to remain accessible and useful to its 
valid users. Computer security can be defined in the following ways: 
 
 Confidentiality: Confidentiality is a service that prevents the access of information to the 
unauthorized systems or users. There are many ways of ensuring confidentiality.  
Confidentiality can be explained in two ways [Stallings 2011] 
 
 Data confidentiality: It assures that private or confidential information is not 
disclosed to unauthorized users. 
 Privacy: It assures that individuals can control or influence the information related to 
them and also can control the system so that information should be revealed only to 
authorised users. It should have the ability of an individual or group to conceal them 
and expose them selectively. 
 
 Integrity: Integrity means that data cannot be modified by unauthorized users or it cannot 
be changed undetectably. To ensure data integrity in an unreliable channel, it is essential to 
detect data manipulation by unauthorised users. Various types of data manipulations are 
insertion, deletion and substitution.  Integrity may be two types [Stallings 2011] 
 Data Integrity: Data integrity assures that information and programs are changed 
only in a specified and authorized manner.  
 System Integrity: System integrity means a system should perform its intended 
function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized 
manipulation of the system. 
 
 Availability: This means the resources should be available for the authorized users.  It 
should work promptly and service is not denied to authorize users.  
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 Authenticity: Authenticity means the genuineness of the origin and being able to be 
verified and trusted. This also ensures confidence in the validity of a transmission, a 
message, or message originator.    
 
 Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is a service which prevents either sender or receiver 
from denying a transmitted message. When the message is received from the sender, the 
receiver can prove that the alleged sender in fact has sent it. Similarly when any 
acknowledgement is sent back to the sender, the sender can verify that the alleged receiver 
in fact received the message.  
 
 Access control: Access control provides protection against unauthorised use of resources. It 
can protect the use of a communications resource: the reading, writing, or deletion of an 
information resource; or the execution of a processing resource [Stallings 2011]. 
 
2.10.2         Introduction to Cryptography 
 
Cryptography is the technique of hiding information and combines the disciplines of mathematics, 
computer science, and electrical engineering. The many schemes used for encryption constitute the 
area of study of cryptology. Such a scheme is known as cipher. Cryptanalysis is the term used for 
the study of methods for obtaining the meaning of encrypted information without the knowledge of 
the key and the process normally required. The areas of cryptography and cryptanalysis together are 
called cryptology. Modern cryptographic techniques can be divided into two main classes, 
symmetric and asymmetric techniques, depending on the nature of the keys used [Menezes et al. 
1996, Mitchell 2003 and Stinson 2002]. Some cryptographic data integrity algorithms are also used 
for data security. For example, cryptographic hash functions, message authentication codes and 
digital signatures are the most popular algorithms among them.  
 
2.10.2.1       Symmetric Cipher Model 
 
Symmetric encryption method is a form of cryptosystem in which the sender and the receiver share 
the same key [Stallings 2011] and it has five elements as shown in Figure 2-5. 
 Plaintext (X): This is the original information used as input into the encryption algorithm. 
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 Encryption algorithm (E): The encryption algorithm carry outs various substitution and 
transformation on the plaintext. 
 
 
 
                     Plaintext          Secret key                             Secret key     
                                                                               
                                                                       
                                                                                                       
 
    Plaintext                   Encryption Algorithm          Decryption Algorithm               Plaintext                                                                                                                  
 
Figure 2-5: Symmetric Encryption     
 
 Secret key (K): The secret key is a value independent of the plaintext and the algorithm. 
The algorithm will produce different output for specific key being used at the time. 
    
 Ciphertext (Y): This is the scrambled unintelligible message produced as output. It depends 
on the plaintext and the secret key. For a given plaintext two different keys will produce two 
different ciphertexts. 
 
 Decryption algorithm (D): Decryption algorithm is the encryption algorithm run in the 
reverse order. It produces the original plaintext from the ciphertext and the secret key.                    
                                      
2.10.2.2  Asymmetric (Public-Key) Cryptography  
 
In asymmetric-key cryptography two different but mathematically related keys are used for 
encryption and decryption as shown in Figure 2-6. The two keys used for asymmetric encryption 
are referred to as the public key and the private key. It is also known as public-key encryption. A 
public-key encryption has six elements 
 Plaintext (X): This is the original information used as input into the encryption algorithm. 
 
K 
Ciphertext 
Y=E(K,X) 
 
X=D(K,Y) 
K 
X 
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 Encryption algorithm (E): The encryption algorithm carry outs various substitution and 
transformation on the plaintext. 
 Public (PUa) and Private (PRa) key:  This is the pair of keys used for complementary 
operations. If one is used for encryption then the other is used for decryption. The 
transformations done in the algorithm depend on the public key and private key that is given 
as input.    
 Ciphertext (Y): This is the scrambled unintelligible message produced as output. It depends 
on the plaintext and the secret key. For a given plaintext two different keys will produce two 
different ciphertexts. 
 Decryption algorithm (D): Decryption algorithm is the encryption algorithm run in the 
reverse order. It produces the original plaintext from the ciphertext and the secret key. 
 
                                      Public key                           Private key     
                                                                          
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                           
                                                                                                        
 
 Plaintext                     Encryption Algorithm          Decryption Algorithm               Plaintext                                                                                                                  
 input                                                                                                                           output 
 
Figure 2-6: Asymmetric Encryption 
 
2.10.3     Other Security Algorithms 
 
There are many other cryptographic security algorithms in the literature. The most well known 
algorithms will be discussed in this section since the entire region is beyond the scope of this 
research. Traditional cryptographic algorithms are highly computation and storage intensive which 
are not suitable for low-cost RFID tags. Some of the examples of traditional cryptographic 
examples are Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) etc.  
 Ciphertext 
Y=E(PUa,X) 
 
X=D(PRa,Y) X 
PUa
PRa 
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2.10.3.1  Cryptographic Hash Function 
 
A hash function maps a variable-length input message into a fixed-length output message. A hash 
function takes an arbitrary data as input string and gives a short, fixed-length value as output.  The 
output is known as a hash value or hash code. Any change to the input data will also change the 
hash value. Hash functions have the one-way property, that is, it is not computationally feasible to 
find an input string from the output. They must be simple and efficient to compute [Menezes et al. 
1996, Mitchell 2003 and Stinson 2002]. For example,   lh }1,0{}1,0{: *    be a one-way hash 
function where a hash value space belongs to l}1,0{ .  
 
It is assumed that a cryptographic hash function is able to withstand all known types of 
cryptanalytic attack.  The basic requirements for a cryptographic hash function are as follows: 
 Preimage resistance:  Given a hash output y it is infeasible to find any message x such that 
yxh )(  . This is the one-way property of a hash function. 
 Second preimage resistance: Given an input 1x it should be difficult to find another input 
2x  where 21 xx  such that )()( 21 xhxh  . This property is known as weak collision 
resistance  
 Collision resistance: It is infeasible to find two different messages 1x  and 2x such that 
)()( 21 xhxh  . This property is known as strong collision resistance.  
2.10.3.2   Message Authentication Codes 
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short piece of information used to authenticate a 
message. A MAC algorithm is a cryptographic function that takes a message and a secret key as 
input, and produces an authentication called a MAC code. The recipient of a MAC equipped with 
the correct secret key, can re-generate the authentication code to verify the integrity of the message 
[Menezes et al. 1996, Mitchell 2003 and Stinson 2002]. The MAC value protects both a message's 
data integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing the recipients to detect any changes to the 
message content. 
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A MAC algorithm is a family of functions f parameterised by a secret key k, with the following 
properties [Menezes et al. 1996]: 
 Ease of computation: For a given a secret value k and an input x, it is easy to compute the 
MAC )(xf k . 
 Compression: The function f maps an input string x of arbitrary finite length to an output 
)(xf k of fixed length l. 
 Forgery-resistance: For a given sequence of text-MAC pairs ))(,( 11 xfx k   for a fixed key k, 
it is computationally infeasible to compute a text-MAC pair ))(,( 222 xfx  for any 21 xx  . 
 
2.10.3.3  Pseudorandom Number Generator 
 
A Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) is an algorithm for generating a sequence of 
unpredictable numbers that approximates the properties of random numbers. PRNGs are used in 
variety of cryptographic and security applications. The basic requirement when PRNG is used in 
cryptographic application is that an adversary who does not know the seed cannot determine the 
pseudorandom string. If the pseudorandom bit stream is used in a stream cipher, then the knowledge 
of the pseudorandom bit stream would enable the adversary to recover the plaintext from the 
ciphertext. The general requirements for secrecy of the output of a PRNG are randomness, 
unpredictability and the characteristics of the seed [Stallings 2011].  
 Randomness: The requirement of a PRNG is that the generated bit streams appear random 
even though is deterministic. If the PRNG shows randomness on the basis of multiple tests it 
will be accepted that it satisfies the requirements of randomness. 
 
 Unpredictability:  Pseudorandom numbers should show two types of unpredictability – 
forward unpredictability and backward unpredictability. In forward unpredictability if the 
seed is unknown the next output bit in the sequence should be unpredictable though the 
previous bits in the sequence are known.  In backward unpredictability it should not be 
feasible to determine the seed from knowledge of any generated values.  
 
 Seed requirements: The PRNG is a deterministic algorithm. This is why in the 
cryptographic applications the seed of the PRNG needs to be secured. Otherwise, if the 
adversary can obtain the seed, the output can be determined. 
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2.11  Conclusions 
 
This chapter gives a review of RFID systems and also discusses the components of RFID systems 
including the readers, tags and a backend database. RFID systems use radio transmission to 
communicate, recognize, categorize, locate and track objects.  The low-cost tags are attached to the 
products and can be scanned when these enter the read range of a reader. This chapter also discusses 
the classification of RFID tags. It outlined RFID standards and the details of different types of EPC 
classes.  
 
This chapter discusses some application and advantages of RFID systems compared to bar code 
systems. RFID gives many advantages over the optical barcode. Barcodes require line-of-sight 
contact with readers. In contrast, RFID tags are readable without line-of-sight contact and without 
precise positioning. RFID readers can scan tags at rates of hundreds per second. A barcode indicates 
the type of object on which it is used. An RFID tag emits a unique serial number that distinguishes 
among many millions of identically manufactured objects.  However in RFID systems there are 
issues regarding privacy and security. The information in these systems is vulnerable to various 
attacks. This chapter also presented these types of attacks and indicated the security requirements of 
RFID systems. 
 
This chapter further discusses general cryptographic techniques that are used in network 
communication and information systems security. Modern cryptographic techniques are divided 
into two main classes, symmetric and asymmetric techniques. Some cryptographic data integrity 
algorithms such as cryptographic hash functions, message authentication codes and digital 
signatures are also discussed for data security.  
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Chapter 3 Existing RFID Privacy and Security 
Protocols 
 
 
3.1  Background of Privacy and Security Protocols 
 
This chapter introduces the existing RFID privacy and security systems and protocols. It also 
identifies the privacy and security problems of the protocols. There are several attacks in RFID 
systems that can break the privacy and security of the users carrying the RFID tag. Günther and 
Spiekermann [2005] conducted research in Germany and found consumers distrust at RFID system 
implemented to shopping item because of concerns about their privacy. However, researchers have 
been working for long time to prevent those attacks in RFID systems and to facilitate the expansion 
of RFID technology. One key research area that focuses on securing RFID systems against major 
attacks is to design secure authentication techniques. These authentication techniques are designed 
to execute while a reader communicates with an RFID tag for identification purpose.  One extension 
of RFID tag authentication is known as tag searching. Tag searching means searching for an RFID 
tag from a large collection of tags. Any RFID authentication protocol which provides security and 
privacy can be used for this purpose. However, as the number of RFID tags increases, the cost of 
collecting data can be high. Consequently, more efficient methods for performing RFID tag search 
are needed. As this is a basic and invaluable tool for sifting through large amounts of data. Though 
RFID tag searching is an important issue for most RFID systems, the assortment of research 
literature on RFID searching is inadequate. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss some 
famous authentication techniques along with the proposed search protocols that are currently 
available. 
 
Many researchers have discussed efficient algorithms and protocols for RFID system 
authentication. Sharma et al. [2003] pointed out about the resource constrained in an RFID tag as a 
major challenge in providing privacy and security. There are various types of RFID authentication 
protocols for the privacy and security of RFID systems. These protocols can be mostly categorized 
in two ways. Firstly is the hash function based security protocol and secondly is the lightweight 
XOR based security protocol. There are also few other types of privacy and security protocol for 
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RFID system but could not attract the attention of the researchers substantially due to the large 
storage and computation requirements. 
 
There are various ways to protect the privacy and security of the RFID tag and systems. The first 
approach towards the privacy and security of the RFID tag is the physical approach (Section 3.2) 
such as   kill the tag at the point of sale or using Faraday cage etc to protect the tag physically [Jules 
et al. 2003].  The second approach in securing RFID systems against major attacks are to use secure 
various authentication protocols (Section 3.3). These authentication techniques are designed to 
execute while a reader communicates with an RFID tag for identification purpose.  
 
3.2  Physical Approach 
 
This is the most straight forward approach for the protection of the privacy and security of the users. 
The physical approaches are Killing and Sleeping (temporary inactive) [Jules 2006], Faraday Cage 
and Blocker Tag approaches. The approaches are outlined as follows: 
 
3.2.1 Killing and Sleeping 
 
EPC tags address consumer privacy with a simple as well as destructive approach called Tag 
“killing.” When an EPC tag receives a special “kill” command from a reader, it permanently 
disables itself. To prevent killing tag by unauthorised users the kill command is protected by a PIN 
code. The PIN is 32 bits long in the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 standard. To kill a tag, a reader must also 
transmit a tag-specific PIN. As killed tags cannot be activated, it is a highly effective privacy 
measure. It is expected that once RFID tags become widespread on the items of retailer shop, the 
devices at point-of-sale would kill the tags on sold items to protect customer privacy. Killing tags 
protects consumer privacy effectively, but it removes all the benefits of the consumer of post-
purchase of RFID. In some cases, such as libraries and rental shops, RFID tags cannot be killed 
because they must survive over the lifetime of the objects they track. So, it is essential to look at 
approaches other than killing for more reasonable solutions to consumer privacy. 
 
A related approach to kill a tag, suggested by EPCglobal [2005], is to make RFID tags easily visible 
and removable to the consumer. For example, Marks and Spencer incorporated RFID into price tags 
rather than directly into the garments [Collins 2004]. However, this method has the similar 
disadvantage as the killing of tags. It eliminates the benefits of consumer and the process of tag 
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removal from the garments invites additional disadvantage of inconvenience. The drawbacks 
include smart appliances and other useful systems will not work with deactivated tags. 
 
Another approach is to put the tag into sleep mode rather than killing at the point of sale, making 
them only temporarily inactive and then waking them when they are ready for home use [Jules 
2006]. This idea is simple, but would be difficult to handle in practice. It is apparent that, sleeping 
tags would offer no true privacy protection if any reader could wake them after the sleep duration. 
Therefore, some form of access control would be required for the waking of tags. This access 
control might be similar to the tag specific PINs those used for the killing of the RFID tag. To wake 
a tag from sleeping, a reader could use this PIN. 
 
3.2.2  Faraday Cage 
 
An RFID tag may be protected from the radio signal using a physical approach called Faraday Cage 
[Jules et al. 2003]. It is a container made up of metal foil that is not penetrable by wireless signals of 
some specified frequencies. A State of California agency currently implemented this approach by 
using mylar bags to protect toll-payment transponders from reading when not in use. They offered a 
way to opt out of state-initiated programs that use such transponders to monitor traffic patterns. 
However, Faraday cages have limitations in utility since all the useful items cannot be kept inside a 
Faraday cage for example a wrist-watch. They not only stop reading of RFID tags on privately 
owned items, but also serve in assisting in-store theft. For this reason, retail shops are not interested 
to support their extensive use. Faraday cages are likely to be of little use if RFID tags are implanted 
in a wide range of personal items, such as cloths [Shim 2003]. Faraday cages can be used at best as 
a very partial solution to consumer privacy. 
 
3.2.3  Blocker Tag 
 
Juels et al. [2003] propose a privacy-protecting scheme called blocking. To protect privacy in a tag 
it uses a privacy bit. The privacy bit is a modifiable bit into tags can be either ‘0’ or ‘1’. A ‘0’ 
privacy bit marks a tag to show unrestricted for public scanning; a ‘1’ bit marks a tag to represent it 
as a private. A blocker tag provides a physical region of privacy protection so that a reader is unable 
of singulating tags in a scenario of a consumer carrying a tag e.g. purchased item etc. A blocker tag 
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is a special RFID tag that prevents unwanted scanning of tags by mapping it into the privacy zone. 
Jules et al. [2003] refer to the part of identifiers with leading ‘1’ bits as a privacy zone. 
 
3.3  Authentication Protocols  
 
Many researchers have proposed authentication protocols for RFID system. This chapter outlines 
the most well known authentication protocols and these are classified according to the encryption 
method used. Many works are done using hash function. The advantages of hash function are it is 
low cost and it has one-way property that makes it secure [Henrici and Muller 2004, Ha et al. 2007]. 
A hash function using random numbers in tag side and database side can make the protocol 
anonymous and intractable. Some protocols also use timestamp instead of a random number. Since 
hash function requires complex calculations many researchers proposed protocols using light-
weight xor encryption. Hash-based protocols are further classified according to the nature of the 
update policy of the identifier and secret after each authentication session. The approaches are hash-
based protocols using varying identifier and hash-based protocol using static identifier. The 
advantages of hash-based protocols using varying identifier are the tracking of the identifier is not 
possible since it changes in each session [Henrici and Muller 2004]. It ensures the privacy and 
security of the RFID system effectively. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires 
updating of the system that may not be suitable in ubiquitous computing environment. In hash-
based protocol using static identifier the identifier is not changed in each authentication process. It 
is suitable for ubiquitous computing. The classifications of the protocols are as follows: 
 
1. Hash-based protocols using Varying Identifiers (Section 3.3.1) 
2. Hash-based Protocols using Static identifiers (Section 3.3.2) 
3. Light-weight encryption protocols (Section 3.3.3) 
 
The most well known security protocols are discussed in this Chapter. Some of the protocols are 
introduced in short to outline the evolution of the research but further details are listed in the 
Appendix A number 1 to 8 for brevity.  
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3.3.1      Hash-based Protocols using Varying Identifiers 
 
To protect the privacy and security of the RFID systems efficiently many researchers use the 
varying identifier approach [Henrici and Muller 2004, Lee et al. 2005]. In his approach the 
identifier and secret value are updated after each successful authentication protocol. The update 
process is done in both the tag side and the database side. This ensures synchronization of the 
information in a distributed environment [Henrici and Muller 2004].  In this approach hash function 
also uses random number to make the response anonymous [Lee et al. 2005]. However, this 
approach is less suitable for the ubiquitous environment since it requires synchronization after each 
session. Some of the most well known protocols with hash-based varying identifiers are discussed 
as follows: 
 
3.3.1.1    Hash-based ID Variation  
 
Henrici and Muller [2004] proposed a hash-based ID variation scheme (HIDV) using one way hash 
function to enhance location privacy by changing the ID after each session. The notations are given 
as follows:  
 
 
 
It implements all the three main tasks: identification, authentication, and identifier modification. 
Each tag stores 4 fields: 
            The tag identifier ID, 
            The database identifier DB-ID, 
            Transaction or session number TID  
            Last successful transaction number LST.  
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The backend database stores two records for each tag. Each record in the database needs to contain 
a table with the following entries: 
 
 Hash of current identifier HID, acting as primary index of the table 
 Current identifier ID   
 Transaction or session number TID 
 Last successful transaction number LST 
 Associated database entry AE 
 A reference to tag data / user data DATA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Hash-based ID variation protocol [Henrici and Muller 2004] 
 
Initially, the fields in the tag and the backend database are in synchronized and TID (Tag 
Identification) is equal to LST. The protocol operates as shown in Figure 3-1. The reader starts the 
authentication process by sending a request to the tag. After receiving the request, the tag increases 
its current session number TID by one and calculates ΔTID =TID- LST. Then the tag replies with 
the hashed identifier HID = h(ID), a hash value h(TID ο ID) for authenticating the tag, and the 
calculated ΔTID to give the backend database a hint for calculating TID. Here ‘ο’ is a conjunction 
operation for example, XOR. Using the received h(ID), the backend database can identify the tag. 
Using ΔTID and the LST from the database record, the current session number TID of the tag 
(TID*) can be recovered. If the TID* is not current or the received hash value h(TID* ο ID) is 
wrong, the message is discarded.  
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If everything is fine the current TID* is stored as TID in the record row. Now a random number 
“RND” is generated and a new ID (ID*) is updated by ID* =RND ο ID and HID is updated by 
(ID*). The TID of the newly selected row is updated to the TID* value, its last successful 
transaction ID (LST) gets the same value. Using the random number a reply message h(RND ο 
TID* ο ID) is created and is sent to the reader which forwards the message to the tag. 
 
The tag receives the reply from the reader and verifies it. If it is not matched the message is 
discarded. Otherwise the tag updates its ID to the value RND ο ID and sets its last successful 
transaction number (LST) to the TID value.  
 
In this scheme a tag always replies with the same hashed ID before the next successful 
authentication and allows a degree of tag tracking [Chien and  Chen 2007].  This protocol does not 
provide backward untraceability because a strong attacker could compute the identifiers used in 
previous sessions by combining the server’s random number and the current identifier [Song 2008]. 
 
3.3.1.2         Hash Chain Approach 
 
Ohkubo et al.[2003] proposed a tag identification scheme by modification after each query using 
hash chains and is referred to OSK (Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita) protocol. The hash chain 
approach does not provide authentication because the protocol does not prevent the replay of 
messages. Each tag has an identifier ID that is never revealed to the reader. The hash value g(ID) is 
used for identification. The identifier update is not triggered by the backend entity. The tag modifies 
the identifier itself without any interaction with the reader and Figure 3-2 shows the complete 
protocol.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Hash Chain Protocol 
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The tag is initialized with the ID and the backend database is initialized with the ID0 of the tag. The 
steps of this protocol are given below: 
 
1. After receiving a query from the reader side, the RFID tag replies with a hash response  
݃(ܫܦ) and identifier ID of the tag by using the function f. This guarantees that the tag will 
provide a new refreshed identifier at the next session.  
2. The back-end database tries to identify the tag using the received݃(ܫܦ). Therefore, the 
back-end database needs to repeatedly use the function f to all ID0 until g(IDn+1) matches the 
g(ID) or a last record is reached. The back-end database does not need to send a reply to the 
tag. 
 
The function f  has a uniformly distributed output and the one-way property of a cryptographic hash 
function. The scheme gives forward secrecy and therefore if an ID is exposed to an adversary at any 
time, they cannot acquire the previous tag ID.  
 
From a security point of view, the approach has some good characteristics. It is also efficient since 
the tags only require a single variable and only need to perform a single hash calculation. The main 
drawback of the hash chain scheme is that the backend database requires many hash operations to 
all the stored tag identifiers to identify a tag. The reason is that if the tag and the database lose 
synchronization because of unsuccessful identification or update process the database does not 
know the expected value.  
 
If the number of iterations in the back-end database is kept limited, an adversary can leave a tag 
unidentifiable by sufficient repeated queries. If no limit is applied, an attacker can run a denial-of-
service attack against the back-end database by introducing an invalid tag ID into the RFID system. 
A solution is to incorporate a limit of iterations that a tag performs before it starts with the initial 
ID0. In this case the identifiers repeat. This could be misused by an adversary for unwanted 
identification and tracking. However, the protocol is not scalable since many hash operations are 
needed to identify a tag. The complexity is expressed as O(n²), whereby n is the number of tags 
known to the back-end database. Although the protocol cannot be used in real life, it is a good 
conceptual base for developing other new protocols.  
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3.3.1.3         Triggered Hash Chains 
 
In Triggered Hash Chains (THC) the Hash-based ID variation and the Hash chain approach are used 
to take the advantages of the both the protocols [Henrici and Muller 2008].  That means the scheme 
has the same desirable properties as hash-based ID variation like the ability for performing 
authentication without the inelegant ΔTID and the resulting issue by using the hash chain concept.  
To achieve this, an update of the inner tag state is done using a hash function similar to the hash 
chain approach. However, an update is not performed on each tag query as in hash chain approach. 
Update is performed only when it is triggered by the backend database. Figure 3-3 shows the 
complete Triggered Hash Chains protocol.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Triggered Hash Chains Protocol 
 
Each tag has an identifier ID that is never revealed to the reader. The current tag identifier is 
calculated by using the hash function by Extid = g(ID). The backend entity knows the inner state of 
the tag and can also calculate g(ID)  and identify the tag successfully. The inner state ID is updated 
by a hash function f. The update is not performed unless the tag receives a message that contains the 
hash value h(ID), whereby h is another hash function. The steps in the protocol are as follows: 
 
1. After receiving a query, the tag sends ݃(ܫܦ) to the back-end database.  
2. The back-end database can recognize the tag and get the current inner state ID of the tag.  
3. The back-end database computes Updauth = h(ID) using the hash function h and sends the 
result to the tag via the reader. 
4. The tag computes h(ID). If the computed result and the received message match, the inner 
state of the tag is updated by computing ID ← f(ID). Otherwise, the received response is 
rejected by the tag. 
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The backend database keeps two records for each tag. If an updates message is lost, the backend 
database can still identify the tag using the old tag identifier.  
 
3.3.1.4         Low-cost Authentication Protocol  
 
Low-cost Authentication Protocol (LCAP) simplifies and enhanced HIDV scheme in both 
efficiency and security [Lee et al. 2005]. The scheme uses one way hash function to protect the 
privacy and security of the tag. Figure 3-4 shows the LCAP protocol. The notations and symbols 
used in LCAP operation are as follows [Lee et al. 2005]: 
 
h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l  is a one-way hash function  
ID:  ID denotes identity of a tag and is a random value in {0, 1}l. 
HaID: HaID value is the hash value of ID used for identifying or addressing the tag.  
TD: TD-entry is used to trace previous data information of a tag when loss of message 
occurs in the current session.  
DATA: DATA stores the information about an accessible tag. 
 
Data fields of a tag and a reader are initialized to the following values: 
Tag: The data field of a tag is initialized to its own ID. 
Reader: A reader picks uniformly a random number r in {0, 1}l.  
The data fields of a back-end database are initialized to HaID, ID, TD and DATA.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-4:  LCAP protocol 
 
56 
 
The back-end database keeps two rows; Prev is for the previous session and Curr is for the current 
session. Each row consists of HaID, ID, TD, and DATA fields. The back-end database stores HaID 
and ID in the previous session in Prev. In Curr rows, it updates the HaID and ID of Prev. TD-field 
of the Curr rows has HaID value of Prev rows and TD-field of Prev rows contains HaID-value of 
Curr rows. 
 
LCAP works as follows: 
 
1. A reader selects a random number r and sends a request and r to the tag. 
2. The tag computes HaID=h(ID) and h(ID||r) using r and its ID  and sends hL(ID||r) and 
HaID to the reader, where hL(ID||r) is the left half of h(ID||r). 
3. The reader sends hL(ID||r), r, and HaID to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database then compares if the value of HaID in Prev is same as the value of 
HaID received from the reader. If successful, the back-end database calculates hR(ID||r) 
using the random number r obtained from the reader and ID in Prev, where hR(ID||r) is the 
right half of h(ID||r). The back-end database computes and stores HaID=h(ID r) and 
ID=IDr in Curr for next session. TD-field of Prev is updated with current HaID=h(ID
r). At last the back-end database sends hR(ID||r) to the reader. 
5. The reader then sends hR(ID||r) to the tag. 
6. The tag checks hR(ID||r). If it matches, the tag updates its ID to ID r. 
 
It also has the similar problem as in HIDV that a tag always replies with the same hashed ID before 
the next successful authentication which allows tag tracking [Morshed et al. 2010]. 
 
3.3.1.5         Song and Mitchell (SM) Mutual Authentication Process 
 
Song and Mitchell [2008] proposed a mutual authentication protocol using varying identifier with 
hash functions. The protocol is designed for the tags that can generate random strings and perform a 
hash function and a keyed hash function (for further details Appendix A). 
 
This protocol is claimed to design to have the most security properties in the literature [song 2008]. 
However, Cai et al. [2009] discovered that the mutual authentication protocol is vulnerable to both 
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tag impersonation attack and reader impersonation attack. This enables an adversary to impersonate 
any legitimate reader or tag.  
 
3.3.1.6        The Duc-Park-Lee-Kim (DPLK) Protocol 
 
Duc et al. [2006] proposed an authentication protocol DPLK for EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 RFID 
tags (for further details Appendix A).  
 
The protocol cannot prevent the system from replay attacks until the next successful authentication 
is done, because Y1 and Y2 can be reused by an adversary to impersonate the tag. Another problem of 
this scheme is that, a DoS attack could permanently desynchronise a server and a tag [Chien and 
Chen 2007]. The scheme also does not provide backward traceability because EPCs are fixed 
[Chien and Chen 2007].  
 
3.3.1.7        The Lim-Kwon (LK) Protocol 
 
Lim and Kim [2006] proposed a challenge-response based protocol employing pseudo-random 
functions (for further details Appendix A).  
 
3.3.1.8       The Chien-Chen (CC) Protocol 
 
Chien and Chen [2007] proposed an RFID mutual authentication protocol based on the EPCglobal 
Class-1 Gen-2 RFID standard. The scheme uses simple cryptographic primitives for example a 
PRNG and a cyclic redundancy code (for further details appendix A).  
 
3.3.1.9        The Tsudik Protocols 
 
Tsudik [2006] described an RFID identification scheme that provides a basic level of tag 
identification using time-stamps. It will be referred to as T1 (for further details Appendix A). This is 
a famous identification protocol that places little burden on the back-end server and uses a 
monotonically increasing time-stamp which makes it secure against tracking but unsecure against 
DoS attack. Tsudik [2007] proposed two further protocols known as the T2 and T3 schemes that 
also provide tag authentication (for further details Appendix A). The schemes use monotonically 
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increasing time-stamps for tracking-resistant tag authentication, and employ a keyed hash function 
f. The DoS vulnerability of the T1 and T2 schemes is overcome in T3 scheme by using a hash-chain 
to generate a so-called epoch token, which allows a tag to ascertain that a time-stamp is not too far 
into the future. Figure 3-5 summarizes the T3 protocol. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5: The Tsudik  T3  protocol 
 
A server makes a hash-chain of length v by starting with an initial value  X and repeatedly hashing it 
v times to generate a root hv(X), where  /maxtv   and   is the epoch duration. Initially each 
tag stores an epoch token zi as a root of the hash-chain, hv(X). 
 
A server generates a random number r1 and sends 0t , r1 and its epoch token iz  to a tag. The tag 
checks the received values of 0t  and iz  by verifying that 00 tt   and max0 tt  and that 
)( ii zhz 

, where      // 00 tt  . If the validations are successful, the tag updates t0 
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and zi to  0t and iz , respectively. The tag then computes )( 01 tfY ik , generates r2, computes 
)||( 212 rrfY ik , and sends Y1, Y2, and r2 as its reply. Otherwise, the tag generates pseudo-
random numbers r2, r3 and r4, and sends them instead. The server identifies the tag by finding Y1 in 
its look-up table for the time-stamp 0t , and authenticates the tag by checking that 
)||( 122 rrfY ik . Figure summarises the T3 protocol. 
 
The server only requires O(1) operations to identify and authenticate a tag, if the tag reply is valid. 
Otherwise, the server requires O(n) time to authenticate a tag. For T3, DoS attacks is still existed as 
a threat, because an adversary can make the tag inactive for the epoch duration  , if it queries the 
tag with the current epoch token and the maximum possible 0t  within the current epoch [Tsudik 
2007]. Additionally, for both T2 and T3, the adversary can distinguish between synchronised and 
desynchronised the tags by timing the server responses, because a synchronised tag only requires a 
server to perform a quick look-up in the table, whereas a desynchronised tag requires performing an 
extensive search. Furthermore, all the Tsudik schemes have backward traceability, because of their 
use of a fixed key ki [Tsudik 2007].  
 
3.3.2     Hash-based Protocols using Static Identifiers 
 
To protect the privacy and security of the RFID systems many researchers use the static identifier 
approach so that it can work better in ubiquitous computing environment [Choi et al. 2005, Ha et al. 
2007]. In his approach the identifier and secret are static and update is not done in the authentication 
process. The hash function uses random numbers in the tag side and the database side to make the 
response anonymous. A few researchers also use monotonically increasing timestamp instead of a 
random number in the reader or database side to make the response unpredictable.  This approach 
eliminates the problem of lack of synchronization since the identifiers are always same.  
 
3.3.2.1        Hash-Based Access Control 
 
Weis at el. [2004] proposed a Hash-based Access Control (HAC) scheme to lock a tag outlined in 
Figure 3-6. They consider the resource limitations of low-cost tags and offer a simple security 
scheme based on one-way hash functions [Menezes et al. 1996].  Each hash-enabled tag in this 
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design will have a part of memory reserved for a temporary metaID.  It will operate in either a 
locked or unlocked state. To lock a tag, the tag owner stores the hash of the key at its metaID given 
as follows: 
                               )(KeyhashmetaID    
 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Hash-Locking: A Reader Unlocks a Hash-locked Tag 
 
The back-end-database stores both the key and metaID. The tag enters its locked state with the 
metaID. In locked state, a tag responds to all queries with only its metaID and offers no other 
functionality. To authenticate a tag the owner needs to unlock the tag first. To accomplish this, the 
owner queries the tag. The tag replies with the metaID to the reader. The reader forwards it to the 
database and the database looks up the appropriate key for the metaID and finally transmits it to the 
tag. The tag hashes the key and compares with its metaID. If the values match, it authenticates the 
reader and unlocks itself to perform required function before it is locked again.   
 
Due to the one-way hash function the adversary cannot retrieve the contents of the tag from the 
hash value. Also spoofing attack may be detected but cannot be protected. An adversary may query 
a tag to get the metaID. Later the adversary may spoof the tag to a legitimate reader by a replay 
attack.  The reader will send the key to the spoofed tag. However, to detect spoofing, the reader may 
check the information of the tag with the back-end database with the proper metaID.  If any 
inconsistency is detected, the reader may be alarmed that, a spoofing attack may have occurred. As 
it always uses the same metaID, it can be easily tracked by an adversary. Another problem in this 
approach is that the key is sent in plain text over the forward channel which can be easily 
eavesdropped.  
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3.3.2.2     Randomized Access Control 
 
Weis et al. [2004] also suggested an extended approach called Randomized Access Control (RAC), 
which uses a random number to prevent location privacy. In each session the tag generate a random 
number to produce a response as a hash function with this number concatenated with ID. Then it 
sends the response and the random number to the reader. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-7: Randomized Hashed Locking 
 
A legitimate reader takes all the IDs from the database and computes the hash function with the 
random number with each ID and compares this value with the tag response to find a match. If it 
finds a match for any ID then it sends the ID to the tag for authentication (Figure 3-7). 
 
It needs a large number of hash calculations for each tag search. It is impractical for retailers where 
there are a large number of tags being used and may be feasible for retailers with a relatively small 
number of tags [Weis et al. 2004]. However, it cannot protect the system from tag impersonation 
attack and cannot guarantee location privacy since a reader always responses with static tag ID in 
plain text obtained from its back-end database [Song 2008 and Lee et al. 2005].   
 
3.3.2.3   One-way Hash-based low-cost Authentication Protocol (OHLCAP) 
 
In the schemes where ID is changed in each authentication the protocols do not work well in 
ubiquitous environment. In ubiquitous computing environment, components of the RFID systems 
can exist anywhere. If the components of a tag are changed it may not be synchronized with every 
system [Choi et al. 2005]. The authors proposed a One-way Hash-based low-cost Authentication 
Protocol (OHLCAP). OHLCAP uses static ID and secrets and works in ubiquitous environment. It 
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also uses a one-way hash function for privacy and security of the tag. Notations used in the 
OHLCAP protocol are as follows: 
h        A one-way hash function, lh }1,0{}1,0{: *   
l         The length of an identifier 
r         Random number in l}1,0{  
ID      Tag identifier 
GI      Group index 
GIi      ith group index 
K       Secret in all tags. 
S        Tag secret 
BL      Left half of the message B 
BR      Right half of the message B 
c        Counter  
       XOR operator 
      Concatenation operator 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8:   The OHLCAP Protocol 
 
The OHLCAP protocol is shown in Figure 3-8 and the steps in the protocol are as follows [Choi et 
al. 2005]: 
 
Step 1   A reader selects a random value r and sends a request with r to a tag. 
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Step 2   The tag verifies a random value r if it is all zero or not. 
             1. If the value of r is all zero, the tag sends stop message to the reader to terminate the      
                 process. 
             2. Else the tag performs as follows: 
                    - Calculates A1= K   c, A2 = ID + (GIi r c) mod (2l-1), 
           B=h(ID||(S GIi)||(r c))  and sends A1, A2 and BR to the reader, where BR is a right   
            half of B,  
                    - Then, the tag increases the counter c until it exceeds 2l-1 and is initialized. 
Step 3   After receiving from the tag, 
             1. The reader forwards A1, A2, BR and r to the back-end database. 
             2. The database computes c/= A1 K and )12mod()(2/  ljj crGIAID   
                for all  groups  GIj , },.......,1{ nj  
3.The database checks if any / }).....1{( njID    matches to one of the stored IDs in the database  
for same GIj.    
                  - If this is successful, the database computes h(ID||(S GIi)||(r c))   
                  - Else, the database terminates this process. 
             4. Then, the database authenticates the tag by matching the received value BR. 
             5. The database sends BL to the reader, where BL is a left half of B. The reader 
                  forwards  BL to the tag. 
Step 4   The tag authenticates the reader by comparing the received value BL. 
 
OHLCAP is an efficient approach in ubiquitous environment that uses one-way hash function for 
privacy and security. However, Ha et al. [2007] find its security weakness and proposes an 
enhanced OHLCAP (EOHLCAP) scheme. The authors showed that this protocol is vulnerable to 
traceability attack and impersonation attack because of its special property, namely, cc=cp+1 for two 
successive sessions. The adversary eavesdrops the messages transmitted between the tag and the 
reader and obtains the successive A1p and A1c where A1p= Kcp, A1c = Kcc. Then, it computes A= 
A1pA1c= cpcc= cp (cp+1) and removes the secret key K in this equation. In this way, the 
adversary can trace the tag’s holder. Similarly, the adversary can implement impersonation attack 
by selecting special random number rc = rp+1. If rccc= rpcp then the value of Bp is equal to Bc 
since B=h(ID||(SGIi)||(rc)). To overcome the security weakness, Ha et al. [2007] adds a pseudo 
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random number generator (PRNG) to generate a random number and removes the counter in the tag 
to prevent traceability attack. 
 
3.3.2.4         EOHLCAP Approach 
 
In the EOHLCAP approach to prevent traceability a random number is used in a tag in place of a 
counter information. However, this protocol requires a random number generator in a tag. Due to 
this random number in place of a counter value, the tracing attack and impersonation attack by 
maliciously updating the random number becomes impossible. In contrast to OHLCAP, the 
proposed protocol removes the data fields, the secret key Sij and counter c due to their uselessness. 
The system setup is as follows [Ha et al. 2007]: 
 
System Set-up 
 
Tag: A tag is initialized by a data field, including ID, GI, K. 
Back-end database: Divides all the tags into n groups. The data fields are GIi, K, IDij. 
 
 
                                              Figure 3-9:   The EOHLCAP Protocol 
 
The protocol is shown in Figure 3-9 and the steps are given as follows: 
 
Step 1.  The reader sends a request and r1 to a tag. 
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Step 2.  The tag generates a random number r2 and computes A1= K   r2 , A2 = GI+(r1 r2), and 
B=h(ID||GI||r1||r2).   
              It then sends A1, A2, and BR to the reader. 
Step 3.  The reader then sends A1, A2, and BR with r1 to the back-end database. 
Step 4.  The back-end database computes r2 = K   A1 and GI= A2 - (r1 r2), then finds the ID in 
the GI by checking the BR. The back-end database authenticates the tag by checking that the 
computed BR equals the received one, and then sends the BL to the reader. 
Step 5.  The reader sends the BL to the tag. 
Step 6.  The tag also authenticates the reader by checking if the received BL equals the computed 
one as in Step 2. 
 
The EOHLCAP overcomes the problems in OHLCAP and protects the RFID system from most of 
the attacks but it requires many complex hash operations in the database side. 
 
3.3.2.5       Molnar and Wagnar (MW) Protocol 
 
Molnar and Wagner [2004] proposed a mutual authentication scheme to provide privacy and 
security for library RFID systems. The scheme uses a shared secret and pseudo-random number 
function to protect the messages communicated between the tag and the reader. 
 
In the basic authentication protocol, a reader R and a tag T share a shared secret s, that is used as a 
key for a pseudo-random number function f. The reader queries a tag by sending it a random 
number r1. The tag generates a random number r2, computes )||||0( 211 rrfIDY si    , and sends 
them both to the reader. The reader sends it to the server. The server finds the value IDi for the tag 
using the received values of r2 and Y1, and sends )||||1( 212 rrfIDY si  back to the reader and the 
reader sends it to the tag to complete server authentication.  Figure 3-10 shows the steps of the 
protocol. 
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Figure 3-10: MW Protocol 
 
This scheme uses a tree-based technique to search a tag in the database. This reduces the 
complexity of tag identification from O(n) to O(logn). The n tags are regarded as leaves in a 
balanced binary tree, and each edge is linked with a secret in the tree structure. A server knows all 
the secret values, and each tag stores the logn secrets corresponding to the path from the root to the 
tag.  
 
However, this protocol could hamper privacy if an adversary tampers with a tag, because in this 
case the adversary is able to trace other tags in a probabilistic way [Avoine et al. 2005b]. Also, this 
protocol uses a static secret s for each tag T, and therefore it cannot resist backward traceability; 
once a tag is compromised, the adversary can trace the past communications of the tag.  
 
3.3.2.6       The Molnar-Soppera-Wagner (MSW) Protocol 
 
Molnar et al. [2005] proposed an RFID pseudonym protocol that employs pseudo-random number 
functions. The authors claim that, the scheme provides two new features not seen in prior RFID 
protocols, namely time-limited delegation and ownership transfer (for further details Appendix A).  
 
3.3.2.7         Challenge-Response Based RFID Authentication Protocol 
 
Rhee et al. [2005] proposed challenge response based RFID authentication protocol (CRAP) which 
is designed to use in pervasive computing. 
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Figure 3-11: CRAP Protocol  
 
The protocol is shown in Figure 3-11 and the steps are given as follows: 
Step 1.  The reader sends a Query and r1 to a tag. 
Step 2.  The tag generates a random number r2 and computes h(ID||r1||r2).   
              It then sends  h(ID||r1||r2) and r2 to the reader. 
Step 3.  The reader forwards h(ID||r1||r2) and r2 with r1 to the back-end database. 
Step 4.  The back-end database computes h(ID||r1||r2) for all IDs and compares with the received 
h(ID||r1||r2) from the reader. If the authentication is successful then the back-end database sends 
h(ID||r2) to the reader. 
Step 5.  The reader forwards the h(ID||r2)  to the tag. 
Step 6.  The tag computes h(ID||r2) and compares with the received  h(ID||r2) for successful 
authentication.   
 
The proposed protocol is secure against the replay attack, spoofing attack and so on. However, this 
scheme requires )1
2
( N hash functions computations which is impractical for large number of tags in 
ubiquitous computing (Choi et al. 2005). 
 
3.3.3 Light-weight  Encryption Protocols 
 
Recently a number of lightweight encryption authentication protocols are proposed for the privacy 
and security protections of RFID systems. For this purpose simple light weight encryption for 
example bitwise XOR is used [Jules and Weis 2005, Goldreich and Levin 1989].   These are 
suitable for low-cost RFID tags than hash-based protocols since hash functions are computationally 
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more expensive than bitwise logical operations. The details of this technology are discussed in the 
next Section 3.3.3.1.   
 
3.3.3.1       The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) Problem and HB Protocol 
 
The LPN problem works with binary inner product of two numbers. It is assumed that each number 
is k-bit long and two k-bit numbers 2110 )....((  kaaaa  and 2110 )......(  kxxxx .  The inner product of 
a and x is denoted by a.x and it can be evaluated as )(......)()(. 111100   kk xaxaxaxa . 
It is easy to implement in low cost hardware such as an RFID tag and is also possible to compute 
one bit at a time [Jules and Weis 2005]. This means it is not necessary to store all k bits of a and x 
when computing. Goldreich and Levin [1989] proved that a.x is unpredictable if only a or x is 
given.    
 
The HB protocol proposed by Hopper and Blum is a cryptographic protocol based on binary inner 
product. It was a human authentication protocol because human can evaluate one binary inner 
product operation, and generate a random bit. This HB protocol is claimed to be secure under the 
assumption that Learning Parity with Noise problem is intractable.  
 
In HB protocol both human and machine shares a common secret x of k-bit long. In this case the 
human plays the role of a tag and the reader plays the role of a machine.   
 
      Reader(x)                                                   Tag(x) 
 
 kRa 1,0                         ]1[Pr|1,0 vobv    
      
                                 a      
 
                                                  vxaz  ).(  
                                 z  
  
 
Verify xaz .  
 
Figure 3-12: One Round of HB Protocol. 
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The HB protocol is depicted in Figure 3-12 and the steps in this protocol for one round are given as 
follows: 
 
1. The reader generate a random number a and sends it to the tag. 
2. The tag receives the random number and computes xaz . and introduces a noise factor v with 
it. Here v =1 with probability )5.0,0( . 
3. The tag then sends vxaz  ).(  to the reader. 
4. The reader then verifies xaz .  if tag produces fewer errors than r  in r round. 
 
The purpose of v is to protect x from the passive eavesdropper after observing k pairs (a, z). The 
noise bit is generated in each round with a value 1 with probability .  
 
The HB protocol is secure only from passive attackers. It is not secure against active attacks where 
a reader can be malicious. Jules and Weis [2005] proposed an extended version of the HB protocol 
to protect against active attack and this new protocol is referred to as HB+. 
 
3.3.3.2      The HB+ Protocol 
 
The HB+ protocol is an improved version of HB protocol and gives better privacy and security 
protection. In the HB+ protocol the reader and the tag both share two secrets (x, y) of k-bit long. In 
the HB+ protocol the tag also generates a random number b as a blinding factor. The purpose of the 
blinding factor b is to protect the tag from the malicious reader from extracting secret by repeatedly 
querying the tag with the same random number a.  The HB+ protocol is depicted in Figure 3-13 and 
the steps in this protocol are as follows:  
 
1. The tag generates a random number b as a blinding factor and sends it to the reader. 
2. The reader generates a random number a and sends it to the tag. 
3. The tag receives the random number a and computes vybxaz  ).().( . Here v is a noise 
factor of value 1 with probability )5.0,0( . 
4. The tag then sends vybxaz  ).().(  to the reader. 
5. The reader verifies ).().( ybxaz   if the tag produces fewer errors than r  in r round. 
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                           Reader (x, y)                                          Tag (x, y) 
                                                                                     
                                                  ]1[Pr|1,0 vobv  
                                                             kRb 1,0                                               
                                    b  
 
                              
k
Ra 1,0  
                                    a      
  
                                                        vybxaz  ).().(  
                                 z  
  
                             Verify ).().( ybxaz   
                                       
Figure 3-13: One Round of HB+ Protocol. 
 
In the HB+ protocol the purpose of v is same as in the HB protocol. It is to protect x from passive 
eavesdropper after observing k pairs (a, z). The noise bit is generated in each round with a value 1 
with probability  as in HB protocol. 
 
Though it is claimed that the HB+ protocol is free from an active attack however, Gilbert et al. 
[2005] has described an attack on HB+  protocol. The authors proved that it is not secure against the 
man-in-the-middle attack. The adversary chooses a k-bit vector  and introduces it by doing XOR 
with a in each round and sends the result a  to the tag in place of a  shown in Figure 3-14. The 
tag will compute vybxaz  ).().(  and send it to the reader. It is obvious that if 
authentication process is successful then 0. x otherwise 1. x  with a high probability. So, one 
can recover one bit of x by using same  in all r round. To retrieve the k-bit secret x it is sufficient 
to repeat the whole protocol k times by changing the value of  linearly independently. 
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  Reader(x, y)                                      Tag(x, y)                                                                                    
                                        ]1[Pr|1,0 vobv  
                                                         kRb 1,0                                               
                                    b  
 kRa 1,0  
                               aa      
                                                        vybxaz  ).().(  
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Figure 3-14   Attack in one Round of HB+ Protocol. 
 
3.3.3.3     HB-MP Protocol 
 
Munilla and Peinado [2007] proposed a new protocol named HB-MP, derived from HB+ to 
improve efficiency and resist active attacks to the HB-family. The authors proposed the protocol in 
two phases. First one is called HB-MP/ which exchanges only two messages. The second protocol 
HB-MP is defined applying a modification to the previous HB-MP/ protocol. It can resistant the 
simple man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
                           Reader (x)                                               Tag (x)        
      
                                    a      
  
                                                       vxaz  ).(  
                                 b                    Choose b/ b.x = z     
  
                            Check yaxb ..   
 
 
Figure 3-15:  One Round of HB-MP/ Protocol. 
 
The HB-MP/ protocol is composed of r rounds, one of which is depicted in Figure 3-15. The 
protocol can be described as follows: 
 
        1. The reader generates a k-bit random binary vector a, and sends it to the tag. 
        2. The tag then computes the z as follows: 
                vxaz  ).(  
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             It searches for a k-bit binary vector b such that 
               zxa .  
       3. The tag then sends b to the reader. 
       4. The reader verifies  yaxb ..   
         
It is easy to prove that the problem of finding x with the known vectors a and b is at least as difficult 
as solving the LPN problem. For example if the adversary picks a = 000..... 000 for all the rounds he 
would obtain the following system of linear equations: 
                             0.0 0xbi q 
where ib  is the vector b in the ith round. The system incorporated noise in the bitstring ib .  From 
the adversary point of view, the system is a linear equation where the ib are right and some of the 
0’s in the part to the left of equation are wrong; that means this is the LPN problem. However, a 
checking to avoid that the challenge could be 0 would make solving this problem even more 
difficult. 
 
The  step-2 seems to be very complex in the protocol. This step can be carried out very easily for 
4
1
  without resorting to any noise generator. The following algorithm efficiently performs this 
step in the HB-MP/. 
 
 
HB-MP/ protocol is secured against passive attack but vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack 
proposed by Gilbert et al. [2005]. To protect from the attack the HB-MP/ protocol is modified. It is 
called HB-MP. The HB-MP protocol uses two shared secrets as in HB+ protocol. The lengths of the 
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secret keys do not coincide with length of the exchanged messages for example keys of 64 bits for 
the messages of 60 bits.  
 
Notation 
k: length of the secret keys. 
m: length of the messages exchanged between the parties. 
x,y: secret keys shared by the reader and the tag. 
xm: m less significant bits of x. 
a,b: random m-bit binary vectors. 
v: noise bit; v = 1 with probability ]2
1,0[  
 : XOR operation. 
Rotate (p,w): Bitwise left rotate operator. The operand p is rotated w positions. 
 
Reader (x, y)                                      Tag (x, y)                                                     
      
                                    a      
  
                                                     x=  Rotate(x,yi) 
                                                    vxmaz  ).(  
                                 b                 Choose b/ b.xm = z     
  
                              x=  Rotate(x,yi) 
                              Check xmbxma ..   
 
 
Figure 3-16: One Round of HB-MP Protocol. 
 
This protocol is also composed of r rounds and is depicted in Figure 3-16.  The protocol can be 
described as follows: 
 
1. The reader generates a m-bit random binary vector a, and sends it to the tag. 
2. The tag then computes x= Rotate(x,yi), where yi is the ith bit of y. 
3. The tag also computes z: 
                vxaz  .  
               and looks for a k-bit binary vector b such that zxmb . , using the previous algorithm 
 4. The tag then sends b to the reader. 
5. The reader computes the secret key as x= Rotate(x, yi) where yi is the ith bit of the key y. 
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6. The reader verifies        xmbxma ..   
 
3.3.3.4       HB-MP+ Protocol 
 
Leng et al. [2008] propose an improved version of the HB-MP authentication protocol, referred to 
as the HB-MP+ scheme. The HB-MP+ protocol overcomes the man-in-the-middle attack to which 
the basic HB-MP protocol is vulnerable. Protection against the man-in-the-middle attack as 
proposed by Gilbert et al. [2005] has been considered in the HB-MP protocol.  The rotation of xm is 
used to protect from the attack.  However, this rotation has its own weakness. In the HB-MP 
protocol, for every new session, xm needs to be identical in the ith round. It is not mentioned clearly 
about when to start and end an authentication session. It is assumed that when the tag enters the 
range and starts to communicate with the reader, an authentication session begins and when the q-
round is finished or the tag leaves from the range of the reader, the session ends. Since x = Rotate(x, 
yi), the value of xm in the first round of all the authentication sessions have to be the same. The 
adversary can commence recurring authentication sessions, initially confined to the first round. 
Then the techniques of the Section 3.3.3.3 can be used to reveal the xm of first round of the tag. If 
the adversary monitors the ith round, he is able to expose the xm value used in ith round. 
 
The scheme ought to use the same value xm between the authentication sessions to evade the 
synchronisation problem. The value of x is fixed. If the value of x is changed after each session on 
both the tag and the reader side, a new reader will not be capable of verifying the tag with updated 
value and cannot authenticate the new tag. It is possible only if all the tags and the readers are 
updated simultaneously after each authentication session, which is very expensive and difficult to 
implement.  Even if the synchronization problem is removed and the value of x is altered in each 
successful authentication session there is still a way to carry out the special man-in-the-middle 
attack. As the size of secrets x and y is k if in any authentication session, the scheme runs k rounds, 
the value of x will be rotated by p bits, where p is the number of ‘1s’ in y, so if the adversary runs 
the scheme for k number of times, that is k2 rounds, the x is to be rotated p ・ k times and finally it 
comes to its initial value. As a result a repeat of the value xm takes place again. As the proposed 
value of x is 512 bits, 262144 rounds will generate a repeated xm which is an inexpensive attack. 
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To overcome the weakness coming from the predictable repetition of xm, Leng et al.[2008] use 
some additional random bits generated by the reader to randomize the rotation. The objective of 
HB-MP+  scheme is to use a random secret value in each round.  
 
Reader (x)                                      Tag (x)        
      
                                    a      
  
),( xafxs                                        ),( xafxs   
Check if xbxa ..                              vxaz s  .  
                                 b                      Choose zxbb s ./  
  
Figure 3-17:  A Single Round of HB-MP+ Protocol 
 
The HB-MP+ protocol is shown in Figure 3-17 and the steps are given as follows: 
 
1. The reader picks at random a m-bit binary vector a  and sends it to the tag. 
2. The reader and tag computes the round key ),( xafxs  .  f(.) is a one-way function. 
3. The tag computes z as follows vxaz s  . and looks for a m-bit binary vector b  such 
that zxb s .   
4. The tag sends b to the reader 
5. The reader computes the xs = f(α, x), using the secret x and random number a 
6. The reader checks if ss xbxa ..   
 
The round key sx  is obtained by a random number a  and the shared secret x. There is no need for 
another secret y because the value of x is not altered. There is no problem of synchronization 
between tag and reader. Since the rotation is a linear operation, the output of f(.) should be less 
predictable. Using the simple bit operations, it is very easy to apply a low-cost non-linear function 
f(.). Since f(.) does not inevitably use rotation operation, the bits in x are not need to be mentioned. 
 
3.3.3.5       HB-MP++ Protocol 
 
The nonlinear one-way function used in HB-MP+ is abstract. So it is not possible to prove the 
validity of the protocol for RFID systems. Also, as the tag’s response has the same number of bits, 
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the protocol is still vulnerable to traceability [Weste and Harris 2005, Garg 2000]. Yoon et al. 
[2009] proposed the HB-MP++ protocol that uses the LSFR that has two  consecutive two-stage 
memory or storage stage and feedback logic (See appendix A).  
 
3.4   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed a number of recently proposed RFID authentication protocols. This 
chapter also classified the authentication protocols according to their implementation. Advantages 
and disadvantages of the protocols are also outlined for each protocol.  The protocols are classified 
based on hash-based varying identifier, static identifier and light-weight encryption based protocols 
for RFID systems.  The protocols with hash-based varying identifiers ensure privacy and security of 
the information by updating it after every authentication session so that the response is 
unpredictable. In this case the adversary cannot use any response in future to authenticate the 
system since the identifier and the secret value are no longer similar. However it requires 
synchronization in the tag side and the database side which involves computational and storage 
overheads. This approach is not suitable in the ubiquitous computing environment since the 
synchronization of the updated values is difficult to ensure in the distributed environment.  The 
protocols with static identifiers are suitable for ubiquitous computing environment but it requires 
more storage. Finally this chapter discusses a number of well known light-weight encryption 
authentication protocols and their advantages and disadvantages. The light-weight encryption 
protocols require less complex operations than hash-based protocols since hash functions are 
complex and computation intensive. 
 
The privacy, security and efficiency problems in different existing protocols are also identified in 
this chapter. It is a challenge to ensure all the identified privacy and security threats effectively and 
efficiently. In the following chapters a number of novel authentication protocols are proposed to 
protect the privacy and security of the RFID systems to overcome the problems of existing 
protocols.  The proposed protocols attempt to protect from the following privacy and security 
threats: information leakage, location privacy, impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, 
replay attack, DoS attack, forward privacy and backward privacy. The concepts of the existing 
protocols are used as the foundation for the proposed protocols. The protocols combined the 
advantages of various existing protocols to overcome the privacy and security problems in RFID 
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systems. It also effectively uses the hash function, hash address, random numbers and timestamp in 
the proposed protocols.   
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Chapter 4   Proposed Hash-based Ubiquitous 
Protocols  
 
 
4.1     Secure Ubiquitous Authentication Protocols 
 
In this chapter, the possible privacy and security threats to the Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) systems are investigated and four novel group-based authentication protocols are proposed 
which provide the identified privacy and security in an efficient manner for a ubiquitous computing 
environment. The approach utilizes the concepts of two very different, widely known RFID 
protocols, i.e. the Low-Cost Authentication Protocol (LCAP) approach and the One-way Hash 
based Low-Cost Authentication Protocol (OHLCAP) approach. The resulting protocols combine the 
advantages of both protocols and eliminate the existing privacy and security problems from these. 
The approaches are evaluated using a variety of criteria that are relevant in practice. The proposed 
protocols use random numbers and a hash function to encrypt the key to protect the RFID system 
from the adversary attacks. The protocols also use the hash value as a hash address to reduce the 
search time to locate the tag in the database from a large number of records. The analysis shows that 
it requires low tag-side storage and computation. A simulation experiment is also conducted to 
verify some of the privacy and security properties of the proposed protocol. 
 
4.1.1   Related Workd 
 
The proposed protocols combine the concepts of two different prominent protocols LCAP [Lee et 
al. 2005] and OHLCAP [Choi et al. 2005] and join the advantages to solve the existing privacy and 
security problems.    
 
The detail of the LCAP protocol is given in Section 3.3.1.4. The LCAP scheme uses one way hash 
function to protect the privacy and security of the tag.  The hash function h(ID) is also used to 
denote the address or index of the tag in the database.  To authenticate each other it generates 
h(ID||r) and uses two halves hL(ID||r) and hR(ID||r) to authenticate in  two ends. In LCAP scheme 
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ID is changed in each authentication. So it does not work in ubiquitous environment. As mentioned 
earlier (Section 3.3.1.4), it does not overcome the traceability problem. 
 
The OHLCAP uses a static identifier and secrets and is suitable for ubiquitous environment. The 
detail of the OHLCAP protocol is given in section 3.3.2.3. It also uses a one-way hash function for 
privacy and security of the tag.  OHLCAP requires an ID and a hash function h as in LCAP. Some 
additional fields are also required. GI is used as a group index. K is a common secret used in all 
tags, S is a tag secret. BL and BR are the left and right half of B respectively. c is used as a counter 
and initialized to an arbitrary value. It is increased every time a reader sends a query to the tag. The 
notation  is used for xor operation and || is used for concatenation operation. 
 
OHLCAP is an efficient approach in ubiquitous environment that uses one-way hash function for 
privacy and security. However, Ha et al.[2007] found its security weakness and proposes an 
enhanced OHLCAP (EOHLCAP) scheme. The authors showed that this protocol is vulnerable to 
traceability attack and impersonation attack because of its special property, namely, cc=cp+1 for two 
successive sessions. The detail of the attack is given in section 3.3.2.3. To overcome the security 
weakness, Ha et al.[2007] adds a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) to generate a random 
number and removes the counter in the tag to prevent traceability attack. 
 
4.1.2   The Proposed Secure Ubiquitous Authentication Protocols  
 
OHLCAP is not protected against traceability and impersonation attacks. It requires considerable 
storage on the tag side and database side. EOHLCAP eliminates the privacy problem in OHLCAP 
with reduced amount of storages in the tag side and the database side but it takes many hash 
operations to locate the tag in the database [Ha et al. 2007]. LCAP requires less storage in the tag 
and reduces search time in the database but it is not suitable for ubiquitous computing environment 
as the ID is updated after each authentication process. To overcome these problems, three Secure 
Ubiquitous Authentication Protocols SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 for RFID systems are proposed 
in this section. The SUAP1 is a simple RFID authentication protocol that will work in a system 
where the numbers of tags are small (several thousands). Some aspects of the work of the SUAP1 
was published in [Morshed et al. 2010]. In this section the SUAP1 protocol has been improved with 
additional privacy and security enhancement. This also added privacy and security comparison, 
simulation results with an extensive analysis and evaluations. The SUAP2 and SUAP3 are the 
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extension of SUAP1 and work in a large group-based system where RFID tags are divided into 
several groups.  These protocols are low-cost and secure based on challenge-response method using 
a one-way hash function, hash-address as a search index. The proposed protocols combine the 
features of the hash address and hash function of the LCAP protocol and the ubiquitous property of 
OHLCAP protocol and overcome the existing privacy and security problems in these two schemes. 
The advantage of hash address is to reduce the search time in the database. The notations used in 
the SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 protocols are as follows: 
 
Notations 
h        A one-way hash function, lh }1,0{}1,0{: *   
ID      Tag identifier  
GID    Group identifier 
Had    Hash address h(ID) 
N        Number of tags 
n        Number of groups 
mi       Number of tags in the ith  group 
l         The length of an identifier. The value of l is assumed 96 bits. 
r1        Random number in l}1,0{  
r2        Random number in l}1,0{  
       XOR operator 
||        Concatenation operator 
      Assignment operator 
 +       Modular addition by mod (2l − 1) 
 
4.1.2.1      SUAP1 
 
The SUAP1 protocol uses a static identifier and a secret number, hash function and two random 
numbers. This protocol also uses the hash function value as an address to search the tags in the 
database. The objective of the SUAP1 protocol is to preserve the ubiquitous property of the protocol 
and is suitable for a small number of tags. In this case a common secret is stored in all the tags. Two 
random numbers make the hash response unpredictable so that it is impossible to perform 
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impersonation and tracing attack by a malicious reader.  The system set-up of the SUAP1 protocol 
is as follows: 
 
System Set-up 
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag Identifier 
x:   Common secret number 
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields. 
Back-end Database: Back-end database contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag identifier 
x:    Common secret number 
Had: Hash address h(ID) 
 
When a tag enters into the range of a reader, the reader can initiate the authentication protocol. The 
steps in the authentication protocol are as follows. 
1. The reader generates a random number r1 and sends it to the tag.   
2. Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another random number r2.  
protocolstopisrorrif 021  
otherwise performs the following computations 
   )()( 21 rrIDhy   
    xrt  2  
  )||||( 21 rrIDhComputes  
   The tag then sends the value of y, t, hL to the reader. 
    Where  Lh  is the left half of )||||( 21 rrIDh  
3. The reader then sends the value of y, t, hL and r1 to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database will calculate the following 
xtr 2  
)()( 21 rryIDh   
)(IDh is the address of the record containing the ID where )(IDhHad   
 Access the address Had  
 Retrieves the ID from the record 
 Then the back-end database )||||( 21 rrIDhComputes  
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 If hL matches the tag is authenticated 
 Sends Rh to the reader  
     Where Rh  is the right half of )||||( 21 rrIDh  
5. The reader forwards the Rh to the tag 
6. If the received Rh matches the reader is authenticated. 
 
The protocol is shown in the Figure 4-1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1:  The Proposed SUAP1 Protocol 
 
The protocol is simple and works for an organization having small number of tags (several 
thousands). Two random numbers make the response anonymous. The problem in this simple 
protocol is that it maintains a common secret for all the tags in the database. It can be a problem to 
manage this secret in a large organization having different departments.  Having only a single secret 
for all the tags it cannot ensure privacy and security for a large organization having millions of tags 
in many departments. 
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4.1.2.2  SUAP2  
 
To overcome the problem in SUAP1 of having only one secret for all the tags the SUAP2 maintains 
groups for the different departments and different types of products. In addition to the ID and 
secrets in the SUAP1, one extra variable GID is needed in the tag side and the database side. It 
represents a group identifier. This is also a secret number. The database divides the tags into n 
groups and the protocol is shown in the Figure 4-2. The only difference between the SUAP1 and 
SUAP2 is that SUAP2 maintains the groups of the tags and there is a common secret for each group 
like OHLCAP and EOHLCAP. In this case one secret value x is used for all the tags in a group. It 
will reduce the tag search time in the database. This is suitable for the case where the tags of the 
same group are not distributed in various places. It ensures better security but requires less 
computation and search times in the database. The system set-up of the SUAP2 protocol is as 
follows: 
 
System Set-up 
 
The system setup for the tag, reader and database for the SUAP2 protocol are as follows: 
   
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag Identifier 
x:   Secret number 
GID: Group identifier 
 
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields. 
 
Back-end Database: Back-end database contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag identifier 
x:    Secret number 
Had: Hash address h(ID) 
GID: Group identifier 
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Figure 4-2: The Proposed SUAP2 Protocol 
 
The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows. 
 
1. The reader generates a random number r1 and sends it to the tag.   
2. Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another random number r2.  
protocolstopisrorrif 021  
otherwise performs the following computations 
   )()( 21 GIDrrIDhy   
    xrt  2  
   Computes )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDh  
   The tag then sends the value of y, t, hL to the reader. 
    Where Lh  is the left half of )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDh  
3. The reader then sends the value of y, t, hL and r1 to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database calculates the following  for all GIDs 
       xtr 2  
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      )()( 21 GIDrryIDh   
)(IDh  is the address of the record containing the ID where )(IDhHad   
Lookup the address Had  
Retrieves the ID from the record 
Then the back-end database )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDhComputes  
If hL matches the tag is authenticated 
     Sends Rh to the reader  
     Where Rh  is the right half of )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDh  
5. The reader forwards the Rh to the tag 
6. If the received Rh matches the reader is authenticated. 
 
The SUAP2 protects the RFID systems from all the identified privacy and security problems in 
large organization but requires more storages than SUAP1.  
 
4.1.2.3    SUAP3  
 
The SUAP3 enhances the SUAP2 in efficiency by removing the secret x from the tag and the 
database.  It also requires the group variable GID in the tag and the database as in SUAP2. It 
represents a group identifier and also a secret number. The database divides the tags into n groups.  
The protocol is shown in the Figure 4-3. The only difference between the SUAP2 and SUAP3 is 
that SUAP3 does not use the secret x for the tag and the database. The group based structure is used 
for the searching tags in the database. The privacy will not be hampered due to the elimination of 
the secret x because the GID works as an l bits secret which is also difficult to guess by the 
adversary. It reduces the number of searches significantly. Since the hash function is one-way it still 
gives the same security protection to the ID. The system set-up of the SUAP3 protocol is as follows: 
 
System Set-up 
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag Identifier 
GID: Group identifier 
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields. 
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Back-end Database: Back-end database contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag identifier 
Had: Hash address h(ID) 
GID: Group identifier 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: The Proposed SUAP3 Protocol 
 
The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows. 
 
1. The reader generates a random number r1 and sends it to the tag.   
2. Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another random number r2.  
protocolstopisrorrif 021  
otherwise performs the following computations 
                       2rGIDt   
                    ))(()( 21 rrGIDIDhy      )||||||( 21 rrGIDIDhComputes  
   The tag then sends the value of y, t and hL to the reader. 
    Where  hL is the left half of )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDh  
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3. The reader then sends the value of y, r1, hL and t to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database calculates the following  for all GIDs        
              tGIDr 2  
                ))(( 21 rrGIDyHadi            
               )(IDh is the address of the record containing the ID where )(IDhHadi   
Lookup the address iHad  in the database 
If HadHadi  for any ID retrieves the ID from the record 
Then the back-end database )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDhComputes  
If hL matches the tag is authenticated 
     Sends Rh to the reader  
     Where Rh  is the right half of )||||||( 21 GIDrrIDh  
5. The reader forwards the Rh to the tag 
6. If the received Rh matches, the reader is authenticated. 
 
4.1.3 Analysis 
 
To evaluate the proposed protocol this can be analyzed in two ways. Firstly is privacy and security 
analysis and secondly is its efficiency analysis. The privacy and security analysis includes 
information leakage, location privacy, impersonation and replay attack, Denial of Service (DoS) 
and traceability. In efficiency analysis the storage, computation and communication costs are 
compared with existing related protocols. 
 
4.1.3.1  Privacy and Security Analysis 
 
The privacy and security of the proposed protocol is analyzed against the identified threats as 
follows. 
 
 Information Leakage: In SUAP1 protocol, the adversary must be authenticated to access 
any sensitive information from a tag. To authenticate the systems an adversary must know 
ID, x and r2 to access any information from the tag. The SUAP2 protocol has additional GID 
secret to make the response more unpredictable. The SUAP3 uses the GID as a secret 
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instead of x. The combination of r1 and r2 makes the response y so unpredictable that the 
adversary can only guess the value of hR and hL. The advantage of an adversary is at most 
l2
1 , which is negligible for l=96 or more.  
 
 Location Privacy: The responses from the tags are always changing in every new session. 
The value of t, y and Lh cannot be linked with any particular tag in the SUAP1 and SUAP2. 
In the SUAP3 the value of y and Lh also cannot be linked with any particular tag. The 
protocols ensure location privacy by using new values of r1 and r2 each time. Even if a 
malicious reader sends a same random value r1 all the times, a tag transmits the refreshed 
values that are refreshed by r2 and x.  
 
 Impersonation and Replay attack: The protocols work in a complete challenge-response 
fashion by mutual authentication. When a tag reaches within the range of a reader, the 
reader queries with a random value to the tag. An adversary may also request a tag with a 
random number. Without knowing ID, hash function, secret x and random number r2 
generated by the tag, the adversary cannot find h(ID). In SUAP2 and SUAP3 the group 
identifier GID also makes the response more unidentifiable. For each session the tag gives 
new value of y that is totally indistinguishable and different from other sessions. So 
impersonation and replay attack is nearly impossible in practical scenario. Impersonation 
and replay attack could be possible if the attacker waits for a matched response (same hL) 
from the tag and replays the hR to authenticate itself. Such repeating hash response could 
only be reproduced once in 2l responses (where the responses are uniformly random in 
nature) as the length of the hash response is l. 
 
 Denial of Service (DoS): Since the ID and the secret are never changed in the proposed 
protocols, if the attacker prevents the last flow to the tag from the reader it will not cause 
any problem of desynchronization. Consequently the DoS attack cannot break the 
synchronization of the system.  
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 Traceability: Attacker cannot identify the past and future interactions. The schemes 
SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 are fully protected from future forward and backward 
traceability. The attacker has no access over r2, and the combination of r1, r2 and hash 
function. The responses are always anonymous and the attacker does not know about the ID 
and the secret x or GID. So the previous, present and future interactions are all 
indistinguishable. The attacker cannot identify the past and future interactions.    
 
4.1.3.2    Efficiency Analysis 
 
For efficiency analysis the storage, communication and computation cost of the proposed protocols 
are compared with other protocols. The storage cost indicates the storage requirements in the tag, 
database and the reader. The communication cost means the length of bits the tag and the reader 
send during the authentication process. The computation cost is the maximum computations require 
in the tag and the database during the execution of the authentication protocol. Various existing 
authentication protocols are selected to compare with the proposed protocols in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-1     Efficiency Analysis 
Efficiency 
Criteria 
 LCAP  CRAP  OHLCAP EOHLCAP Proposed Protocols 
SUAP1 SUAP2 SUAP3 
Storage Tag 1l 1l 5l 3l 2l 3l 2l 
Reader - - - - - - - 
Database 6l 1l 4l 3l 3l 4l 3l 
Computation Tag 2h 3h 1h(+A1) 1h(+A2) 2h (+A2) 2h (+A3) 2h 
(+A3) 
Reader - - - - - - - 
Database 1h hN )1
2
( 
 1h+ε1 2)2
1(  hm i
 1h+ ε3 1h+ ε4 1h+ ε5 
Communication Tag-to-
Reader 
1.5l 2l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 
Reader-to-
tag 
0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 
          A1,A2,A3: Additional XOR and Add operations in the tag     ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5: Small operations in the 
database 
 
 
In Table 4-1 the LCAP [Lee et al. 2005] performs better than other protocols for almost all criteria 
but it suffers from traceability problem and it is not suitable for ubiquitous computing. The 
proposed protocols show better performance because it requires less tag side and database side 
storage and gives protection from all known attacks. The storage requirement for tag and the 
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database are 2l, and 3l respectively in SUAP1 and SUAP3, whereas OHLCAP [Choi et al. 2005] 
requires 5l and 4l respectively. CRAP [Rhee et al. 2005] uses only 1l storage for tag but it needs 
)1
2
( N  hash operations which is practically unsuitable because in ubiquitous environment the value 
of N is extremely high and does not divide the tag in groups. It needs many hash operations and 
hence requires long search time to obtain the tag information in the database. Similarly the 
EOHLCAP [Ha et al. 2007] requires 3l storages in the tag side and 3l storages in the database side 
but requires a large number of hash operations for a group. This is also high for a group having a 
large number of tags.  The main computation costs in the tags are the hash operations. OHLCAP 
requires 1 hash operations and additional operations A1 which are four xor operations in the tag. 
EOHLCAP also requires 1 hash operation and additional operations A2 which are two xor 
operations in the tag. The proposed protocols require two one-way hash operations in each tag. 
SUAP1 requires additional operations A2 which are two xor-operations. Both SUAP2 and SUAP3 
require additional operations A3 which are three xor-operations in the tag. In each protocol the tag 
requires one addition operation. Since both xor-operation and addition operation are very simple 
bits operation, hardware embodiment of these operations is simpler than one-way Hash function. 
Therefore, the proposed protocols are suitable to a low-cost RFID tag systems. ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4 and ε5 are 
additional operations other than hash functions in the corresponding databases as shown in Table4- 
1. 
 
4.1.4       Simulation Experiment and Evaluation 
 
To validate the proposed protocols, simulation experiments have been conducted.  The privacy and 
security protections are ensured with the hash functions and random numbers. A hash function is a 
one-way function for which information leakage is not possible from the hash response. 
Mathematically the probability of success to guess the value of a response using a brute-force 
technique is at most 
l2
1 . In this experiment the value of l takes different values i.e. 16, 32, 64 and 
96. However, many combinations of the hash inputs can give the same response that can be used by 
the adversary to impersonate the RFID systems. This is the main reason to conduct the simulation 
program. The objective of the simulation program is to verify the protection for impersonation, 
replay attack and location privacy.  It checks the response y if it recurs more than once for one tag 
during the attacks by an adversary in a given number of attempts. If the same response is generated 
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for any given random number pair it can be used by the adversary for impersonation and replay 
attack and the location privacy of the tag may be broken.   
The impersonation and replay attack are simulated using Monte Carlo simulation method. To replay 
the hash value h (hL|| hR) for a particular ID and GID, hash responses are generated for 1011 times 
with the same ID and GID and different set of r1 and r2.  The hash value generated at ith attempt hi is 
considered vulnerable for impersonation and replay attack if hi=h. The generated random sequences 
for r1 and r2 are tested for uniform random distribution using chi square test to ensure the validity of 
the simulation using Monte Carlo method. The number of matches found is recorded to generate the 
performance results. For a particular data length 10 simulations are executed using different set of 
random numbers and the possible impersonation and replay attacks are observed in the simulation. 
The averages of the successful replay attacks are reported in Table 4-2.        
 
Table 4-2   Attacker’s Success for one Tag 
 
No. 
Number 
of 
Attempts 
Data 
Length 
l (bits) 
Expected 
Number of 
Matches 
Average Number of Matches (Attacker’s Success) 
EOHLCAP SUAP1 SUAP2 SUAP3 
1 1011 16 1525878.91 1532979.81 1536442.83 1535009.84 1526520.77 
2 1011 32 23.28 21.34 20.30 21.20 20.81 
3 1011 64 5.42x10-9 0 0 0 0 
4 1011 96 1.26x10-18 0 0 0 0 
 
 
A simulation program in Turbo C++ compiler has developed. It runs in a desktop computer of Intel 
(R) Core 2 Duo.  Processor speed is 2.93GHz and memory 3.46 GB. The operating System was 
Windows XP professional. The objective of the simulation program was to check the anonymity of 
the response for one tag.   
 
The output of a hash function is the same for the same random number pair. Some different random 
number pairs may also give the same response. The objective is to ensure unique response for 
different inputs of random number pair so that an adversary is unable to use any response at later 
stage to access the tag or the reader. We select one tag and generate a response for two random 
numbers as in SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EOHLCAP. Then the program attempts 1011 times to 
check that how many times the same response is generated. This is the role of an adversary. In each 
attempt a new response is generated with a new pair of random number.  The average number of 
times a similar response generated in SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EOHLCAP are given in Table 
4-2. The expected number of matches is also reported in a column to compare the obtained result. 
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The value of the expected number of matches are calculated using the analysis of repeating hash 
response presented for replay attack in Section 4.1.3.1 and it is calculated as l21011 . All the selected 
protocols show almost similar results.  The number of matches represents the success of the 
adversary to attack the tag. The experiment was conducted for 16, 32, 64 and 96 bits of secrets, 
random number and ID. The success of the adversary is found for 16 and 32 bits since many 
occurrences of the same response are found. For 64 and 96 bits the adversary cannot break the 
privacy and security of the tag for an extremely large number of attempts. There was no recurrence 
of the same response for 64 bits and 96 bits for the specified number of attempts, i.e. 1011 times. 
The summary of the result for SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 and EOHLCAP is shown in Table 4-3. 
Simulation experiments were not performed for LCAP, OHLCAP and YA_TRAP* (T3) protocols 
since these are not protected against all the privacy threats [Choi et al. 2005, Ha et al. 2007, Tsudik 
2007]. CRAP is also not included since it requires many hash operations [Choi et al. 2005]. 
 
The results shown in Table 4-3 indicated that for 64 and 96 bits there is no matching response and 
the results were always dissimilar for the different sessions. If the result is unique the adversary 
cannot use it for replay attack, impersonation attack and location tracking. For 16 and 32 bits there 
were some recurrences of the same response which was due to two reasons. Firstly it produces the 
same random number pairs and secondly it produced similar responses for some other combination 
of random number pairs. With 64 and 96 bits the tag produced unique response for a tag.  
 
Table 4-3  Attacker’s Success Summary for SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EOHLCAP 
  
No. of 
Queries 
Attacker’s Success (Number of 
matches) 
Data length  
(16 bits) 
Data length  
(32 bits) 
Data length  
(64/96 bits) 
1011 >0 >=0 0 
 
 
According to the privacy and security analysis in the Section 4.1.3.1 and the simulation results the 
summary of the privacy and security properties are given in Table 4-4.   
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Table 4-4  Privacy and Security Comparisons 
 
Property LCAP  CRAP OHLCAP EOHLCAP YA_TRAP* Proposed Protocols 
SUAP1 
 
SUAP2 SUAP3 
Information 
privacy 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Location Privacy N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Impersonation A Y N Y Y Y Y Y 
Replay attack Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 
Message 
Interception 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
Backward 
Traceability 
Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 
Forward 
Traceability 
Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 
Y: Provided    A: provided under assumption   N: Not Provided 
 
The privacy and security properties of the proposed protocols are compared with five other 
schemes. The five schemes were chosen because all of these protocols involved tag authentication. 
LCAP and YA_TRAP* involves secret update process but the other three protocols CRAP, 
OHLCAP and EOHLCAP do not support secret updates. Proposed protocols are more similar to 
CRAP, OHLCAP, EOHLCAP than LCAP and YA_TRAP* since all these protocols support 
authentication in ubiquitous computing environment and do not update the identifier and the secret 
value. Table 4-4 shows that, the proposed protocols provided protections from the identified privacy 
and security threats.  
  
4.2    Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol 
 
In group-based security protocol the privacy and security of the RFID system is managed by group 
secrets. In practical it is difficult to ensure the privacy protection of a secret value that is managed 
by a group in some distributed environment since it is handled by various groups of interests.  This 
section proposes a novel Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol (EMAP) which provides the 
privacy and security in an efficient manner using individual secret for each tag. The evaluation also 
indicates that it requires low storage and computation but offers larger ranges of security protection.  
 
This research aims to propose Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems to 
address the privacy and security issues using static identifier and secret for ubiquitous computing 
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environment. The OHLCAP and the proposed SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 in Section 4.1 use static 
identifiers and common secret for a group. In this section the proposed EMAP uses individual tag 
secret for each tag to ensure the privacy and security more particularly and efficiently.  
 
This proposed EMAP protocol is related to two popular works OHLCAP and Enhanced OHLCAP. 
OHLCAP works in ubiquitous environment. It also uses a one-way hash function for privacy and 
security of the tag. Ha et al.[2007] indicated its security weakness and proposes an enhanced 
OHLCAP (EOHLCAP) scheme. The authors showed that this protocol is vulnerable to traceability 
attack and impersonation attack because of its counter for two successive sessions. In EOHLCAP to 
prevent traceability a random number is used in a tag instead of a counter value. Due to this random 
number instead of a counter, the tracing attack and impersonation attack by maliciously updating 
the random number become impossible.  
 
4.2.1 The Propsoed Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol 
 
In this section, a new Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol (EMAP) is proposed using a one-
way hash function, static identifier, an individual secret and the randomized hash function in the 
RFID systems. The protocol works in ubiquitous computing environment suitably since it uses the 
static identifier and does not change any secrets in authentication process. It offers a design with 
low storage using only two data fields in the tag side by eliminating the group index GI, group 
secret value k and the counter value c used in OHLCAP from the tag and the database side. The 
proposed protocol ensures protections from all the identified privacy and security threats and also 
avoids the large number of hash computations that might incur due to the introduction of an 
individual secret value in each tag.  
 
Notations 
 
The notations used in this protocol are as follows: 
 
h        A one-way hash function, lh }1,0{}1,0{: *   
l         The length of an identifier 
r1        Random number in l}1,0{  
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r2        Random number in l}1,0{  
ID      Tag identifier 
S       Secret of the individual tag 
Had   Hash address h(ID), acting as an index 
       XOR operator 
||     Concatenation operator 
      Assignment operator 
             +       Modular addition by mod (2l − 1) 
 
System Set-up 
 
The EMAP also uses the static identifier and secret. It uses only one secret S in the tag and the 
database. The protocol uses the hash function h(ID) to encrypt the ID.  The hash response is also 
used as a hash address for the tags in the database. The system setup of the EMAP protocol is as 
follows: 
 
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields: 
ID:   Tag Identifier 
S:     Secret value of a tag 
 
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields. 
Back-end Database: Back-end database contains the following fields: 
ID:      Tag Identifier 
S:        Secret value of a tag  
Had:   Hash address h(ID), acting as an index 
 
EMAP Operations 
 
The EMAP protocol shown in Figure 4-4 reduces the number of fields in the tag by removing three 
data fields GI, c and K from the OHLCAP and uses only two data fields ID and S in the tag side. 
The database uses three data fields Had, ID and S.  The proposed protocol uses the hash value Had 
as the hash address in the database to search the tag information. However, this hash address is sent 
to the reader with an encryption so that an adversary cannot track the tag. For authentication 
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between the reader and the tag it uses a different hash value )||||||( 21 SrrIDh  so that the information 
in the tag is always secure and the valid tag is identified correctly. The random number r1 is 
transmitted in plaintext but the r2 is transmitted by encrypting with the secret value S. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4:   The Proposed EMAP Protocol 
 
The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows:  
 
1. A reader selects a random number r1 and sends a request with r1 to the tag. 
2. After receiving the random number r1 the tag will generate another random number r2.       
 The tag computes  SrM  2  
                               ))4/(()4/()( 212 lrrlrIDhX                                   
                               )||||||( 21 SrrIDhZ   
                     and sends the values of M, X and ZL to the reader. ZL  is the left half of Z. 
3. The reader then sends r1, M, X and Z to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database then computes for all IDs in database 
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                             MSr 2                              . 
                             ))4/(()4/( 212 lrrlrhadX   
                               XXif   
                                     Lookup the addresses Had  
                                     Pick the ID that matches the Had 
                         Computes )||||||( 21 SrrIDhZ     
                                     Verifies ZL 
                                     If the ID is authenticated the database sends ZR to the reader. ZR  is the right 
half of Z. 
5. The reader forwards ZR to the tag. 
6. The tag verifies ZR. 
 
 
Comparing with the security scheme OHLCAP, the proposed EMAP protocol has the following 
advantages (see Tables 4-5 and 4-6): 
1. Uses less storage in both tag side and database side. 
2. Improves privacy and security due to that the proposed protocol has removes the counter 
field used in OHLCAP and uses a random number. 
3. Insures the individual security using the individual tag secret value instead of the group 
secret value. 
Comparing with the security scheme EOHLCAP, the proposed EMAP protocol has the following 
advantages (see Tables 4-5 and 4-6): 
1. Uses the less storage in the tag side. 
2. Insures the individual security using the individual tag secret value instead of the group 
secret value. 
3. Reduces the hash computation. 
 
4.2.2 Evaluation 
 
To evaluate the proposed protocol privacy, security and efficiency are analysed. Firstly is privacy 
and security analysis and secondly is efficiency analysis. The privacy and security analysis includes 
information leakage, location privacy, impersonation and replay attack, Denial of Service (DoS) 
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and traceability. In efficiency analysis the storage, computation and communication costs are 
compared with existing related protocols. 
 
4.2.2.1   Privacy and Security Analysis  
 
The attack model is defined in the following way: 
             : An adversary 
R: Reader 
T: Tag 
 
It is assumed that the adversary disguises as a reader RA and IDA, SA will be used by the adversary 
as fake ID and secret. )||||||( 21 SrrIDhL  will be used as the left half ZL and )||||||( 21 SrrIDhR  as the right 
half ZR of Z. The proposed protocols have the following privacy and security properties: 
 
Information Leakage: In the proposed protocol authentication is required to obtain any sensitive 
information from a tag.  In EMAP the adversary must know the ID and S to authenticate the system. 
The ID is never sent in plaintext. The combination of r1 and r2 with S and ID make the hash 
response unpredictable so that the adversary does not have any information about the secret.  The 
adversary disguises as a reader R and tries to extract the IDA and SA. After receiving the response 
ZL from the tag or ZR from the reader the adversary can try to compute the secrets and send the 
request to the tag and failed, where ZL is the left half and ZR is the right half of 
)||||||( 21 SrrIDhZ  . The adversary A may also collect the responses from the tag and the readers 
to use them for next session but due to two random numbers the responses are always unpredictable 
and authentication is not possible. For example the adversary takes the responses from the tag as 
follows: 
                    :)(  RT ,2 SrM  )),4/(()4/()( 212 lrrlrIDhX   ZL  
It is not possible for the adversary to extract the value S from the responses since r2 is never sent in 
plain text. The value of ID is always sent in a hash function. So the information leakage is not 
possible. 
 
Location Privacy: The response cannot be linked with any particular tag. The protocol ensures 
location privacy by using new values of r1, r2 each time. The EMAP refreshed the value using the 
r1, r2  and S.  The adversary   can receive the following response from the tag in one session. 
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            )||||||(: 21 SrrIDhT L            
In the next session the adversary   will receive a different response from the tag since the r1 and r2 
are changed and the response is also changed. Therefore, the new response shown below is not 
matched with the previous one. 
            )||||||(: 21 SrrIDhT L   
The adversary can send fixed query with fixed r1. In that case the response is refreshed by r2 by the 
tag and the response is still anonymous.  
               )||||||(: 21 SrrIDhT L   
 
In subsequent all sessions the response from the tag are anonymous hence location privacy is 
protected and tracking is not possible.  The adversary may also try to use the value of M and X to 
extract the secret S. Since the random number r2 is passed secretly the value of M and X are always 
unpredictable. 
 
Impersonation and Replay Attack: The protocol works in a complete challenge-response method 
by mutual authentication. When a tag reaches within the range of a reader, the reader sends a query 
request with a random value to the tag. An adversary may also make a request to a tag with a 
random number. However, without knowing the ID, the hash function, secret S an adversary is 
unable to impersonate. For each session the tag generates a new response which is totally 
indistinguishable and different from other session and subsequently the impersonation and replay 
attacks are not possible.  
 
The adversary   can receive the responses from the tag and the reader in one session for 
impersonation and replay attack. 
         )||||||(: 21 SrrIDhT L   
         )||||||(: 21 SrrIDhR R  
In the next session the adversary   may try to use this response to attack the tag. The adversary   
can have two approaches. It can use the same response to attack the tag or it can try to guess the 
value of ID  and S.  Since the r1, and r2 are all changed and the secret is also unknown the response 
will not match. Both the attacks are shown as follows: 
      (i) First approach 
            The random number r1 is sent in plain text. It is assumed that the adversary   can track and 
receive it. 
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             )||||||(:)( 21 SrrIDhTR L    
             T: Verify. 22 rr   
             T  Authentication fail. 
 
 (ii) Second approach 
              The adversary can try to assume the values ID and S and use fake IDA and SA. 
              )||||||(:)( 21   SrrIDhTR  
              T: Verify. 22,, rrSSIDID    
              T  Authentication fail. 
 
Message Interception or DoS Attack: The protocol uses static identifier and secret. Since the 
values are not changed in the authentication process the protocol does not face any update 
anomalies. If the adversary is able to prevent the last transmission to the tag from the reader it will 
not face any synchronization problem.  
 
Traceability: An adversary is unable to identify the tag from its response because each time it gives 
a different value which is non traceable from other responses. Alternatively, for traceability an 
adversary needs to know the secret ID or S. ID is secure due to the one-way hash function 
)||||||( 21 SrrIDh  and the secret S is also sent by encryption with a new random number r2 in each 
session. Both the schemes are fully protected from the future forward and backward traceability. It 
is also not possible to trace the expression ))4/(()4/()( 212 lrrlrIDhX   since r2 is 
passed in secret and changed in every session. The summary of privacy and security comparisons 
are given in Table 4-5. 
 
Table  4-5  Privacy and Security Comparisons 
 
Property LCAP  CRAP OHLCAP EOHLCAP Proposed 
EMAP 
Information privacy Y Y Y Y Y 
Location Privacy N Y Y Y Y 
Impersonation A Y N Y Y 
Replay attack Y Y N Y Y 
Message Interception Y Y Y Y Y 
Backward Traceability Y Y N Y Y 
Forward Traceability Y Y N Y Y 
Y: Provided      A: provided under assumption      N: Not Provided 
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4.2.2.2    Efficiency Analysis 
 
Storage, communication and computation cost are considered for efficiency analysis. Various 
existing authentication protocols are compared with the proposed protocols. LCAP requires less 
storage in the tag side but it does not work in a ubiquitous environment since the identifier is 
updated after every authentication process. It also has location privacy problem. The EMAP 
protocol shows improved performance as shown in Table 4-6 because it requires less tag side and 
database side storage than OHLCAP and EOHLCAP protocols and gives protection from all the 
identified threats.  
 
The storage requirements for the tag and the database are 2l and 3l respectively in EMAP which is 
the lowest in all the protocols except CRAP.  CRAP gives protections from all the attacks but it 
needs )1
2
( N   hash operations for N tags, which is costly because the value of N may be extremely 
high and many hash computations will make the protocol slower. EOHLCAP also gives protections 
from all the identified threats but it also requires (mi +1)/2 hash operations for a number of tags in a 
group. mi is the number of tags in the ith group and this number also may be very high. 
 
Table 4-6     Efficiency Analysis 
 
Efficiency 
Criteria 
 LCAP  CRAP  OHLCAP EOHLCAP Proposed 
EMAP 
Storage Tag 1l 1l 5l 3l 2l  
Reader - - - - - 
Database 6l 1l 4l 3l 3l 
Computation Tag 2h 3h 1h+A 1h+A 2h+A 
Reader - - - - - 
Database 1h hN )1
2
( 
 1h+ε  hmi )
2
1
(
 1h+ ε 
Communicat
ion 
Tag-to-
Reader 
1.5l 2l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 
Reader-
to-tag 
0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 
             A: Additional XOR and Add operations in tag         ε: Small operation in back-end database 
 
4.2.3 Simulation Experiment 
 
Though the proposed protocols are logically and mathematically secret from various attacks the 
adversary can go for repeated replay attack to take the advantage of generation of similar response 
for a number of different inputs. If the adversary can match any response it can be used for 
102 
 
impersonation and replay attack and can break the location privacy. To validate the proposed 
protocol, simulation experiments have been conducted. A simulation program in Turbo C++ 
compiler was developed for desktop computer of Intel (R) Core 2 Duo with processor speed of 
2.93GHz and memory of 3.46 GB. Windows XP Professional was used as the operating system. 
The objective of the simulation program was to check the anonymity of the response for one tag. 
The output of a hash function is the same for the same random number pair. The objective is to 
ensure unique response for different inputs of random number pair so that an adversary is unable to 
use any responses at later stage to access the tag or the reader. The program checks to match a 
response of a tag with the responses of different sets of random numbers. Two protocols EMAP and 
EOHLCAP were selected for the experiment. The number of times a similar response is generated 
is given in Table 4-7 for 1011 attempts. The summary result is shown in Table 4-8.  
 
Table 4-7   Attacker’s Success for one Tag 
 
Exp No. Number 
of 
attempts 
Data 
Length 
Number of Matches (Attacker’s 
success) 
EOHLCAP Proposed EMAP 
1 1011 16 1539054 1545003 
2 1011 16 1536078 1537687 
3 1011 16 1536965 1535689 
4 1011 32 0 0 
5 1011 32 40 0 
6 1011 32 0 42 
7 1011 32 43 0 
8 1011 32 0 39 
9 1011 32 0 0 
10 1011 32 0 0 
11 1011 32 0 0 
12 1011 64 0 0 
13 1011 64 0 0 
14 1011 64 0 0 
15 1011 64 0 0 
16 1011 96 0 0 
17 1011 96 0 0 
18 1011 96 0 0 
19 1011 96 0 0 
20 1011 96 0 0 
 
 
The summary results of the simulation experiments were same for both the proposed protocol 
EMAP and the selected protocol EOHLCAP. The experiments were conducted for 12, 16, 32, 64 
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and 96 bits of secrets, random number and ID. The results shown in Table 4-8 indicated that for 64 
and 96 bits there is no matching for a response of a tag. It means the response were always unique. 
If the result is unique the adversary cannot use it for replay or any other attack. For 12, 16 and 32 
bits there were some recurrences of the same response.   
 
Table 4-8  Attacks and success of an adversary on one tag for EMAP and EOHLCAP 
 No. of 
Attempts 
 
Attacker’s Success 
Response length  
(16 bits) 
Response 
length  
(32 bits) 
Response 
length  
 (64/96 bits) 
1011 >0 >=0 0 
 
The recurrence of the same response was due to two reasons. Firstly, it produces the same random 
number pairs and hence the same response. Secondly, it produces similar responses for some other 
combination of random number pairs. If an adversary uses this response for any of these 
combinations of random number pairs it may impersonate as a valid reader.  
 
Any simulation experiments for LCAP, CRAP and OHLCAP protocols were not performed since it 
is already mentioned that logically and mathematically the LCAP, OHLCAP are not protected 
against all the privacy threats [Choi et al. 2005, Ha et al. 2007]. CRAP is also protected from all the 
threats but it requires a large number of hash operations. The response of EOHLCAP is also similar 
in nature as in the proposed protocols and shows the same results.  
 
4.2.4   Hospital Case Study 
 
This section presents a case study of a hospital RFID System to explain how the proposed EMAP 
can be implemented to ensure privacy and security. In the medical environment, the security and 
privacy problem will be crucial to RFID based medical application. The privacy issue with tagged 
patient cards involves the risk of exposing the information, such as trace of personal location, 
information of personal health and clinical history. Through the tag the private data of a person can 
be tracked and the personal information can be captured which could be a violation of privacy under 
the Data Protection Act 1998. Many security threats are identified in RFID system in hospitals 
[Jules et al. 2005]. The details of the hospital privacy and security scenario are given in Chapter 8. 
In this case it is assumed that there are K readers are connected to the database. There are N tags. It 
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is assumed that there is no classification in the tag side. The database may classify the tag according 
to the patient disease or other criteria. The Figure 4-5 shows the tag, reader and the database 
architecture for the hospital system. The database only shows the basic part of the tags. This can be 
used to link with other information of the patient and hospital.  All the readers read the tags and 
verify the tag information with the database. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5:  Security Architecture of the Hospital RFID Systems 
 
It is assumed a reader Readeri initiates authentication protocol with Tagj.  
 
1. Readeri generates a random number r1 and sends a request with r1 to the tag. 
2. After receiving the random number r1 the tag Tagj generates another random number r2.       
    The tag computes M, X and Z and sends the values of M, X and ZL to the reader. ZL  is the left half 
of Z. 
3. The reader then sends r1, M, X and Z to the back-end database. 
4. The database verifies the tag. If the response from the tag is forged by the adversary the database 
can recognise it. If it does not match with the tag records stored in the database then the database 
recognize the tag as a forged or external tag. To do it the database also computes the X and Z using 
the database field S and Had with received M.  The database then sends the ZR to the reader, where 
ZR is the right half of Z. 
5. The reader forwards ZR to the tag. 
6. The tag verifies ZR. If any adversary forges the response the tag can also recognise it. 
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There are several readers are connected in the network systems of the hospital to communicate with 
the database server. The reader and tag authenticate each other using the hash responses ZL and ZR. 
The information is fully secured in this protocol. The ID is never transmitted in plaintext and the 
one way hash function with two random numbers makes the response Z fully unpredictable. Only 
the valid reader can authenticate the tag using the information stored in a secured database. An 
authorized reader cannot track or authenticate any tag related to patient, doctor or nurse etc.  
 
4.3    Conclusion  
 
Three group-based efficient and secure authentication protocols are proposed to protect privacy for 
the low-cost RFID system in ubiquitous computing environment. The privacy and security problem 
of OHLCAP is overcome in these protocols.  SUAP1 is suitable for the organization having small 
number of tags. SUAP2 and SUAP3 are for medium and large organizations having many 
departments. All the proposed schemes require only two one-way hash function operations that 
make them very efficient. The tag search time in the database is reduced by using the hash value as 
the address of the corresponding tag. EOHLCAP also overcomes the problem in OHLCAP and 
protects the RFID system from most of the attacks but it requires many complex hash operations. In 
the proposed protocols the number of hash operations has been reduced in database side and ensure 
privacy and security protections from the identified threats. The storage requirements in SUAP1 and 
SUAP3 are also less than OHLCAP and EOHLCAP protocols. The comparison shows that the 
proposed protocols are both secure and efficient than other schemes and have practical advantages 
over them because these are simple and provide greater number of privacy and security protection 
for less storages and computations.  
 
A new efficient and secure authentication protocol EMAP is also proposed using an individual 
secret value for each tag to protect privacy for low-cost RFID systems. It also uses static identifier 
so that it can work in a ubiquitous computing system. The proposed EMAP requires only one one-
way hash function in the database and two one-way hash functions in the tag side. The storage 
requirements for the tag and database are also low i.e. 2l and 3l respectively. Due to two random 
numbers, one generated in the reader and the other generated in the tag, a tracing attack and 
impersonation attack become impossible. It has practical advantages over other protocols because it 
is simple and provides a larger range of privacy and security protections. The proposed protocol is 
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robust to the identified threats, such as information leakage, an impersonation attack, replay attack, 
DoS attack and location tracing problem. 
 
 
Part of the substance of this chapter has been published in the following journal: 
Morshed,  M.M., Atkins, A.S., Yu H. 2010, ‘Secure Ubiquitous Authentication Protocols for RFID 
System’, EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking.  
 
Part of the substance of this chapter has been accepted in the following journal: 
 
Morshed, M.M., Atkins, A.S., Yu, H. 2011, ‘Efficient Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID 
Systems’, IET Communications. 
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Chapter 5 Proposed Efficient and Secure 
Authentication Protocol (ESAP) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter proposes a hash-based Efficient and Secure Authentication Protocol (ESAP) protocol 
using a monotonically increasing timestamp and a random number to protect the privacy and 
security of the RFID systems effectively and efficiently. It also identifies different advantages of 
using the timestamp to ensure the privacy and the security of the RFID systems. 
 
The use of RFID tags may cause privacy violation of users carrying an RFID tag because of the 
unique identification number of the RFID tag. This can result possible privacy threats such as 
information leakage of a tag, traceability of the consumer, denial of service attack, replay attack and 
impersonation of a tag. There are some challenges in providing privacy and security in the RFID 
tags due to the extremely limited computation, storage and communication ability of passive RFID 
tags. Many research works have already been conducted using hash functions and random numbers.  
As the same random number can recur many times the adversary can use the response derived from 
the same random number for replay attack and it can cause a break in location privacy. This section 
proposes an RFID authentication protocol ESAP using a monotonically increasing timestamp, a tag 
side random number and a hash function to protect the RFID system from adversary attacks. The 
proposed protocol also indicates that it requires less storage and computation than previous existing 
RFID authentication protocols but offers a larger range of security protection. A simulation 
experiment is also conducted to verify some of the privacy and security properties of the proposed 
protocol. 
 
5.2  Related Works 
 
In most of the RFID authentication protocol to make the response unidentifiable one or two random 
number are used with hash function. Tsudik [2006] described an RFID identification protocol that 
provides a basic level of tag identification using time-stamps. It will be referred to as T1. This is a 
widely acknowledged authentication protocol that places only a small burden on the back-end 
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server and uses monotonically increasing timestamp which makes it secure against tracking but 
unsecure against DoS attack. Tsudik [2007] proposed two further schemes T2 and T3 to provide tag 
authentication. The schemes use monotonically increasing time-stamps for tracking-resistant tag 
authentication, and employ a keyed hash function f. However, these protocols are not protected 
from privacy and security threats. The detail of the protocol is given in Section 3.3.1.9. 
 
It is an important research consideration to develop a privacy and security protocol for the RFID 
system that addresses these privacy and security issues and overcomes these problems with the 
limited storage and computational capacity of an RFID tag. The next section presents the proposed 
Efficient and Secure Authentication Protocol (ESAP) to overcome the present privacy and security 
problems. 
 
5.3    The Propsoed  Efficient and Secure Authentication Protocol  
 
In this section, a new protocol (ESAP) is proposed. This is based on the challenge-response method 
using the one-way hash randomized hash function for the RFID systems. This protocol uses a 
monotonically increasing timestamp to make the response more unidentifiable and anonymous. The 
notations used in this protocol are as follows: 
 
5.3.1 Notations 
 
h        A one-way hash function, lh }1,0{}1,0{: *   
l         The length of an identifier 
r1        Random number in l}1,0{  
ID      Tag identifier 
X        Shared secret value  
IDX    IDX ; it is the search index of the records 
Tr       Time stamp generated by the reader 
Tt       Last timestamp stored in a tag 
ft        Tag response 
fr        Reader response     
      XOR operator 
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     Concatenation operator 
      Assignment operator 
 
5.3.2 System Set-up 
The system setup of this protocol is given below: 
 Tag: Each tag contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag identifier 
X:  Shared secret value 
Tt:    Last timestamp 
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields. 
Back-end Database: Back-end database contains the following fields: 
IDX:   IDX ; Search index 
ID:  Tag identifier 
 
5.3.3 ESAP Operations 
 
When a tag enters into the range of the reader, this can initiate the authentication protocol. The 
protocol is shown in Figure 5-1.  
 
 
Figure 5-1:   The Proposed ESAP Protocol 
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The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows. 
1. Reader: The reader generates a time stamp Tr and sends the timestamp to the tag. 
2. Tag: thenTTif rt   
  The tag generates a random number r1 
  The tag computes )||||( 1 rt TrXhXIDf   
   It sends the value of r1 and ft to the reader. The reader then sends r1 and ft to the back-end 
database. 
3. Database: The back-end database then finds X and computes   )||||( 1 rTrXh  and then it finds
)||||( 1 rt TrXhfIDX  .  
The database lookups IDX, ID in the database and  computes )||||( 1 rt TrXhXIDf    
     matchffif tt    
         Then the database authenticates the tag and       
            computes )||||||( 1 rr TrXIDhf           
       Finally the back-end database sends      
           frR to the reader. frR is the right half part of the fr.   
4. Reader: The reader forwards frR   to the tag. 
5. Tag:  The tag also computes fr and check frR. If it matches it authenticates the reader and updates 
rt TT  .  
 
Next, how the protocol works will be discussed. In this protocol the reader starts authentication by 
generating a new timestamp Tr and sends it to the tag.  If the timestamp Tt< Tr then the tag generates 
a random number r1 to make the authentication process reliable. The tag then computes the response 
)||||( 1 rt TrXhXIDf   and sends ft and r1 to the reader. The reader sends the response and the 
random number r1 to the database. The database finds X and at first computes )||||( 1 rTrXh  and then 
it computes )||||( 1 rt TrXhfIDX  . If IDX is found in the database it uses the ID to calculate the 
secret X. The database then calculate ft with this values. If it matches with the ft received from the 
tag then authenticate the tag. The database then computes )||||||( 1 rr TrXIDhf   and sends the right 
half frR to the reader. The protocol uses one monotonically increasing timestamp to keep the 
response unidentifiable or anonymous.  The tag then computes the )||||||( 1 rTrXIDhf  . If the right 
half of this value matches with the received one then the reader is authenticated. The proposed 
protocol uses a random number for the tag side and a timestamp from the reader side.  It makes the 
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response more unpredictable. Moreover the monotonically increasing timestamp also makes the 
input combination unique and intractable.  
 
5.4 Analysis of the Proposed Protocol 
 
To evaluate the proposed protocol this can be analyzed in two ways. Firstly is privacy and security 
analysis and secondly is efficiency analysis. The privacy and security analysis includes information 
leakage, location privacy, impersonation and replay attack, Denial of Service (DoS) and 
traceability. In efficiency analysis the storage, computation and communication costs are compared 
with existing related protocols. 
 
5.4.1  Privacy and Security Analysis 
 
The privacy and security of the proposed protocol are analysed against the threats discussed in 
Chapter 2.  The identified privacy and security threats are information leakage, location privacy, 
impersonation and replay attack, Denial of Service (DoS) and traceability are outlined as follows: 
 
 Information Leakage: To be able to obtain any sensitive information from a tag a protocol 
must be authenticated.  In this protocol, to authenticate the system and to receive any 
information from the tags an adversary must know ID, X and the hash function. The 
combination of r1 ,  Tr and ID makes the responses so unpredictable that the adversary can only 
guess the value or use a brute-force technique with an advantage of only (1/2l), which is  
negligible for data length of 96 bits or more. 
 
 Location Privacy: The value of fr and ft cannot be linked with any particular tag. The protocol 
ensures location privacy by using new values of r1 and  Tr each time. Even if a malicious reader 
sends the same timestamp Tr all the times, a tag transmits the refreshed value using r1 , X and ID.  
 
 Impersonation and Replay Attack: When a tag reaches within the range of a reader, the reader 
queries with a random value to the tag. An adversary may also make a request to a tag with a 
timestamp. However, without knowing the ID, X and the hash function an adversary is unable to 
impersonate. For each session the tag generates new values of ft and fr which are totally 
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indistinguishable and different from other session and subsequently the impersonation and 
replay attacks are not possible.  
 
 Message Interception or DoS attack: It is not possible to detect all the types of DoS attacks. 
The objective of the protocol is to take action against the vulnerability of a DoS attack and the 
system should not be desynchronized. The proposed protocol uses a static identifier for the 
authentication process. If the adversary is able to prevent the last transmission to the tag from 
the reader then the tag will not authenticate the reader in that session. In the next authentication 
phase it will use a new random number to authenticate and the reader will send a new timestamp 
and the process will be continued. 
 
 Traceability: An adversary is unable to identify the tag from its response because each time it 
gives a different value which is non-traceable from other responses. This scheme is fully 
protected from the future forward and backward traceability. The adversary has no control over 
r1, and the combination of r1, Tr and hash function and also does not know the ID and secret X. 
Consequently, the previous, present and future interactions are all indistinguishable.   
 
5.4.2    Efficiency Analysis 
 
Storage, communication and computation cost were considered for efficiency analysis. Two 
existing authentication protocols OHLCAP [Choi et al. 2005] and T3 [Tsudik 2007] were compared 
with the proposed ESAP authentication protocol. These protocols were selected for efficiency 
comparison since all of them work in ubiquitous environment.  OHLCAP and T3 require a larger 
storage and computations than other protocols. OHLCAP is also vulnerable to impersonation attack. 
The ESAP protocol shows improved performance as shown in Table 5-1 because it requires less tag 
side and database side storage than other protocols. The storage requirement for the tag and the 
database are 3l and 2l respectively. The protocol requires less hash functions in both tag and 
database.  T3 cannot give protections from all the identified attacks and it requires (N/2+1) complex 
functions operations which is costly because the value of N may be very high and it requires many 
function computations that will make the protocol slower [Tsudik 2007].  Table 5-1 gives an overall 
comparison of the different protocols compared to the proposed ESAP. Another advantage of the 
proposed protocol is that it requires less data to be communicated from the reader to the tag. 
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Table 5-1    Efficiency Analysis 
Efficiency Criteria  OHLCAP  T3 ESAP 
 
Storage Tag 5l 4l 3l 
Reader - - - 
Database 4l 5l 2l 
Computation Tag 1h 2h  2h  
Reader - - - 
Database 1h+ε (N/2+1)h 2h 
Communication Tag-to-Reader 2.5l 3l 2l 
Reader-to-tag 0.5l 3l 0.5l 
ε: Small operation in back-end database 
 
5.5   Experiment Results and Evaluation 
 
To validate the proposed protocol ESAP, simulation work has been conducted. The privacy and 
security protections are ensured with the hash functions, timestamp and random number. A hash 
function is a one-way function for which information leakage is not possible from the hash 
response. The simulation is to further verify the protection for impersonation attack, replay attack 
and location privacy. It is assumed that the adversary will capture a response from the tag or the 
reader and then subsequently use this response 1011 times to impersonate the tag or the reader.  It 
checks the responses ft and fr if any of them recur more than once for one tag during the attacks by 
an adversary. If the same response is generated it can be used by the adversary for impersonation 
and replay attack and the location privacy of the tag may be broken.  A simulation program in 
Turbo C++ compiler is developed. It runs in a desktop computer of Intel (R) Core 2 Duo.  Processor 
speed is 2.93GHz and memory 3.46 GB. The operating System was Windows XP professional.  
 
The objective of the simulation program was to check the response for one tag if the response is 
anonymous. The output of a hash function is the same for the same random number and timestamp. 
The objective is to ensure unique response for different inputs of random number and timestamp so 
that attacker cannot use any response it collected and attack later to access the tag or the reader.   
The program checks to match a response with subsequent responses for a set of random numbers 
and time stamps. The number of times the same response generated for the tag response ft and the 
reader response fr is given in the Table 5-2. It represents the success of the adversary for 1011 
attempts of attacks for different sizes of secret numbers and data. The experiment was conducted for 
16 bits, 32 bits, 64 bits and 96 bits of secret and data length. In this experiment there was no match 
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of the response for 64 bits and 96 bits. For 16 bits and 32 bits there were some recurrences of the 
same response.  The reason is that it produced the same response for some other combination of 
random number and the timestamp. The recurrence of the response for 16, 32, 64 and 96 bits are 
shown in the table for 1011 attempts.  
 
Table 5-2    Attacker’s success table 
Exp No Number of Queries to the 
Tag 
Attacker’s Success for different data length 
Data   
length 
Number of Matches 
ft fr 
1 1011 16 1538360 1538360 
2 1011 16 1550799 1550799 
3 1011 16 1527728 1527728 
4 1011 32 20 20 
5 1011 32 15 15 
6 1011 32 0 0 
7 1011 32 0 0 
8 1011 32 25 25 
9 1011 32 23 23 
10 1011 64 0 0 
11 1011 64 0 0 
12 1011 64 0 0 
13 1011 64 0 0 
14 1011 64 0 0 
15 1011 96 0 0 
16 1011 96 0 0 
17 1011 96 0 0 
18 1011 96 0 0 
19 1011 96 0 0 
20 1011 96 0 0 
 
 
This experiment shows that during the attempt with 64 and 96 bits of data and secret the tag and the 
reader produced unique response for a tag ID and the adversary cannot break the privacy and 
security of the RFID systems by using the same response. 
 
In this experiment the attacker only tries to track the response in passive mode. It cannot use the 
previous timestamp and the response to attack the tag, since the tag always checks if the new 
timestamp is larger than its stored one.  The tag does not modify its timestamp until an 
authentication process is successful. This experiment showed that the protocol is secure for at least 
64 bits of data and secrets in 1011 attempts and the following Table 5-3 shows the evaluation 
summary.  
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Table 5-3     Attacker’s Success Summary 
Number    
    of Queries 
Attacker’s Success 
Data length  
(16 bits) 
Data length  
(32 bits) 
Data length  
(64/96 bits) 
ft fr ft fr ft fr 
1011 >0 >0 >=0 >=
0 
0 0 
ft: Tag Response, fr: Reader Response 
 
 
In this authentication system it is not possible to perform an active attack by the adversary to the tag 
by using the same or fake timestamp. The reason is that the tag always stores the last timestamp and 
it does not allow any authentication process until it receives a timestamp greater than the previous 
one. Due to this monotonically increasing timestamp, impersonation and replay attack is not 
possible. Another advantage of this protocol is that the adversary cannot be successful with 
arbitrary big fake timestamp since the tag does not update its timestamp unless a successful 
authentication is performed. This prevents the protocol from DoS attack. 
 
The summary of the privacy and security properties is given in Table 5-4.  The privacy and security 
properties of ESAP are compared with four other schemes [Lee et al. 2005, Choi et al. 2005, Chien 
and Chen 2004, Ha et al. 2007. Tsudik 2007]. The four schemes were chosen because all of these 
protocols involved tag authentication. HIDV and LCAP involve secret update process and other two 
protocols OHLCAP and T3 do not support secret update. ESAP is similar to OHLCAP and T3 since 
ESAP does not support secret update and all these protocols support authentication in ubiquitous 
environment. Another reason to select T3 is that it also uses timestamp to make the response 
unpredictable. The table shows that the proposed protocol provided protections from all the 
identified privacy and security threats.  
 
Table 5-4     Privacy and Security Comparisons 
Property HIDV  LCAP  OHLCAP T3 ESAP 
Information privacy Y Y Y Y Y 
Location Privacy N N Y Y Y 
Impersonation N A N Y Y 
Replay attack N Y N Y Y 
Message Interception Y Y Y N Y 
Backward Traceability N Y N N Y 
Forward Traceability N Y N N Y 
Y: Protected    A: provided under assumption   N: Not Provided 
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Figure 5-2 shows the storage comparison with two other ubiquitous RFID privacy and security 
protocols. Storage requirement in ESAP is less than other protocols. Storage requirements are 
presented as l bits. The HIDV and LCAP protocols are not included in storage comparison since 
they update their ID after each authentication phase.  
 
 
Figure 5-2:  Storage Comparison 
 
The simulation experiment successfully authenticates the tag and the reader without any privacy 
and security failure.  
 
5.6   Application 
 
This protocol will be suitable for hospital scenario where the privacy of the patient is important. In 
this case the patient identification number will be used as ID for an RFID tag.  
Through the tag ID the private data of a person can be tracked [Lee and Kim 2007]. The privacy 
issue with tagged patient cards involves the risk of exposing the information, such as trace of 
personal location and the information of their personal health and clinical treatment. Many security 
threats are identified in RFID system that can also be threats in hospitals.  
To protect the private data in the hospital environment the ESAP protocol can be used in the tag and 
the database. A hospital database will keep information about the patient. The information contains 
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personal detail of the patient. It also linked with other information related to the patient like disease, 
medicine and diagnostic information.  It will additionally keep secret number for the tag.   In this 
case any unauthorised user cannot track a patient or cannot extract any information from the patient 
tag. Figure. 5-3 shows that the encrypted value ft and fr cannot be extracted by the unauthorised 
user.  
 
Figure 5-3:  Protection of the Patient Data 
 
Similarly the proposed protocol can also be used in a shopping mall to protect the product 
information from the unauthorised users. In this case all the items will be assigned a unique ID and 
keep a secret shared by the database. The customer may buy products that are private for them such 
as cloths, drugs or any items they do not like to disclose about the items.   
 
5.7    Conclusion 
 
A new efficient and secure authentication protocol ESAP has been presented in this chapter to 
protect privacy for low-cost RFID systems. The protocol uses a static identifier to provide effective 
privacy and security in a ubiquitous environment using hash functions, a timestamp and a random 
number. The strength of this protocol is the use of a monotonically increasing timestamp and a 
random number to make the response more unidentifiable. This protocol stores the current 
timestamp after each successful authentication. This protocol uses the search index IDX to search 
the tag records in the database. It reduces the tag search time substantially in the database. The 
simulation experiment also proved that, the responses during the experiment were unique for both 
the 64 and 96 bits long secret and data length.  It is secured from an adversary from all the 
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identified attacks discussed in Chapter 2. Specific privacy and security protections from an 
adversary appropriate to simulation experiment were tested and found to be satisfactory. The 
privacy and security protections were also analyzed and the analysis verified that this protocol is 
protected from the identified threats. The proposed scheme requires only two one-way hash 
functions making it highly efficient. The storage requirements for the tag and database are also cost 
efficient. The comparison outlined in the analysis and experiment result shows that the proposed 
protocol is secure and efficient in compared to the other protocols. It has practical advantages over 
these protocols because it is simple and provides a larger range of privacy and security protections. 
This protocol will be suitable in the RFID systems of healthcare industry, supply chain management 
etc. 
 
 
 
 
Aspects of this chapter have been published in the following journals or conferences. This paper 
was awarded as the Best Student Paper in the area of Computing and Networking.  
 
1. Morshed, M.M., Atkins, A.S., Yu, H. 2011, An Efficient and Secure Authentication 
Protocol for RFID Systems, 17th International Conference on Automation and Computing 
(ICAC'11), 10 September, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK 
 
 
An extended version of this paper is accepted for the journal International Journal for Automation 
and Computing (IJAC) as it is awarded as the Best Student Paper. 
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Chapter 6    A Group-based Authentication 
Protocol using Varying Identifiers (GAPVI)  
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter proposes a Group-based Authentication Protocol using Varying Identifier (GAPVI) to 
protect the privacy and security of the RFID systems effectively and efficiently. To ensure the 
privacy and security it updates the identifier after each successful authentication.  
 
The use of RFID tags may cause privacy violation of users carrying an RFID tag. Due to the unique 
identification number of the RFID tag, the possible privacy threats are information leakage of a tag, 
traceability of the consumer, denial of service attack, and impersonation of a tag. Some RFID 
systems protect privacy and security by changing its identifier and other secret numbers. In that case 
some unexpected scenario like synchronization may be broken due to incomplete authentication 
process between the tag and the reader for unsuccessful communication or any other reasons like 
message interception or blocking. This GAPVI protocol provides the privacy and security in a more 
efficient manner. The protocol recovers from unexpected lack of synchronization due to incomplete 
authentication process or abnormal termination of communication. Analysis of the proposed 
protocol also indicates that it requires less storage and computation than some RFID authentication 
protocols but offers larger ranges of security protection.  
 
6.2    Related Works 
 
To protect the RFID tags and the reader in an efficient and effective way varying identifiers are 
used in many authentication protocols [Henrici and Muller 2004, Lee et al. 2005, Song and Mitchell 
2008]. This section focuses on some of the protocols using varying identifiers and secret numbers 
for the authentication and is outlined as follows: 
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Chien and Chen [2007] proposed a challenge-response based authentication protocol to prevent a 
replay attack. This protocol uses a database in a server which maintains new and old tag keys to 
protect a DoS attack. To prevent a traceability authentication key and access keys are updated. 
However, this scheme is still vulnerable to backward and forward traceability [Peris-Lopez et al. 
2009]. If an active adversary compromise a tag can identify the tag’s past interactions from previous 
transactions and the fixed identifier of the tag.  Using the past transaction and fixed identifier it 
would be able to identify any future transaction.  
 
Ohkubo et al. [2003] proposed an RFID privacy scheme using a hash chain (HC) mechanism. This 
method used two hash functions to protect the privacy and security. It is also not suitable in 
practical use because the back-end database requires a large number of hash chains.  
 
Henrici and Muller [2004] proposed a scheme which is called the hash-based identifier variation 
scheme (HIDV). It uses one way hash function to protect location privacy by changing the ID after 
each session. However if any authentication session is unsuccessful it replies with the same hashed 
ID again for which it opens up the vulnerability for impersonation attack like spoofing.  
 
Lee et al. [2005] proposed a low-cost authentication protocol (LCAP) which simplifies and 
enhances the HIDV scheme in both efficiency and security. It also has the similar problems as 
HIDV that a tag always replies with the same hashed ID before the next successful authentication 
which allows tag tracking. 
 
Dimitriou [2005] proposed an RFID authentication scheme that preserves user privacy and also 
protects against tag cloning. This protocol uses the hash of its identifier as a response to a reader 
query to maintain scalability at the server, and the back-end server sends a message using the 
updated identifier to the tag after getting the tag response.  This scheme is also having problems of 
tracking between valid sessions as the tag identifier remains  the same.     
 
Song and Mitchell [2008] proposed an RFID authentication protocol and an ownership transfer 
protocol [Song 2008] to prevent all the attacks discussed. Though these protocols are efficient in 
terms of storage and computation requirements but are vulnerable to both tag impersonation attack 
and reader impersonation attack. 
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Hoque et al. [2009] proposed a Robust Authentication Protocol (RoAP) that supports not only 
security and privacy but also recovery in RFID systems. The protocol can get back the 
desynchronized tags and readers to their normal state, and thus provides robustness. It requires a 
large number of functions and hash computations. 
 
Cai et al.[2009] proposed a revised authentication protocol of Song and Mitchell [2008] to eliminate 
the problems in it without violation of any other security properties. The storage and computation 
requirements are also comparable with the existing protocol. 
 
The protocols discussed remove most of the privacy and security threats but fail to remove the 
threat of location privacy of the tag with reasonable storage and computation costs. Some of them 
are vulnerable to impersonation attack and tracing problem [Henrici and Muller 2004, Lee et al. 
2005, Song and Mitchell 2008, Chien and Chen 2007]. These protocols do not consider a large 
system that may divide the tags in many groups. This is an important research consideration to 
develop a privacy and security protocol for the RFID system that addresses these issues and 
overcome these problems using limited storage and computational capacity of an RFID tag. This 
chapter proposes a new group-based authentication protocol which provides the privacy and 
security in a more efficient manner using varying identifiers. To enhance the privacy and security 
protection of the RFID systems we propose a new protocol in the next section with the following 
features: 
 
1. It is a group-based authentication protocol using varying identifier that reduces computation 
and search time. 
2. It uses hash function and two random numbers. 
3. It eliminates the existing privacy and security problems. 
4. It requires low storages, computation and communication costs that are suitable for low-cost 
RFID tags. 
 
6.3   The Proposed GAPVI Protocol 
 
In this section, a new protocol (GAPVI) is proposed. This is based on the challenge-response 
method using the one-way hash function and the randomized hash function in RFID systems. This 
122 
 
protocol supports recovery in case of desynchronization due to incomplete authentication process 
with less computations and protecting location privacy effectively. Relying on the same 
prerequisites as the one-way hash function and key management at the back-end, a scheme is 
proposed that not only provides data privacy but location privacy as well. The general idea is to 
change the ID of a tag on every read attempt in a secure manner. Any attempts like eavesdropping, 
spoofing, modification, replay attacks, or man-in-the-middle attacks cannot compromise the 
scheme. 
 
6.3.1  Preliminaries 
 
The hash function h is defined as y = h(x), where h(x) is a cryptographic one-way function. Ideally, 
besides the function being difficult to invert, the output y should not reveal any substantial 
information on its preimage x [Menezes et al. 1996].  A hash function h is an efficiently computable 
function which maps an arbitrary length input to a fixed length output;  
                     lh }1,0{}1,0{: *    
A cryptographic hash function has the following properties  [Menezes et al. 1996]: 
 Preimage resistance: For any output y, it is computationally infeasible to find an input x such 
that h(x) = y. 
 Second-preimage resistance:  Given x, it is computationally infeasible to find xx , where 
xx    such that )()( xhxh   
 
6.3.2   Notations 
 
The notations used in this protocol are as follows: 
h         A one-way hash function, lh }1,0{}1,0{: *   
l          The length of an identifier 
r1         Random number in l}1,0{  
r2         Random number in l}1,0{  
ID       Tag identifier 
IDPrev   Previous tag identifier 
HID    Hash address 
HIDPrev:   Previous value of the hash address 
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GI       Secret group index 
       XOR operator 
 ||         Concatenation operator 
       Assignment operator 
+       Modular addition by mod (2l − 1) 
 
6.3.3  System Set-up 
 
The system setup for the tag, reader and the database are as follows: 
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag Identifier 
GI:   Secret group index 
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields. 
Back-end Database: Back-end database contains the following fields: 
ID: Tag identifier 
HID:   Hash address 
GI:   Secret group index 
HIDPrev:   Previous value of the hash address 
IDprev: ID in previous phase 
 
6.3.4      GAPVI Operations 
 
 
When a tag enters into the range of the reader, this can initiate the authentication protocol. The 
protocol is shown in Figure 6-1.  
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Figure 6-1:    GAPVI Protocol 
 
The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows: 
 
1. A reader selects a random number r1 and sends a request with r1 to the tag. 
2. After receiving the random number r1 the tag will generate another random number r2.       
 The tag computes 2rGIA   
                             ))(()( 21 rrGIIDhB   
                            )||||( 21 rrIDhC  , and sends the value of A,B, CL to the reader. 
3. The reader then sends A,B,CL,r1 to the back-end database. 
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4. The database computes AGIr 2 , ))(( 21 rrGIBHID  for all GI values  
         If computed HID is equal to any HID in the database then pick the ID and computes  
)||||( 21 rrIDhC     
         if LL CC  matches for any ID then the ID is authenticated 
             For the next session, update    
              IDID ev Pr        
              HIDHID ev Pr  
              21 rrIDID  .  
              )(IDhHID  
       Sends RC     to the reader 
     else LL CCif   
                  Computes AGIr 2 , ))(( 21 rrGIBHID   for all GI values       
                 if computed HID is equal to any HIDPrev in database computes )||||( 21Pr rrIDhC ev             
                 if LL CC  matches for any IDPrev then the ID is authenticated  
                         Sends RC      to the reader      
5. The reader forwards RC   to the tag. 
6. if RR CC  matches then the reader is authenticated. Update 21 rrIDID   
 
The description and applications of the proposed algorithm will be presented in the next section.  
 
6.3.5   Protocol Description and Example 
 
To understand the update procedure of GAPVI operations and synchronization operation in the tag 
and the database in each authentication process the protocol descriptions are outlined as follows:   
 
Assume in the initial state the database and the tag has the following values 
 
Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
HID0, ID0, GI, HID0 , ID0 ID0, GI 
 
In case of successful authentication process the tag sends A, B and CL to the reader to forward these 
values to the database. The database after authentication updates its parameters and sends the RC   to 
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the tag. The tag also authenticates and updates its parameter to synchronous with the database. After 
successful authentication process it has the following state: 
 
Database (HID, ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
HID1, ID1, GI, HID0 , ID0 ID1, GI 
 
If the authentication process is unable to complete because of some abnormal situation (e.g. loss of 
transmission) in this case the tag is unable to authenticate and update the parameter ID and is then 
holding the previous value. The scenario is shown as follows:  
 
Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
HID1, ID1, GI, HID0 , ID0 ID0, GI 
 
For the next authentication phase of the tag the database cannot authenticate with current value of 
HID1 and ID1 and hence will authenticate the tag with the HIDPrev and IDPrev which are now HID0 
and ID0 . After this it will synchronize the values as follows: 
 
Database (HID, ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
HID1, ID1, GI, HID0 , ID0 ID1, GI 
 
The scenarios are shown with some examples as follows: 
  
Initial state: 
We assume h(100)=10 and h(117)=12  and the fields are initialized with the following values: 
 
HID0=10, ID0=100, GI=1, HID0=10, ID0=100 
 
Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
10, 100, 1, 10, 100 100, 1 
 
Next states: 
We also assume that the next value of the ID will be 117.  If a successful authentication is 
performed the database and tag will update the values as follows: 
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Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
12, 117, 1, 10, 100  117, 1 
 
The subsequent successful authentication process will be continued in the same way. 
 
If the authentication is not successful we assume only the database updated the values successfully 
but the tag failed to update. In that case the values will be as follows: 
 
Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
12, 117, 1, 10, 100 100, 1 
 
After this state if a successful authentication is performed with the previous values of HIDPrev=10 
and IDPrev=100 the database and tag will be again synchronized as follows: 
 
Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
12, 117, 1, 10, 100 117, 1 
 
6.4 Experiment Result and Discussion 
 
To validate the proposed protocol GAPVI, simulation experiments have been conducted. A 
simulation program in Turbo C++ compiler was developed in a desktop computer of Intel (R) Core 
2 Duo with processor speed of 2.93GHz and memory of 3.46 GB. Windows XP Professional was 
used as the operating system. The objective of the simulation program was to check the anonymity 
of the response for one tag. The output of a hash function is the same for the same random number 
pair. The objective is to ensure unique response for different inputs of random number pair so that 
an adversary is unable to use any responses at later stage to access the tag or the reader. The 
program checks to match a response for different sets of random numbers. EOHLCAP is selected 
which uses static identifier to protect the privacy and security of the RFID systems with our 
proposed protocol.  The number of times a similar response is generated is given in Table 6-1.  The 
experiment was conducted for 16, 32 and 64 bits for secrets, random number and data. The results 
shown in Table 6-1 indicated that for 32 and 64 bits there is no matching response and the results 
are always unique for the proposed protocol but for EOHLCAP this unique response is obtained 
only for 64 bits and the secure zones for the two protocols are shown in the shaded cells. For 16 bits 
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there were some recurrences of the same response for both the protocols.  The recurrence of the 
same response is due to two reasons. Firstly it produces the same random number pairs and 
secondly it produces similar responses for some other combination of random number pairs.  
 
Table 6-1    Attacker’s Success Table 
Ex
p 
No 
Number 
of 
Queries 
to the 
Tag 
Data/ 
Secret   
Size (bits) 
Attacker’s Success 
EOHLCAP[18] 
(Static ID) 
GAPVI 
(Varying ID) 
1 1011 16 1539054 1511114 
2 1011 16 1536078 1505568 
3 1011 16 1536965 1526852 
4 1011 32 0 0 
5 1011 32 40 0 
6 1011 32 0 0 
7 1011 32 0 0 
8 1011 32 0 0 
9 1011 32 43 0 
10 1011 64 0 0 
11 1011 64 0 0 
12 1011 64 0 0 
13 1011 64 0 0 
14 1011 64 0 0 
15 1011 64 0 0 
16 1011 64 0 0 
17 1011 64 0 0 
18 1011 64 0 0 
19 1011 64 0 0 
20 1011 64 0 0 
 
 
The Table 6-2 shows the summary of the evaluation. 
 
Table 6-2   Attacker’s success table  
 
Data/Secret size  EOHLCAP[18] 
(Static ID) 
GAPVI 
(Varying ID) 
16 bits Not secured Not secured 
32 bits Not secured Secured 
64 bits Secured Secured 
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This experiment showed that the protocol is secure for 32 and 64 bits in 1011 attempts. For 16 bits 
there were some recurrences of the same response that can be used by an adversary.  However, the 
EOHLCAP is not secure for 32 bits of data and secret values.  
 
6.5   Analysis 
 
To evaluate the proposed protocol privacy, security and efficiency will be analysed. The identified 
privacy and security are information leakage, location privacy, information and replay attack, 
message interception and tracing. In efficiency analysis storage, computation and communication 
costs are considered. The attack model is defined in the following way: 
: An adversary 
R: Reader 
T: Tag 
It is assumed that the adversary disguises as a reader R and  GIID ,  will be used by the 
adversary as fake ID and secret GI respectively.  
 
6.5.1 Privacy and Security Analysis 
 
The privacy and security of the proposed protocol is analysed against various threats such as 
information leakage of a tag, location privacy, and impersonation of a tag, Denial of Service attack 
and traceability and are outlined as follows: 
 
Information Leakage: In this protocol to be able to obtain any sensitive information from a tag the 
adversary  must be authenticated.  To authenticate the system an adversary   must know ID, GI 
and the hash function to get any information from the tags. The combination of r1 and r2 with GI 
and ID makes the response C so unpredictable that the adversary can only guess the value or use a 
brute-force technique with an advantage of only 
l2
1 , which is negligible. From the responses 
))(()( 21 rrGIIDhB  and )||||( 21 rrIDhC   of the tag the adversary cannot extract the value of 
ID.  
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Location Privacy: The value of B and C cannot be linked with any particular tag. The protocol 
ensures location privacy by using new values of r1, r2 each time. The identifier ID is also updated 
after each authentication session. Even if a malicious reader sends the same random value r1 all the 
times, a tag transmits the refreshed value using r2 and GI. The adversary   can receive the 
following response from the tag in one session. 
 
         )||||(: 21 rrIDhT    
          
In the next session the adversary   will receive a different response from the tag since the ID, r1, 
and r2 are all changed the responses are not matched. 
           
In subsequent all sessions the responses from the tag are anonymous hence location privacy is 
protected and tracking is not possible.       
 
Impersonation and Replay Attack: When a tag reaches within the range of a reader, the reader 
queries with a random value to the tag. An adversary may also make a request to a tag with a 
random number. However, without knowing the ID, the hash function, secret GI an adversary is 
unable to impersonate. After each session the ID is updated internally to a new value. The value of 
secret GI is passed always secretly.  For each session the tag generates a new value of the responses 
A, B and C which are totally indistinguishable and different from other sessions and subsequently 
the impersonation and replay attacks are not possible.  
     
Message Interception: The protocol recovers from the abnormal interruption of the authentication 
process. If the adversary is able to prevent the last transmission to the tag from the reader then the 
tag will not authenticate the reader in that session. In the next authentication phase it will use a new 
random number to authenticate and the database will use the previous IDprev to authenticate and 
synchronous the system. For example the database will use HID0, ID0 instead of HID1, ID1 to 
authenticate the tag as shown as follows: 
 
Database (HID,ID, GI, HIDPrev , IDprev) Tag(ID, GI) 
 
HID1,ID1, GI, HID0 , ID0 ID0, GI 
 
Traceability: An adversary is unable to identify the tag from its response because each time it gives 
a different value which is non traceable from other responses. This scheme is fully protected from 
131 
 
the future forward and backward traceability. The adversary has no control over r2, and the 
combination of r1, r2 and hash function and also does not know the ID and group secret value GI. 
Consequently, the previous, present and future interactions are all indistinguishable.   
 
Table 6-3    Privacy and Security Comparisons 
Property HIDV 
(Varying ID) 
LCAP 
(Varying ID) 
RoAP 
(Varying ID) 
EOHLCAP 
(Static ID) 
GAPVI 
(Varying ID) 
Information privacy Y Y Y Y Y 
Location Privacy N N Y Y Y 
Impersonation N A Y Y Y 
Replay attack N Y Y Y Y 
Message Interception Y Y Y Y Y 
Backward 
Traceability 
N Y Y Y Y 
Forward Traceability N Y Y Y Y 
Y: Protected    A: provided under assumption   N: Not Provided 
 
The summary of the privacy and security properties is given in Table 6-3. The privacy and security 
properties of GAPVI are compared with four other schemes HIDV, LCAP, RoAP and EOHLCAP. 
The three schemes HIDV, LCAP, RoAP were chosen because all of these protocols involved tag 
authentication and involve secret update process after each successful authentication. The protocol 
EOHLCAP was chosen from static ID group since it offers better privacy and security options.   
The table shows that the proposed protocol provided protections from all the identified privacy and 
security threats.  Some of the privacy and security properties are further tested by simulation 
program and outlined in Section 6-4.  
 
6.5.2  Efficiency Analysis 
 
Storage, communication and computation cost are considered for efficiency analysis. Various 
existing authentication protocols are compared with the proposed GAPVI authentication protocol. 
HIDV [Henrici and Muller 2004]  requires a larger storage and computations than other protocols 
and suffers from location privacy issues. It is also vulnerable to impersonation attack. LCAP 
appears to be better in performance however, it has location privacy problem [Lee et al. 2005]. The 
GAPVI protocol shows improved performance as shown in Table 6-4 because it requires less tag 
side and database side storage than some protocols and gives protection from the all attacks [Lee et 
al. 2005]. The storage requirement for the tag and the database are 2l, and 5l respectively. The 
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protocol requires less hash function in both tag and database in simulation experiments.  RoAP 
[Hoque et al. 2009] gives protections from all the attacks but it needs 
2
N  functions and 2 hash 
operations which is costly because the value of N may be very high and require many hash 
computations that will make the protocol slower.  Table 6-4 gives an overall comparison of the 
different protocols compared to the proposed GAPVI. It shows that the proposed protocol requires 
much less hash function than the secured RoAP protocol. As the hash functions computations on the 
database side is less the proposed protocol requires less computation time.  
  
Table 6-4     Efficiency Analysis 
 
Efficiency 
Criteria 
 HIDV  
(Varying ID) 
LCAP  
(Varying ID) 
RoAP 
(Varying ID) 
EOHLCAP 
(Static ID) 
GAPVI 
(Varying ID) 
Storage Tag 3l 1l 2l 3l 2l 
Reader - - - - - 
Database 10l 6l 3l 3l 5l 
Computation Tag 3h 2h 2h + f 1h+µ 2h  
Reader - - - - - 
Database 3h+ ε 2h+ ε  )2
2
( hfN
  

 hm i )
2
1
(  1h+ ε 
Communication Tag-to-
Reader 
3l 1.5l 2l 2.5l 2.5l 
Reader-
to-tag 
2l 0.5l l 0.5l 0.5l 
ε: Small operation in back-end database µ: small operation in the tag side  h: hash operation   f: 
Function operation  N: Total number of tags, mi: number of tags in the ith group 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
A new efficient and secure authentication protocol GAPVI is proposed to protect privacy for low-
cost RFID systems. The protocol uses a varying identifier to provide effective privacy and security 
with recovery of the identifier to maintain synchronization. Due to the group-based design it 
requires less computation and search time to authenticate a tag. Due to the new updated identifier 
after each authentication process the response is more unpredictable and consequently more secure. 
It is also secured from an adversary by maintaining location privacy in case the authentication 
process is interrupted, since it always uses new random number pairs to generate the hash response. 
The new random number pairs in each session make the hash response unidentifiable. It also 
protects the systems from an adversary for both privacy and security attacks as it was tested in the 
simulation experiment and analysis. The proposed scheme requires only two one-way hash 
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functions in the tag and only one hash computation in the database making it highly efficient. The 
storage requirement for the tag and database is also cost efficient for an authentication protocol 
using varying identifiers. The comparison outlined in the analysis of the protocol is both secure and 
efficient compared to the other protocols outlined. It has practical advantages over these protocols 
because it is simple and provides a larger range of privacy and security protections. In future the 
intention is to perform more comparisons related to privacy, security and performance with other 
protocols using experiments by simulation software. 
 
Part of the substance of this chapter has been published in the proceedings of the following 
conference. 
 
1. Morshed,  M.M., Atkins, A.S. , Yu, H., Ahmed, S.I. , Akbar, M.M. 2010, ‘A Novel 
Authentication Protocol using Varying Identifier for RFID System’, IEEE 4th International 
Conference on Advanced Computing & Communication Technologies (ICACCT), India, 
pp.1-6.  
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Chapter 7  Privacy and Security 
Enhancements of the  HB-MP  Protolcols  
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter proposes a different approach to ensure privacy and security of the RFID systems 
instead of using hash function. It uses lightweight cryptographic techniques to ensure the privacy 
and security of the low-cost resource- constraint RFID systems. 
 
It is essential to ensure privacy and security protections in RFID systems. However, implementation 
of conventional cryptography is not possible in a passive RFID tag due to its limited processing 
capability and memory limitations [Parbhu et al. 2005]. This chapter analyzes the privacy and 
security problems in HB, HB+ and HB-MP protocols and a new authentication protocol Enhanced 
HB-MP (EHB-MP) is presented, to overcome their limitations.  HB was suitable against a passive 
attack but vulnerable to an active attack. HB+ and HB-MP were designed to protect against the 
active attack. However, it is found that these protocols are not safe against some active attacks such 
as the man-in-the-middle attack.  In this chapter, the possible attacks in the existing light weight 
protocols of Radio Frequency Identification System (RFID) systems are investigated and new 
lightweight authentication protocol related to HB+ and HB-MP protocols is proposed which provide 
the identified privacy and security in an efficient manner for pervasive computing environment. 
More precisely, the proposed protocol is enhanced version of HB-MP protocol. It is shown that 
storage and computation require to implement these protocols are almost similar to HB+, HB-MP 
protocols. A mathematical proof is presented to show that the Enhanced HB-MP protocol is 
protected from the man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
Various privacy and security goals are identified in the RFID systems. Some of the privacy and 
security objectives are to protect the RFID systems form information leakage, location privacy, 
man-in-the-middle and replay attack, backward and forward traceability and cloning. In typical 
RFID system there is a chance of information leakage. For the protection from such information 
leakage, an RFID system needs to provide privacy control so that unauthorized readers cannot 
access the tags. Location privacy is another important issue for a tag holder. An unauthorized user 
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may try to know the location of the tag holder. When a tag transmits any information to a reader, an 
adversary may try to distinguish it from other responses and can find the location of the user. An 
unauthorized reader may initiate man-in-the-middle and replay attack. When a tag responds to a 
reader, an adversary can collect the information from the tag and can modify the response of the 
tag.  Adversary can also impersonate the tag using this information and replay in future. Message 
interception or Denial of Service (DoS) may make the RFID system inoperable.  An adversary may 
try to block communication between the tag and the reader and can cause the server and the tag to 
lose synchronization. It is possible to identify a tag using backward and forward traceability.  If the 
internal stage of a tag is known then it can help to identify the tag interactions of past and future.  
Cloning a tag is a very common threat for an RFID system. To protect from counterfeiting, the 
RFID systems need to be unclonable. An adversary can clone a tag if it knows the secrets of the tag. 
If the response of a tag is always the same then an adversary can mimic this response as a valid 
signal.   
 
This is an important research consideration to develop a privacy and security protocol for the RFID 
system that addresses these issues and overcome these problems using limited storage and 
computational capacity of an RFID tag. The goal is to use lightweight encryption that is easy to 
implement in low-cost RFID tag. The proposed EHB-MP enhanced the HB-MP protocol and 
protect from the identified privacy and security threats.  A mathematical analysis is presented to 
prove that the man-in-the-middle attack described in Gilbert et al.[2005] cannot break the privacy 
and security of the EHB-MP protocol.  
 
7.2 Related Works 
 
The proposed new protocol is an extension of HB-MP protocol and is protected from the security 
attacks discussed in this section. The short review of HB, HB+ and HB-MP protocols and man-in-
the-middle attack described by Gilbert et al. [2005] are given below.   
 
The details of the LPN problem and HB protocol are discussed in Section 3.3.3.1. The LPN 
problem works with binary inner product of two numbers. It is assumed that each number is k-bit 
long and two k-bit numbers 2110 )....((  kaaaa  and 2110 )......(  kxxxx .  The inner product of a and 
x is denoted by a.x and it can be evaluated as )(......)()(. 111100   kk xaxaxaxa . It is 
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easy to implement in low cost hardware such as an RFID tag and is also possible to compute one bit 
at a time [Jules and Weis 2005]. So it is not necessary to store all k bits of a and x when computing. 
Goldreich and Levin [1989] proved that a.x is unpredictable if only a or x is given.    
 
The HB protocol proposed by Hopper and Blum [2001] is a cryptographic protocol based on binary 
inner product. It was a human authentication protocol because human can evaluate one binary inner 
product operation, and generate a random bit. This HB protocol is claimed to be secure under the 
assumption that Learning Parity with Noise problem is intractable.  
 
In HB protocol both human and machine shares a common secret x of k-bit long. In this case the 
human plays the role of a tag and the reader plays the role of a machine.   
 
The HB protocol is secure only from passive attackers. It is not secure against active attacks where 
a reader can be malicious. Jules and Weis [2005] proposed an extended version of the HB protocol 
to protect against active attack and this new protocol is referred to as HB+. 
 
The detail of the HB+ protocol is given in Section 3.3.3.2. The HB+ protocol is an improved 
version of HB protocol and gives better privacy and security protection. In the HB+ protocol the 
reader and the tag both share two secrets (x, y) of k-bit long. In the HB+ protocol the tag also 
generates a random number b as a blinding factor. The purpose of the blinding factor b is to protect 
the tag from the malicious reader from extracting secret by repeatedly querying the tag with the 
same random number a.   
 
In the HB+ protocol the purpose of v is same as in the HB protocol. It is to protect x from passive 
eavesdropper after observing k pairs (a, z). The noise bit is generated in each round with a value 1 
with probability  as in HB protocol. 
 
Though it is claimed that the HB+ protocol is free from an active attack but an attack has been 
described against this protocol by Gilbert et al. [2005]. The authors proved that it is not secure 
against the man-in- the-middle attack. The adversary chooses a k-bit vector  and introduces it by 
doing XOR with a in each round and sends the result a  to the tag in place of a . The tag will 
compute vybxaz  ).().(  and send it to the reader. It is obvious that if authentication 
process is successful then 0. x otherwise 1. x  with a high probability. So, one can recover 
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one bit of x by using same  in all r round. To retrieve the k- bit secret x it is sufficient to repeat the 
whole protocol k times by changing the value of  linearly independently. 
 
The HB-MP protocol is explained in Section 3.3.3.3. The authors proposed the protocol in two 
phases. First one is called HB-MP/ which exchanges only two messages. HB-MP/ protocol is 
secured against passive attack but vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack [Leng et al. 2008]. To 
protect from the attack the HB-MP/ protocol is modified and the second one is called HB-MP. The 
HB-MP protocol uses two shared secrets as in HB+ protocol. 
 
The Rotate() function is supposed to protect the HB-MP protocol form the-man-in-the-middle 
attack. However, this has its own weakness since x=Rotate(x, yi), it gives a same value of xm in the 
first round of all authentication session [Leng et al. 2008].  If the attacker observes the ith round, he 
is able to reveal the xm used in the ith round. Hence the protocol is not protected from the man-in-
the-middle attack [Leng et al. 2008].  
 
7.3   The Propsoed Enhanced HB-MP Protocol 
 
In this section, a new protocol related to HB+ and HB-MP based on challenge-response method is 
proposed.  The proposed protocol utilizes the blinding process of HB+ protocol and the new idea 
from HB-MP protocol.  
 
The notations and symbols used in this protocol are: 
 
 x        Secret number 
 y        Secret number 
 k        The length of an identifier 
 f0(p1,p2)     Shift-left  p1 for every 0 in p2      
 f1(p1,p2)     Shift-left  p1 for every 1 in p2      
 a        Random number in k}1,0{  
 b        Random number in k}1,0{  
       k-bit vector used for attack 
      XOR operator 
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       AND operator 
 z        Result of the inner products 
z      Changed result of the inner products 
 
The proposed protocol that enhanced HB-MP is as follows: 
 
7.3.1   EHB-MP Protocol 
 
The proposed protocol enhanced HB-MP protocol. It uses one-way shift-left functions f0(p1,p2) and  
f1(p1,p2) in place of  the rotate function in HB-MP, HB-MP+ protocols. The objective of the one-
way function is that it makes impossible to get the value of the input from the output. It uses the two 
random numbers a and b to change the value of x and y in each round.  The changed values u and v 
are used to compute the inner product z. The value of u and v are obtained using a one-way shift left 
operation. This will give a new value in all the rounds to make the response non identifiable. It is 
not possible to obtain the secret x and y from u and v. 
 
 
 
 
                                    Reader (x, y)                                             Tag (x, y) 
                                                                                     
                                                         ]1[Pr|1,0 vobv  
                                                         kRb 1,0  
                                              
                                          
 kRa 1,0  
                                    a      
  
                                                   ),(0 ybaxfu   
                                                   ),(1 xbayfv   
                                                   vvbuaz  ).().(  
                                                   Choose c/ zvcuc  ..  
                                 cb,  
  
 
                              ),(0 ybaxfu   
                              ),(1 xbayfv   
                              Verify vcuc ..  ).().( vbua   
 
 
Figure 7-1:  One Round of the Proposed EHB-MP Protocol. 
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The EHB-MP protocol is depicted in Figure7-1 and the steps in the protocols are given as follows:  
 
There are six steps in this protocol.  
1. The reader generates a random number a and sends it to the tag. 
2. The tag receives a from the reader  and  generates a random number b as a blinding factor 
and computes 
),(0 ybaxfu   
),(1 xbayfv   
3. The tag computes 
vvbuaz  ).().(  
and looks for k-bit binary vector c such that zvcuc  .. . Here v is a noise factor of value 1 
with probability )5.0,0( . 
4. The tag sends b and  c to the reader. 
5. The reader computes  
 ),(0 ybaxfu   
),(1 xbayfv     
6. The reader checks   vcuc ..  ).().( vbua   
 
7.3.2      Protection Against the Man-in-the-middle Attack 
 
If a man-in-the-middle attack is done according to Gilbert et al. [2005] using  then the reader will 
use (c+ ) for c. The response reduces to  
                                                  vcuc ).().(    
                                               = )).(( vuc   
                                               = ).( vuc  + ).( vu  
 
It is obvious that if authentication process is successful then 0).( vu otherwise 1).( vu  
with a high probability.  The adversary cannot get any idea about x and y because u and v are 
always changing using the random numbers a and b. Due to the one-way property of the functions 
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),(0 ybaxf  and ),(1 xbayf   it is not possible to link between x, y with u, v pairs. From the 
inner product of ).( vu it is not possible to retrieve the bits of the secret x and y.  
 
7.4   Analysis 
 
The previous protocols HB, HB+ and HB-MP have several privacy and security problems. The HB 
protocol is only protected from passive attacks. The HB+ and HB-MP are vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attack. The proposed EHB-MP protocol is protected from the man-in-the middle attack 
shown in the Section 7.3.2. The other privacy and security analysis are given as follows:   
 
7.4.1 Privacy and Security Analysis 
 
The privacy and security of the proposed protocol are analyzed against the threats discussed in 
Section 7.1.  The responses are computed considering the LPN problem; a passive attacker has to 
solve the LPN problem to reveal the secret of the tag. The strength of the proposed EHB-MP 
protocol is that x and y are replaced by u and v  respectively with two random numbers a and b 
before the inner operation is performed. Two random numbers a and b change the secret x and y to 
make the attacks impossible. The proposed EHB-MP protocol is protected against the identified 
threats. 
 
The proposed protocol is resistant to information leakage. In this protocol, adversary must be 
authenticated to get any sensitive information from a tag. To authenticate an adversary must know x 
and y to get any information from the tag. The combination of a and b makes the response so 
unpredictable that adversary cannot extract the value of x or y from c since x and y are replaced by 
u and v  respectively. The functions ),(0 ybaxf  and ),(1 xbayf  make the secret x and y 
protected from information leakage due to the one-way property of these functions. 
 
The proposed protocol ensures location privacy. The responses from the tags are unidentifiable by 
the adversary. The value of z cannot be linked with any particular tag. This protocol ensures 
location privacy by using new values of a, b each time. Even if a malicious reader sends a same 
random value a all the times, a tag transmits the refreshed value that are refreshed by b, x and y.  
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The proposed protocol is resistant against all passive attacks since the information obtained by an 
attacker is equivalent to the information obtained by HB and HB+ protocols. It is also resistant 
against active attacks applied to HB, HB+ because the shared secret keys x and y are modified by 
two random numbers a and b at every round before the computation of the inner product. It makes 
the response random and unpredictable.  
 
The protocol is protected from the man-in-the-middle and replay attack.  Without knowing x, y 
adversary cannot be authenticated by the tag. In every round tag generates new value of z generated 
from x and y that is totally indistinguishable.  It sends a new value c generated from z in each round. 
It protects the protocol from the man-in-the-middle attack applied to HB+ and HB-MP protocols 
Gilbert et al.[2005].  
 
The EHB-MP protocol does not suffer from DoS attack. The secrets in our protocol are never 
changed. The adversary has no access to the secret value of the tag and the reader. If an adversary 
modifies the responses in any authentication process, the authentication cannot be performed and an 
active attack is detected. 
 
The proposed protocol is also resistant against the backward and forward traceability. In the 
proposed protocol the same challenge does not produce the same response from the tag. Two 
random numbers a and b make the response more intractable by changing the x and y to u and v  
respectively. The previous, present and future interactions are all indistinguishable.  So the 
backward and forward traceability are not possible.  
 
In the proposed protocol the adversary will not be successful to clone a tag. In the protocol the 
secrets are never passed in plain text and the responses are always different due to the random 
numbers a and b.  The same challenge does not produce the same response from the tag.  
 
7.4.2 Efficiency Analysis 
 
The storage cost, communication cost and computation cost of the propose protocols are considered 
to compare with the protocols in the HB-family for efficiency analysis. The proposed EHB-MP 
protocol was compared with HB, HB-MP/, HB+, HB++ and HB-MP protocols. The proposed 
protocol gives protection against the active attacks and also against passive attacks using the same 
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storage and resources as in HB+ and HB-MP protocols.  Storage comparison is shown in the Table 
7-1.  The Proposed EHB-MP requires two secret each like HB+ and HB-MP. HB protocol uses less 
storage but they are not secured against active attacks. It is secured against passive attacks only. 
 
Table 7-1   Storage Comparison 
 
Protocols HB HB-MP/ HB+ HB++ HB-MP EHB-MP 
Tag k k 2k 4k 2k 2k 
Reader k k 2k 4k 2k 2k 
 
 
The fundamental operations used in the proposed protocol are similar as in HB, HB+ and HB-MP 
except HB++ and the proposed protocol require extra functions that make these protocols little 
more complex [Munilla and Peinado 2007]. There are two message transmissions in each round in 
our protocol like HB-MP.  HB+ protocol requires 3 message transmissions in each round.  HB+ and 
HB-MP protocols are vulnerable against man-in-the middle attack described by Gilbert et al.[2005]. 
We show that our protocol is secure against the man-in-the-middle attack with same tag and reader 
storage.  
 
7.5 Application 
 
Recently many researchers are working on Internet of Things (IoT). The main idea of IoT is the 
pervasive presence of RFID tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones etc around us can be interacted 
using their unique identifiers [Giusto et al. 2010].  From the point of the private users, the most 
obvious effects of the IoT will be in everywhere of domestic and working fields. Security and 
privacy are two of the important issues in the IoT, since this technology is widely used in the 
physical world. Many living processes like online payment, transportation and transaction will 
depend on the application of the IoT. People will reject the IoT if there is no public confidence that 
it will not be a threat for privacy. There RFID tags are the important assets in the IoT applications. 
The problem is that when RFID tags are used in the IoT they spend most of the times unattended 
[Giusto et al. 2010].   Data can be scanned or modified by the adversary. To protect the RFID data 
from various attacks researchers suggested various RFID authentication protocols. Due to the 
suitability of the lightweight encryption technology HB+ protocol is suggested by many researchers 
in IoT. Since this protocol is not secure from man-in-the-middle attack the information in the tags 
can be vulnerable to the adversary (Gilbert et al. 2005).  The proposed protocol EHB-MP is secured 
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from the identified threats and can be used to protect the RFID tags in the application of IoT. The 
proposed protocol is also a light weight protocol and it would be suitable in the IoT application. 
 
7.6    Conclusion 
 
A new efficient and secure authentication protocol EHB-MP using light-weight encryption 
technique is proposed to protect privacy for low-cost RFID system for ubiquitous environment. The 
HB+ and the HB-MP protocols are suppose to protect from both the passive and the active attack. 
However they are not protected from the special man-in-the middle attack. The proposed EHB-MP 
protocol derived from HB+ and HB-MP protocols by removing the existing privacy and security 
problems. It is protected from the man-in-the-middle attack as well as other attacks discussed in the 
privacy analysis section. The storage requirements for tag and the reader are also low. The proposed 
protocol requires the same storage as the HB+ and EHB-MP protocols and less than HB++ 
protocol.  
 
The proposed scheme requires only lightweight cryptography which is suitable for low-cost RFID 
tag that makes it more efficient. It takes less storage and computation costs than hash-based RFID 
authentication protocol. Only drawback of the lightweight authentication protocols like HB+, HB-
MP and EHB-MP are the number of iteration takes in data transmission between the tag and the 
reader. The comparison outlined in Section 7.4.1 and shown in Table 7.1 indicates that the protocol 
is both secure and efficient than HB+ and HB-MP protocols.  A mathematical proof is given to 
show that the proposed EHB-MP protocol is fully protected from the man-in-the-middle attack. 
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Chapter 8   Implementation and Application  
 
8.1     Introduction  
 
The applications of RFID technology introduce many privacy and security threats in various 
commercial operations.  The potential areas for RFID applications include e-passport, supply chain, 
automation, healthcare systems and baggage handling in aviation industry etc.   In this chapter the 
privacy and security problems are identified in three most potential applications areas and 
architectures are proposed to use the developed protocols in these applications. Other systems also 
may use the same technologies as well. The application areas are: 
 RFID in e-passport 
 RFID in healthcare systems 
 RFID in baggage handling in airport 
 
8.2 RFID in e-Passport 
 
An e-passport is a biometric passport that combines both paper and electronic chip. It includes 
biometrics information and ID using RFID chip.  The goal of e-passport is to provide strong 
authentication through documents that unambiguously identify the passport holder. An e-passport 
can protect forging of ID and can make rapid progress in immigration. An e-passport is a machine 
readable passport, which is a biometrically-enabled and globally interoperable. The number of 
forged passports is increasing worldwide.  Therefore, to strengthen national security against 
international terrorism or crime, nations all over the world are now proposing the use of electronic 
passports. The e-passport is difficult to forge and increases stability by intensifying the personal 
verification procedure [Schouten and Jacobs 2009].  
 
An e-passport represents a bold initiative in the deployment of two technologies: biometrics and 
RFID. The U.S. government has mandated adoption of e-passports by the 27 countries in the Visa-
Waiver Program in 2006 [Jules et al. 2005]. Other nations like Japan and most of the nations of 
Western Europe together with some other countries are involved in this project. These passports 
follow the guidelines of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an organisation run 
by the United Nations with a mandate for setting international passport standards from Document 
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9303[ICAO 2004a]. The guidelines recommend the inclusion of RFID chips, microchips capable of 
storing data and transmitting it in a wireless manner into a passport. ICAO standard specifies face 
recognition for biometric identity verification. The e-passport will contain digitized photographic 
images of the passport holder’s face. Additionally the standard specifies fingerprints and iris data as 
an optional biometrics. The goal of ICAO is the strong authentication through documents that 
unequivocally identify the passport holders.  
 
 
Figure 8-1: Unique Identification of a Passport Holder 
 
The ICAO standard specifies face recognition for identity verification as the globally interoperable 
biometric. The US-VISIT program in fact requires visitors to provide two fingerprint images in 
addition to a headshot.   
 
Malaysia has already implemented e-passports in a project before the ICAO standard. Since 1998, 
Malaysian passports have incorporated a chip consisting of an image of a thumbprint of the passport 
holder; a second generation e-passports introduced in 2003 that contains extracted fingerprint 
information only. In Kuala Lumpur International Airport,  when a Malaysian passport holder passes 
through the automated gate that reads the thumb print from the chip and compares this thumb print 
to the thumb print given on a scanner [Jules et al. 2005].  
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However, the use of RFID tags used in an e-passport may cause privacy violation of users. Due to 
the unique identification number of the RFID tag, this is subjected to different privacy and security 
threats such as information leakage of a tag, traceability of the consumer, denial of service attack, 
and impersonation of a tag etc. This section investigates different privacy and security problems in 
RFID systems used in e-passport and proposes the implementation of a proposed authentication 
protocol to overcome those privacy and security problems. Simulation experiments show that the 
protocol is secure for larger entropy. There are many security threats are identified in e-passport due 
to the uses of the RFID [Jules et al. 2005].  A summary of the major general privacy and security 
issues in e-passport are outlined as follows: 
 
 Clandestine scanning: Clandestine scanning is possible in RFID tags. The ICAO guidelines 
do not require authenticated transmissions between readers and passports. Consequently, an 
insecure e-passport is subject to short-range clandestine scanning (< 1 m), with attendant 
leakage of sensitive private information including the date of birth and place of birth. 
 
 Clandestine tracking: According to the standard for e-passport, RFID chips (ISO 14443) 
emits the chip ID without authentication on protocol initiation. If this ID is unique for every 
passport, it could enable tracking the movements of the passport holder by unauthorized 
parties. Tracking is possible even if the data on the chip cannot be read.  
 
 Skimming and cloning: Baseline ICAO regulations need digital signatures on e-passport. 
According to the regulations, such signatures allow the reader to verify the correct passport-
issuing authority. In e-passport digital signatures do not bind the data to a particular passport 
or chip. They offer no defence against passport cloning. 
 
 Eavesdropping: Faraday cage is a physical approach for countermeasure to clandestine 
RFID scanning. In an e-passport, a Faraday cage can be used in a form of metallic cover that 
prevents the scanning of RFID signals. Passports equipped with Faraday cages can be 
scanned only when the passport holders expressly presented them, and would allow most 
privacy concerns without knowing. Faraday cages, however, do not prevent eavesdropping 
on legitimate passport-to-reader communications, like those taking place in airports.  
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 Biometric data-leakage: E-passports also include biometric images. According to the 
ICAO standard, these will initially be digitized headshots. If the physical setting were 
controlled strongly, these images need to be secret to carry authentication. However, if the 
proposed uses of e-passports support automation, this may put some risk of biometric data 
leakage.  
 
 Cryptographic weaknesses: ICAO guidelines specify an optional means for authenticating 
and encrypting the passport-to-reader communications. That is a reader reads the name, date 
of birth, and passport number to obtain a cryptographic key K. The key permits the passport 
to verify that if the reader is authentic before releasing RFID tag information. It is also used 
to encrypt all data transmitted between the passport and the reader. Once a reader knows the 
key K, it is revealed to the country’s Customs agents forever. The cryptography relied upon 
by the ICAO standard itself has some minor flaws [Jules et al. 2005]. 
 
8.2.1 Biometrics  
 
Biometric information is concerned about a specific person's aspect such as iris, finger print etc. It is 
physical characteristic or personal behavioural trait used to recognise the identity. With an ever 
increasing awareness of security and identity theft, there is a need to have a method to identify 
specific individuals uniquely and accurately. Biometrics is being used as a technology to provide 
the accurate identification. There are many biometrics in use today, with the most popular being 
[Jules et al. 2005] as follows: 
 
 Fingerprints: A fingerprint is defined by the patterns found on a fingertrip [Jules et al. 
2005]. It is unique to an individual. There are a number of methods for using fingerprints 
to recognize an individual. Some follow the traditional method used by police of visually 
matching minutiae. Other approaches use pattern-matching techniques.  
 
 Iris: The iris is the coloured ring of tissue surrounding the pupil of the eye [Jules et al. 
2005]. The iris is also unique for an individual. It needs to be scanned to use the iris as a 
biometric. The scanned value then can be matched with the templates to recognize or 
authenticate an individual. 
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 Retina: The retina biometric analyses the blood vessels at the back of the eye. This is 
also unique to an individual. 
 
 Voice: The voice biometric is based on the frequency and/or time analysis of the voice. 
A template of the user’s voice is taken by effectively recording the voice. As with most 
other biometrics the recording can be compared with a series of templates to perform the 
biometric check. 
 
 Face: The face can be analysed by geometry of facial characteristics. The geometry is 
captured by taking a digital image of the face and then using software to analyse the 
characteristics. 
 
 Hand Geometry: The geometry of a user’s hand can be analysed in the same way as the 
face.   
 
 Signature: A signature biometric is based on the image of the signature [Jules et al. 
2005]. Signature biometric may be two types static and dynamic. A static signature 
biometric is solely based on image comparison, whilst dynamic analysis uses both the 
image and the dynamics of the signature. 
 
Biometric authentication is the verification of human identity using biometric information [Jules et 
al. 2005]. It is the main mechanism by which human beings authenticate one another. When a 
person recognizes a friend by his or her voice or face, he or she is performing biometric 
authentication. Computers can do the same thing with increasing efficiency, and biometric 
authentication is gaining popularity as a means for people to authenticate themselves to computing 
systems. Typically, biometrics refers to the human-to-computer authentication. In practical 
biometrics for computing systems is different than for human-to-human authentication. Popular 
computer-oriented biometrics are fingerprints, face recognition, and irises. These are the three 
biometrics are selected for e-passport deployments. 
 
The process of biometric authentication is almost similar in most of the systems. An authenticated 
user enrols by giving an initial, biometric image to the sensor. The system databse stores related 
information at the time of enrolment in a template. This template works as the reference for the 
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subsequent authentication of the individual. To prove identity during the time of authentication, the 
user again gives the biometric information to a verifying device. The verifying device checks the 
presented biometric information with biometric of the template for matching. The template and the 
image are matched successfully if they are mostly similar according to some defined metric [Jules 
et al. 2005]. 
 
8.2.2     Data Leakage Threats in E-passport  
 
E-passports are vulnerable to clandestine reading of their contents without protection mechanism 
[Jules et al. 2005]. The short read range of the e-passport is also not free from some threats. It is 
possible to install RFID readers in doorways; tags can then be read from anyone passing through the 
doorway. These types of readers could be installed as checkpoints at airports, concerts and sporting 
events. On the other hand, clandestine readers could be installed in shops or to the entrances of 
buildings. These readers are mostly like the anti-theft gates at present used in thousands of retail 
stores. These types of readers would enable for appropriate surveillance of e-passports. E-passport 
contains personal data that a passport holder does not like to disclose to an unauthorised reader such 
as name, date of birth, passport number etc.  
 
The RFID schemes of an e-passport may expose information when it is in operation.  To avoid 
collisions the ISO 14443 protocol of ICAO and Malaysian second generation e-passports uses a 
unique ID. If the unique ID is static for each e-passport, then it gives a static response for tracking 
the movement of the e-passports. Due to the static identifier it can also enable hotlisting. In 
hotlisting, the adversary can construct a database matching identifiers to persons of interest. After 
this, the adversary can identify the person and extract information without needing to directly 
access the e-passport contents.  
 
8.2.3     Cryptography in E-passports 
 
The ICAO guidelines give varieties of mandatory and optional data elements. To guarantee the 
authenticity of this information, the guidelines contain many cryptographic techniques. The ICAO 
standard specifies one mandatory cryptographic feature for e-passports [ICAO 2004a, ICAO 
2004b]. 
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8.2.3.1   Passive Authentication 
 
The data in an e-passport will be provided and approved by the authority of the issuing nation 
[ICAO 2004b]. The signature algorithms RSA, DSA and ECDSA are permitted for this. The 
passive authentication system shows only that the data is authentic and does not verify that the e-
passport itself is authentic. The guidelines of ICAO indicate two additionally optional cryptographic 
aspects for better security in e-passports. 
 
8.2.3.2   Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging 
 
To protect the RFID tag data from the unauthorised readers, Basic Access Control stores a pair of 
secret cryptographic keys (KENC,KMAC) in the e-passport [Jules et al. 2005]. When a reader tries to 
scan the passport, it encounters in a challenge response protocol that requires the knowledge of the 
pair of keys and generates a session key. If authentication is successful, the passport gives its data 
contents. An unauthorised reader cannot access the passport. The keys KENC and KMAC derive from 
optically scannable data printed on the passport   such as the passport number, the date of birth of 
the passport holder, the expiry date and three check digits, one for each of the three preceding 
values. E-passports use the ISO 11770-2 Key Establishment Mechanism 6 as shown in Figure 8-2 
[Jules et al. 2005]: 
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Figure 8-2: ISO 11770-2 Key Establishment Mechanism 6 
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E is two-key triple-DES in CBC mode with an all-0 IV, and M is the ANSI “retail MAC” [ISO 
algorithm, 1999].  
 
1. In this protocol, the reader at first computes the MAC Mr the value Cr  as described in the 
figure and sends to the tag.  
2. The tag first verifies the MAC Mr and then decrypts the value Cr. The Tag then verifies that 
the rt in the decrypted value matches the rt which it previously sent. If any one of the 
verifications fails, the tag discards the values. 
3. The tag then computes Ct and Mt and sends to the reader.  
4. The Reader receives Ct and Mt and at first checks the MAC Mt and then decrypts Ct . The 
Reader then verifies that the correct rr appears in the decryption of Ct. If any one of the 
verifications fails, the Reader discards the values.  
5. If all the verifications are done correctly the reader and the tag derive a shared session key 
from the “key seed” tr kk  , by using the key derivation mechanism described in the ICAO 
PKI report [ICAO 2004b]. 
 
The objective of the Basic Access Control is that the ability to scan the passport information should 
be only available when a passport owner wants to demonstrate the passport. However, the protocol 
has drawbacks to achieve this objective due to two reasons. 
 
The first problem identified is that the entropy of the keys is too small [Jules et al. 2005]. The ICAO 
PKI Technical Report warns that the entropy of the key is at most 56 bits. Moreover, it further 
acknowledges that some of these bits may be guessable in some circumstances.  
 
Second problem is that, a single fixed key is used for the lifetime of the e-passport [Jules et al. 
2005]. As a result, it is impossible to withdraw the access of a reader to the e-passport once it has 
been scanned. If a visitor visits a foreign country, the visitor must give the key for Basic Access 
Control to the border authority. As the key is always fixed, this enables that nation to know the e-
passport information in perpetuity. This information may be abused in the future 
 
In spite of the limitations, Basic Access Control is better than no privacy measure at all [Jules et al. 
2005]. The United States planned not to incorporate Basic Access Control in its e-passport 
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deployment. On the contrary, the Netherlands and Germany both plan to incorporate this Basic 
Access Control in the ICAO e-passport deployments. 
 
8.2.3.3   Active Authentication 
 
The ICAO guidelines specify another optional security feature which is referred to as “Active 
Authentication.”  The Active Authentication is an anti-cloning feature where as the Basic Access 
Control is a confidentiality feature. It does not protect information scanning from e-passport by the 
unauthorized parties [Jules et al. 2005]. 
 
The protection of the Active Authentication is based on public-key cryptography. The e-passport 
has the private key. The associated public key is also stored on the passport. In the ICAO guidelines 
specification an integer factorization based signature such as Rabin-Williamsis or RSA is presented. 
To authenticate the e-passport, it obtains an 8-byte challenge from the reader. It then digitally signs 
this message using the private key, and sends back the result. The reader also can check the validity 
of the message with the public key of the passport. The ICAO guidelines demonstrate the use of the 
ISO/IEC-7816 Internal Authenticate mechanism, with ISO 9796-2 Signature Scheme 1 padding for 
the underlying signature as shown in Figure 8-3: 
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Figure 8-3: Signature 
 
)(XSig SK is an RSA or Rabin-Williams signature with 9796-2 padding signed with the secret key 
SK of the e-passport. X uses both the random number generated by the tag and a challenge from the 
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reader. This may be used to neutralize padding attacks [Coron et al. 1999]. The 9796-2 padding 
uses a hash function for example SHA-1 or other suitable hash function. The signature can then be 
verified with the public key which is stored in the passport. If the signature verifies, the reader 
assumes that the bearer’s passport is supposed to hold the valid biometric data. It is further 
recommended that e-passport chips must support that data cannot be overwritten on the chip after 
personalization (U. S. Department 2004). Signing the chip’s public key means the corresponding 
secret key is reliable to implement the security policy. 
 
To avoid the man-in-the-middle attack the public key used for Active Authentication must be tied to 
the specific e-passport and biometric data presented [Jules et al. 2005]. Using a man-in-the-middle 
attack it is possible to one passport is presented, but a different passport is used to answer Active 
Authentication queries. This threat is recognized by the ICAO specification and mandates that 
Active Authentication occur in conjunction with an optical scan by the reader of the machine-
readable zone of the e-passport. Therefore, every reader additionally has the hardware capability 
necessary for Basic Access Control with Active Authentication and compliant with the ICAO 
specification. Without this part is implemented properly the systems open themselves to a risk of 
cloned e-passports. 
 
For effectiveness, the private key of Active Authentication must not leave a particular e-passport. 
The guidelines about this in the ICAO PKI report are not clear [Jules et al. 2005]. It only mentions 
that the keys shall be generated “in a secure way” and then stating that “no Key Management is 
applicable for these keys.” In particular, the report does not prevent these keys from being read by a 
remote reader which is supposedly not the intention of the standard. The U.S. Concept of 
Operations document is also not clear. It does not also specify that Active Authentication keys 
cannot be scanned after personalization. The e-passports must also resist the same range of side 
channel and fault injection attacks traditionally found in the smart cards [Jules et al. 2005]. 
 
Active Authentication has another issue with Basic Access Control and privacy when they interact 
with each other. The certificate used for the verification of Active Authentication must be kept 
secret because it contains enough information to derive a key for Basic Access Control. In addition, 
when Active Authentication is used with RSA or Rabin-Williams signatures, responses from 
different e-passports can be distinguished. Consequently, Active Authentication allows tracking and 
hotlisting attacks even if the passive Basic Access Control is used. It is recommended that Active 
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Authentication should be applied only in a secure session after Basic Access Control has been used 
and session keys derived because Active Authentication needs an optical read of the e-passport, just 
as Basic Access Control does [Jules et al. 2005]. 
 
8.2.3.4   Related Works 
 
Privacy and security issues are recognized by numerous media reports [Singel 2005].  Some issues 
are technical in nature and have seen less exposition. Pattinson outlines the privacy problems with 
e-passports that could be readable by anyone and argues for Basic Access Control (Pattinson 2004). 
Jacobs highlights the issues in e-passport use in the Netherlands and reports on work with a 
prototype Netherlands biometric passport [Jacobs 2005]. Jacobs also points out the importance of 
Basic Access Control and also investigates the issues surrounding a national database of biometric 
identifiers.  
 
Various types of RFID authentication protocols have been proposed for typical RFID systems. 
Sharma et al.[2003] indicated the resource constrained in RFID tag as a main challenge to provide 
privacy and security. Weis at el.[2004] proposed  a Hash-based Access Control (HAC) approach to 
protect a tag using a one-way hash function. The tag stores the hash of a random key as metaID. As 
the metaID is same for the tag all the times, it always transmits the same metaID, which can be 
easily tracked by an adversary [Singel 2005]. Another problem in this system is that the information 
is transmitted in plain text which could be easily eavesdropped. 
 
Weis et al. [2004] also suggested another approach that is extended from HAC and referred to as a 
Randomized Access Control (RAC). It uses a random number to prevent location privacy. In each 
session the tag produces a response with a newly generated random number and its ID using a hash 
function. However, it cannot protect the system from replay attack and is not suitable in real life 
system where a large number of tags would be used because it requires many hash operations at the 
back-end. 
 
Several researchers proposed RFID authentication protocol for pervasive computing environment. 
Rhee et al. [2005] proposed challenge response based RFID authentication protocol (CRAP) which 
is designed for use in pervasive computing. However, this scheme requires )1
2
( N hash functions 
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computations which is impractical for large number of tags in ubiquitous computing. Choi et 
al.[2005] proposed a one-way hash based low-cost authentication protocol (OHLCAP), which is 
suitable for ubiquitous environment. Ha et al. [2007] claims that OHLCAP suffers from traceability 
and impersonation attack. They also propose a solution of using hash function to protect from 
traceability attack. 
 
The researchers also proposed authentication protocol using varying identifiers.  If a tag always 
replies with the same hashed ID before the next successful authentication it allows the tag to be 
tracked [Choi et al. 2005]. 
 
However, RFID authentication for pervasive computing environment is preferred for e-passport. 
The reason for this is that, the passport holder travels many countries and places can be 
authenticated anywhere when it is required.  
 
8.2.3.5   E-Passport  and RFID Chip 
 
The ICAO standard for e-passports mandates that the RFID chip contains the passport holder’s 
name, date of birth and passport number [ICAO 2004a]. For biometric information the e-passports 
will contain digitized photographic images of the faces of their bearers. The standard additionally 
specifies fingerprints and iris data as optional biometrics. The ICAO specification for e-passports 
depends on the specification given by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
14443 standard.  It specifies a radio frequency of 13.56MHz. Tags in the ISO 14443 standard are 
passive, meaning that they carry no on-board source of power, and instead derive power indirectly 
from the interrogating signal of a reader. The intended read range of tags in this standard is about 10 
centimetres. 
 
Many large organizations like WalMart, Procter and Gamble, and the United States Department of 
Defence are deploying RFID as a tool for automation of their Supply Chains Management (SCM) 
[Jules 2006]. The RFID used for e-passports is not the same as the RFID used by WalMart and 
others for supply chain management. Supply chain tags are designed to be as simple and cheap as 
possible, with no support for cryptography and minimal additional features beyond holding a single 
identifier. The only privacy feature in the tags is a special “kill” command that renders the tag 
permanently inoperative. These supply chain tags operate at a frequency of 915MHz and have an 
156 
 
intended read range of 5 meters. On the contrary, e-passport RFID devices have a shorter intended 
read range. It also includes other features such as tamper resistance and cryptography. 
 
The passport number in the passports of United States issued since 1981 is 9-digit long [Jules et al. 
2005]. The first two digits encode the passport issuing offices. The remaining 7 digits are assigned 
arbitrarily. The passport number is unique for a country. It may help to identify the traveller 
uniquely. An RFID chip can contain the passport holder’s name, date of birth, passport number of 
passport holder.  
 
The ICAO guidelines specify a large range of mandatory and optional data elements. To ensure the 
authenticity and privacy of this data, the guidelines incorporate several cryptographic measures.  
The ICAO standard specifies passive authentication as a mandatory cryptographic feature for e-
passports [ICAO 2004a, ICAO 2004b].  In passive authentication the data in an e-passport will be 
signed by the authority of the issuing nation [ICAO 2004b]. The passive authentication 
demonstrates only that the data is authentic. It does not prove that the e-passport is authentic. The 
ICAO guidelines specify two additionally optional cryptographic features for improved security in 
e-passports: Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging, Active Authentication. The next Section 
8.2.4 presents the proposed cryptographic authentication protocol for e-passport.  
 
8.2.4    Cryptographic Protection using a  Complete Pervasive Authentication Protocol  
 
In this section, the low-cost complete pervasive authentication protocol (CPAP) referred as SUAP1 
based on challenge-response method using one-way hash function, hash-address and randomized 
hash function RFID system is presented [Morshed et al. 2010].   
 
8.2.4.1    System Setup 
 
The tag identifier ID represents the passport number or the passport ID. The protocol uses a one-
way has function h. Database also contains the hash address Had= h(ID). If the authentication is 
successful the RFID tag of the passport will expose its other information to the reader. The reader 
generates a random number r1 and the tag generates a random number r2. All the data fields ID, x 
and random numbers have the same l bits length. The hash function h also produces l bits response. 
The symbol   means exclusive-or (xor) operation and the symbol || means concatenation operation. 
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The secret number x is common in all the tags in this protocol. This can be implemented for the e-
passport of one country.  
 
8.2.4.2     CPAP Operation 
 
When a tag enters into the range of a reader, the reader can initiate the authentication protocol. The 
protocol is shown in the Figure 8-4. The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows. 
 
1. The reader generates a random number r1 and sends it to the tag.   
2. Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another random number r2.  
protocolstopisrorrif 021  
otherwise perform the following computations 
   )12mod()()( 21 
lrrIDhy  
    xrc  2  
    )||||( 21 rrIDhA   
The tag then sends the value of y, c and AL to the reader. In this protocol c is used as a 
temporary variable to transmit the random number r2 to the reader secretly.  AL is the left 
half of A. 
3. The reader then sends the value of y, c and r1, AL to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database will calculate the following 
xcr 2  
)12mod()()( 21 
lrryIDh  
)(IDh is the address of the record containing the ID where )(IDhHad   
Access the address Had  
Retrieve the ID from the record 
Then the back-end database )||||( 21 rrIDhAComputes   
mathcesAif L  
     the tag is authenticated. 
The database sends AR to the reader.  
Where, AR is the right half of A. 
5. The reader forwards the RA to the tag 
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6. The tag compares the received RA with the computed RA . If they are equal then the reader is 
authenticated. 
 
 
 
Figure 8-4: CPAP Protocol 
 
8.2.5   Application and Evaluation 
 
The e-passport security model using the cryptographic protection is shown in three layers in Figure 
8-5. There are many sensitive information that a traveler may not want to expose to an unauthorized 
person. To protect information leakage and tracking of the passport holder’s RFID chip or tag, 
information is only exposed to the authentic reader. The proposed authentication protocol prevents 
unauthorized readers from obtaining any information from the tags. The information from the 
passport is exposed in the air by encryption technique used in the proposed protocol. The reader can 
verify the encrypted data with the information stored in the database. The confidential code in the 
protocol is common for all the passports in same group. A confidential code (secret) number can be 
assigned for a country or a state as a group. An alternative way of using secret is to write the secret 
inside the e-passport together with the information such as passport number.  
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Figure 8-5:  Security Implementation in e-passport 
 
 
To evaluate the protocol it can be analyzed in two ways. Firstly is privacy and security analysis and 
secondly is efficiency analysis.   
 
8.2.5.1  Privacy and Security Analysis 
 
The privacy and security of the proposed protocol was analyzed against the threats discussed in 
RFID Privacy Problems in e-passport Section 8.2.  
 
Clandestine scanning and tracking are not possible in the proposed protocol. An adversary must be 
authenticated to get any sensitive information from a tag. To authenticate an adversary they must 
know ID, x and r2 to get any information from the tag. The combination of r1 and r2 makes the 
response y and A so unpredictable that an adversary can only guess the value or use brute-force 
technique with an advantage of at most 
l2
1 , which is negligible for a value like  l=96.  
 
Eavesdropping is also not possible by the adversary. Due to two random numbers in the tag side and 
the reader side the response is unpredictable. The adversary cannot extract any value from the 
response due to the one-way hash function. 
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Skimming and cloning are also not possible in this protocol.  For each session the tag gives a new 
value of the response y that is totally indistinguishable and different from other sessions. 
Consequently, impersonation and replay attack is not possible in this system.  
 
The cryptographic weakness is overcome by hash function and two random numbers. The one-way 
hash function with the random numbers always gives a result that cannot be produced and tracked 
by the adversary.  
 
   The summary of the privacy and security comparisons is given in Table 8-1.   
 
Table  8-1  Privacy and Security Comparisons 
Privacy 
Property 
LCAP  CRAP OHLCAP Proposed 
CPAP 
Information 
privacy 
Y Y Y Y 
Tracking  N Y N Y 
Cloning/   
Impersonation 
A Y N Y 
Eaves 
dropping 
Y Y Y Y 
Y: Provided    A: provided under assumption   N: Not Provided 
 
8.2.5.2   Efficiency Analysis 
 
The CPAP authentication protocol compares storage, communication and computation cost with the 
selected existing authentication protocols as shown in Table 8-2. It indicates that LCAP [Lee et al. 
2005] as a reasonable performance however, it suffers from traceability problem and is also not 
ubiquitous. The CPAP protocol shows improved performance because it requires less tag side and 
database side storage and gives protection from all known attacks. The storage requirement for the 
tag and the database is small i.e. 2l, and 3l respectively, whereas OHLCAP Choi et al.[2005] 
requires 5l and 4l respectively. CRAP [Rhee et al. 2005] uses 1l storage for the tag but it needs 
)1
2
( N  hash operations which is unsuitable in practices because in ubiquitous environment the value 
of N is extremely high. It requires a large number of hash operations and therefore requires 
considerable computation time.   
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Table 8-2         Efficiency Analysis 
Efficiency 
Criteria 
 LCAP  CRAP  OHLCAP  CPAP 
 
Storage Tag 1l 1l 5l 2l 
Reader - - - - 
Database 6l 1l 4l 2l 
Computation Tag 2h(+A) 3h(+A) 1h(+A) 2h(+A) 
Reader - - - - 
Database 2h+ε hN )1
2
( 
 1h+ε 1h+ ε 
Communication Tag-to-Reader 1.5l 2l 2.5l 2.5l 
Reader-to-tag 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 
A: Additional XOR and/or Add operations in tag ε: Small operation in back-end database 
 
8.2.5.3    Simulation Experiment Result 
 
To validate the proposed protocol CPAP and CRAP, simulation experiments have been conducted 
for comparison purposes. The objective of the simulation program was to check the anonymity of 
the response for one tag. The output of a hash function is the same for the same random number 
pair. The objective is to ensure unique response for different inputs of random number pair so that 
an adversary is unable to use any responses at later stage to access the tag or the reader. One 
response is compared with the subsequent responses for different random numbers. If it matches 
with any response it can be used by the adversary to attack the system by impersonation. The 
number of times a similar response is generated is given in Table 8-3.  This number is represented 
by m. The experiment was conducted for 12, 16, 32 and 64 bits for secrets, random number and ID. 
We did not include the results for 12 bits since it is too short and result was very poor with many 
recurrences of the same response. The results shown in Table 8-3 indicated that for 64 bits there 
was no matching of the response and the responses were always unique. In this case the number of 
matching m = 0 in the Table. If the result is unique the adversary cannot use it for impersonation 
and replay attack. For 12, 16 bits there were some recurrences of the same response that means m is 
always > 0. For 32 bits the number of matching is m >=0. It means sometimes the recurrences of the 
same response were found and sometimes the responses were unique. The matching of the response 
were due to two reasons, firstly it produced the same random number pairs. Secondly it produced 
the same responses for some other combination of random number pairs. If an adversary uses this 
response for these combinations of random numbers it may impersonate as a valid reader.  
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Table 8-3   Attacks and Success of an Adversary on one Tag in CPAP and CRAP 
  
No. of Attempts 
 
Attacker’s Success  
Data length  
(y=16 bits) 
Data length  
(y=32 bits) 
Data length  
(y=64 bits) 
CPAP CRAP CPAP CRAP CPAP CRAP 
4X1010 m > 0 m > 0 m >=0 m >0 m = 0 m = 0 
4X1012 m > 0 m > 0 m >=0 m >0 m = 0 m = 0 
y: Tag response 
 
This experiment indicated that with 64 bits the tag and the reader produced unique response for a 
tag ID.  
 
The result was almost similar for 16 bits in the CPAP and the CRAP protocols since both the 
protocols produce the same responses many times. For 32 bits CRAP is always vulnerable by the 
recurrence of the same response but the proposed CPAP sometimes shows protected. The result was 
exactly same for 64 bits in the CPAP and the CRAP protocols since both the protocols shows no 
recurrence of the same response during the experiment. We did not perform any simulation 
experiments for the other protocols since it is already mentioned that logically and mathematically 
the LCAP and the OHLCAP are not protected against the identified privacy threats [Choi et 
al.2005, Ha et al. 2007]. CRAP is protected from all the threats but it requires a large number of 
hash operations in the database to search the tag. The CPAP and CRAP protocols successfully 
authenticate the tag and the reader without any privacy and security failure during the experiments 
undertaken for 64 bits.  
 
However, the simulation experiment was done only for passive attacks. No active attack was 
applied to any of the protocols. It means we only tested the response to see if any recurrence of the 
same response was found. We did not manipulate the responses in the authentication process to 
attack the system using the same random number that an active adversary can do. 
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8.3    RFID in Health Care System: Privacy and Security Issues 
 
Information technology and RFID has a tremendous potential in medical and healthcare service to 
improve patient safety and medical services. The use of RFID tags may cause privacy violation of 
users carrying an RFID tag. Due to the unique identification number of the RFID tag, this is 
subjected to different privacy and security threats such as information leakage of a tag, traceability 
of the consumer, denial of service attack, and impersonation of a tag etc. Through the tag the private 
data of a person can be tracked and the personal information can be captured which has implications 
on privacy regarding the Data Protection Act 1998 [Data 1998]. In the medical environment, the 
security and privacy problem will be crucial to RFID based medical application. The tracking of 
personal location or information of personal health and clinical history is sensitive for a patient. 
This section investigates different privacy and security problems in RFID systems used in hospital 
and proposes the implementation of the authentication protocol which has been developed to 
overcome those privacy and security problems. The proposed protocol requires less storage and 
computation than some RFID authentication protocols but offers larger ranges of security 
protection. Simulation experiment shows that the protocol is secure for larger entropy. 
 
Healthcare is assumed to be the important potential area for RFID implementation [Ericson 2004]. 
Generally, the healthcare industry has been investing capital in Information Technology (IT) to 
reduce operating costs and improve patient safety. RFID is expected to become critical to healthcare 
organizations by achieving these two goals. Some hospitals and medical institutes are starting to 
conduct their own small-scale RFID testing projects. The application of RFID in healthcare is still 
in development stage. Healthcare organizations expect RFID technology can help save costs and 
improve patient safety. Many of them started with tracking and asset management of equipment. 
For automation RFID is being used in many hospitals [Wang et al. 2006].   
 
8.3.1   RFID Privacy Problems in Medical Service 
 
In the medical environment, the security and privacy problem will be crucial to RFID based medical 
application. In mobile RFID model, the user holds the RFID reader embedded in mobile phone. The 
user can use the reader to request information by capturing the tag attached to the patient. The 
reader then sends this information to the back-end database. The database subsequently returns the 
requested information to the reader and displays it to user. In an application where RFID technology 
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is being used to track an individual such as a patient in a hospital scenario this can be used to 
provide an enhanced secure and efficient environment.  However, this can also be used for negative 
purpose to break the patient privacy [Lee and Kim 2007].  
 
The privacy issue with tagged patient cards involves the risk of exposing the information, such as 
trace of personal location, information of personal health and clinical history. Through the tag the 
private data of a person can be tracked and the personal information can be captured which could be 
a violation of privacy under the Data Protection Act 1998. In the standard health level seven (HL7), 
the standard for customizing and detailed privacy mechanism has not yet been specified [Lee and 
Kim 2007]. Lee and Kim [2007] analyzed the privacy requirements for the ubiquitous service. It is 
not possible to solve the problems outlined with existing security technology, such as encryption 
and decryption. Using the security information acquired from the probing, the accessing application 
can access clinical information about an individual by querying the ubiquitous information server. 
In order to ensure privacy in this process, a mechanism of encryptions and decryptions of the 
outgoing data from tag and server has been proposed. However, these mechanisms may create 
limitations in the applicability of the ubiquitous service. In addition, if decryption of the information 
is successful, all information could be exposed. For this reason, Lee and Kim [2007] proposed a 
method that protects privacy in the ubiquitous system using a personal privacy policy in order to 
administer information more flexibly and securely as well as mitigate the problems discussed.  
 
Many security threats are identified in RFID system in hospitals and some of these are similar to the 
threat types found in e-passport system [Jules et al. 2005]. Some threats in RFID systems in hospital 
are shown in the Figure 8-6. 
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Figure 8-6: RFID Privacy and Security Problem in a Hospital 
 
The identified threats are information leakage or clandestine scanning, clandestine tracking 
skimming and cloning, impersonation and replay attack and eavesdropping etc.  
 
8.3.2  Related  Works 
 
Several types of RFID authentication protocols have been proposed. Different protocols are suitable 
for different purposes. Few of them are outlined in Section 8.2.3.4.  
 
Lim and Kim proposed a privacy mechanism for RFID in healthcare system [Lee and Kim 2007]. 
They proposed a method that protects privacy in the ubiquitous system using a personal privacy 
policy in order to administer information more flexibly and securely as well as mitigating the 
privacy problems. In order to protect personal privacy of the patient, all of the treatment 
information should be controlled by privacy aware system. In addition, a unique RFID tag of the 
patient could also be used outside the hospital for emergency medical service or other hospital 
services.  
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8.3.3   Cryptographic Protection  
 
In this section a new authentication protocol is adopted to ensure privacy and security of the RFID 
system effectively.  This section analyses the privacy and security properties of the proposed 
protocol shows the results of the analysis and simulation experiment evaluation. This also proposes 
the implementation of the protocol in a hospital environment. This is a Novel Authentication 
Protocol for Hospital Systems (NAPHS) and is discussed as SUAP3 in Chapter 4. This is based on 
challenge-response method using the one-way hash function and the randomized hash function in 
the RFID systems.  
 
The notations used in this protocol are as follows: 
 
8.3.3.1  Notations 
 
The notations used in this protocol are as follows: 
h        A one-way hash function, lh }1,0{}1,0{: *   
l         The length of an identifier 
r1        Random number in l}1,0{  
r2        Random number in l}1,0{  
HID  Hash Address of ID 
ID     Tag identifier 
GID    Group secret  
       XOR operator 
      Concatenation operator 
      Assignment operator 
Each tag and the database have a tag identifier ID and a group secret GID.  The tag identifier ID 
represents the Patient ID.  
 
8.3.3.2   NAPHS Operations 
 
When a tag enters into the range of the reader, the reader can initiate the authentication protocol. 
The protocol is shown in Figure 8-7. The steps in the authentication protocol are as follows: 
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1. A reader selects a random number r1 and sends a Query and r1 to the tag. 
2. After receiving the random number r1 the tag will generate another random number r2.       
 The tag computes 
        2rGIDA   
       )()( 21 rrGIDIDhB   
       )||||||( 21 rrGIDIDhC   
              and sends the value of A,B,CL to the reader. 
3. The reader then sends r1, A,B,CL to the back-end database. 
4. The back-end database then computes   
         AGIDr 2  
        )( 12 rrGIDAHIDi     for all GIDs    
        HIDHIDif i    
                 )||||||( 21 rrGIDIDhC   
        if CL matched the ID is authenticated       
5. The database sends CR to the reader. The reader forwards CR to the tag. 
6. The tag verifies CR 
 
 
Database  Reader    Tag  
ID, GID                ID, GID 
   Request, r1              
    Generate random 
number r2 
 
 
Computes 
 
A,B,CL,r1 
   
A,B,CL  
2rGIDA 
)()( 21 rrGIDIDhB 
 
  AGIDr 2       )||||||( 21 rrGIDIDhC   
  )( 12 rrGIDAHIDi   
for all GIDs    
    
HIDHIDif i    
      )||||||( 21 rrGIDIDhC   
If CL matched 
    the ID is authenticated 
    
       
 
CR 
 
 CR 
 
 
 
 
 
Verify CR 
 
 
 
Figure 8-7:   The NAPHS Protocol 
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8.3.4   Application and Evaluation 
 
All the RFID tags and readers are equipped with the proposed RFID authentication protocols. There 
are several sensitive information that a patient or hospital authority may not want to expose to 
unauthorized person. The personal information of the patient, disease, diagnostics information, 
drugs usage and location are sensitive regarding a patient.  All the patient, visitors, medicine, 
medical record, medical equipments use RFID tags supporting the proposed protocol. To protect 
information leakage, impersonation attack, tracking and cloning of an RFID tag the system should 
ensure that the information will be exposed only to the authentic reader. The proposed 
authentication protocol prevents unauthorized readers from getting any information from the tags as 
shown in Figure 8-8. The figure only shows the information of patient ID and its encryption in the 
RFID system and database. The authentication protocol authenticates the patient RFID tag and 
passes the encrypted ID to the encrypted database. The encrypted ID then passed to the patient ID 
database and can link the patient medical records. When any reader requests any patient information 
from the database it also authenticates the system with its patient ID and secret using the hash 
encryption. It then transmits the patient information encrypting with the hash function.  The hash 
function uses the patient ID, any secret and random number to authenticate each other. 
 
 
 
Figure 8-8: Information Encryption in Hospital 
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To evaluate the proposed protocol for privacy and security this was analyzed in two ways, firstly 
the privacy and security analysis and secondly the efficiency analysis.   
 
8.3.4.1  Privacy and Security Analysis 
 
The privacy and security of the proposed protocol is analyzed against the threats information 
leakage, location privacy, impersonation and replay attack, message interception and tracing. 
 Information Leakage or clandestine scanning: To obtain any sensitive information from a 
tag this must be authenticated.  To authenticate the system an adversary must know ID, GID 
and the hash function. The combination of r1 and r2 with ID and GID makes the response y 
unpredictable. 
 
 Location Privacy: The value of C cannot be linked with any particular tag. The protocol 
ensures location privacy by using new values of r1, r2 each time. The ID is also updated after 
every successful session.  
 
 Impersonation and Replay Attack: Without the knowledge of the ID, the hash function 
and the secret GID an adversary is unable to impersonate. For each session the tag generates 
a new value of C which is totally indistinguishable and different from other session and 
subsequently the impersonation and replay attacks are not possible.  
 
 Message Interception: The protocols use static identifier and secret. These do not face any 
update anomalies. If the adversary is able to prevent the last transmission to the tag from the 
reader it will not face any synchronization problem.  
 
 Traceability: An adversary is unable to identify the tag from its response because each time 
it gives a different value which is non traceable from other responses. The adversary does 
not know the r2, ID, secret GID and the hash value. This scheme is fully protected from the 
future forward and backward traceability. 
 
The summary of the privacy and security properties is given in Table 8-4. The privacy and security 
properties of the proposed protocol are compared with three other schemes HIDV, LCAP, 
OHLCAP and EOHLCAP. The three schemes were chosen because all of these protocols involved 
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tag authentication and involve secret update process. The table shows that the proposed protocol 
provided protections from all the identified privacy and security threats. Some of the privacy and 
security properties are further tested by simulation program and outlined in Section 8.3.4.3.  
 
Table 8-4    Privacy and Security Comparisons 
Property HIDV  LCAP  OHLCAP EOHLCAP Proposed 
Information privacy Y Y Y Y Y 
Location Privacy N N Y Y Y 
Impersonation N A N Y Y 
Replay attack N Y N Y Y 
Message Interception Y Y Y Y Y 
Backward Traceability N Y N Y Y 
Forward Traceability N Y N Y Y 
Y: Protected    A: provided under assumption   N: Not Provided 
 
8.3.4.2    Efficiency Analysis 
 
Storage, communication and computation cost were considered for efficiency analysis. The 
efficiency of the proposed are also compared with three schemes HIDV, LCAP, OHLCAP and 
EOHLCAP as in privacy and security comparisons. Various existing authentication protocols were 
compared with the proposed authentication protocol. HIDV requires a larger storage and 
computations than other protocols and suffers from location privacy issues. It is also vulnerable to 
impersonation attack. LCAP appears to be better in performance however, it has location privacy 
problem [Choi et al.2005].  
 
Table 8-5     Efficiency Analysis 
 
Efficiency 
Criteria 
 HIDV LCAP OHLCAP EOHLCAP Proposed 
NAPHS 
Storage Tag 3l 1l 5l 3l 2l 
Reader - - - - - 
Database 10l 6l 4l 3l 2l 
Computation Tag 3h 2h 1h(+A) 1h(+A) 2h(+A) 
Reader - - - - - 
Database 3h+ ε 2h+ ε 1h+ε  hmi )
2
1
(
 1h+ ε 
Communication Tag-to-
Reader 
3l 1.5l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 
Reader-
to-tag 
2l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 
A, ε: Small operation in tag, back-end database        f: Function operation 
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The proposed protocol shows improved performance as shown in Table 8-5 because it requires less 
tag side and database side storage than the protocols OHLCAP and EOHLCAP and gives protection 
from the all identified attacks. The storage requirement for the tag and the database are 2l, and 3l 
respectively. The protocol requires less hash function in both the tag and the database.  EOHLCAP 
gives protections from all the attacks but it needs (mi+1)/2 hash operations which is costly because 
the value of mi   may be very high and many hash computations will make the protocol slower.   
 
8.3.4.3     Simulation Experiment Result 
 
To validate the proposed protocol, simulation experiments have been conducted. The objective is to 
ensure unique response for different inputs of random number pair so that an adversary is unable to 
use any responses at later stage to access the tag or the reader. The program checks to match a 
response y for different sets of random numbers. The number of times a similar response is 
generated is given in Table 8-6.  
 
Table 8-6    Attacker’s Success Table 
Exp No Number of 
Queries to the 
Tag 
Attacker’s Success for 
different data length 
Data    
length 
Number of Matches 
1 1011 16 1511114 
2 1011 16 1505568 
3 1011 16 1526852 
4 1011 32 0 
5 1011 32 42 
6 1011 32 0 
7 1011 32 40 
8 1011 32 0 
9 1011 32 0 
10 1011 64 0 
11 1011 64 0 
12 1011 64 0 
13 1011 64 0 
14 1011 64 0 
15 1011 64 0 
16 1011 64 0 
17 1011 64 0 
18 1011 64 0 
19 1011 64 0 
20 1011 64 0 
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The experiment was conducted for 16, 32 and 64 bits for secrets, random number and data. The 
results shown in Table 3 indicated that for 64 bits there no matching response and the results were 
always unique. For 16 and 32 bits there were some recurrences of the same response y.  This was 
due to two reasons. Firstly it produces the same random number pairs. Secondly it produced similar 
responses for some other combination of random number pairs. This experiment indicated that 
during the experiment with 64 bits the tag and the reader produced unique response for a tag ID.  
The Table 8-7 shows the summary of the evaluation. 
 
Table 8-7 Attacker’s Success Table  
Number 
of queries 
Attacker’s Success 
Data length  
(16 bits) 
Data length  
(32 bits) 
Data length  
(64 bits) 
y y y 
1011 >=0 >=0 0 
 
This experiment showed that the protocol is secure for 64 bits in 1011 attempts. For 16 and 32 bits 
there were some recurrences of the same response that can be used by an adversary.   
 
The proposed scheme requires only one one-way hash function operation that makes it highly 
efficient. The storage requirement for the tag and database is also low in comparison to the other 
protocols. The comparison shows that the protocol is both secure and efficient than these protocols 
and it has many practical advantages like simplicity, privacy and security protection. The protocol is 
also implemented for the security of wireless database communication. The information is shared 
outside only with encryption proposed in the protocol. Simulation experiment indicated that for 16 
bits data the RFID system is fully vulnerable to adversary attack.  
 
8.4 An Airport Baggage Handling System using RFID Technology 
 
In this section a new architecture is proposed for airport baggage handling using a combination of 
technologies such as RFID, the internet, networks, web and mobile communications. In this section 
the problems associated with handling baggage in airport are identified and a solution to overcome 
those problems is proposed using RFID technology. Some novel ideas to use popular technologies 
such as web, SMS and interactive television screens for baggage handling systems using RFID 
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technology are also proposed.  The total baggage path is divided into several zones to track them 
correctly and to identify where baggage was lost or mishandled if possible. 
 
8.4.1    Handling Baggage in Airport 
 
Today, airlines are facing a number of challenges. The increasing number of air passengers and 
hence the increase in checked-in baggage is stressing the world’s baggage handling systems. In this 
process many pieces of baggage are mishandled and lost. The cost of a mishandled bag is a major 
concern for the airlines, and the problem is growing day by day. In addition to the penalty incurred 
by the airlines for the mishandled bag, it is also a source of great inconvenience and dissatisfaction 
for the passenger.    
 
RFID can enhance the automation of baggage handling and can significantly reduce the number of 
mishandled bags. In the recent years, many airports have initiated the implementation of RFID 
technology in the aviation industry replacing barcode for the automation of baggage handling and to 
reduce the mishandling of baggage. The growing number of air passengers and their baggage are 
creating a big challenge for the airline authorities. Major increases in the reported incidents of 
mishandled baggage give evidence of this challenge. Increased safety regulations in airports, 
growing passenger numbers and tight turn-around times are some of the main cause for baggage 
mishandling [AeroAssist 2008]. Passengers on U.S. airlines reported more than 4 million 
mishandled bags in the year 2006 [Reuters 2006]. In Europe, the Association of European Airlines 
(AEA) also reported that the incidence of mishandled baggage has increased by 1.2 million which is 
about 14.6 percent more than the previous year. The cost of a mishandled bag is also increasing 
rapidly.  In 2006, approximately 34.3 million bags were mishandled globally, costing the airline 
industry $3.8B [Motorola 2007]. Giving the importance of missing baggage in airports, the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) published a report [AeroAssist 2008] on 27 major airlines 
that reported baggage information to AEA. AEA identified the 7 or 8 most affected airlines each 
year as an “Above average” group in terms of missing bags per 1000 passengers as shown in Figure 
8-9. Among them were Air France, Alitalia, British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa and TAP 
(Transportes Aéreos Portugueses) Air Portugal. The ‘Above average’ group has an average in itself 
that can be as high as 27% (in 2007) compared to the average of all AEA companies. Sometimes 
any one reason may cause poorer performance and can cause additional trouble to an airline. TAP 
airline is an example for this that shows very high rates of bags missing in 2007 due to the 
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extremely busy and exhausted Lisbon Airport. Due to these localized problems, airport baggage 
mishandling rates may differ significantly among the different airlines as can be seen in the Figure 
8-9. 
 
 
Figure 8-9: Missing Bags per 1000 Passengers: Airlines with Highest Rates 
(Source AEA Consumer Reports, 2004-2009, Compiled by Authors) 
 
According to the International Airport Transport Association (IATA) survey there are six key issues 
that are identified for baggage mishandling in air travel [Motorola 2007]. These are shown in Table 
8-8. 
Table 8-8  Six Key Issues Identified for Baggage Mishandling 
 
Reasons for mishandling Rate 
Transfer bag: late arrival  30% 
Transfer bag: delay in 
moving bag  
18% 
Missing baggage sortation 
message  
11% 
Error at check-in  10% 
Poor barcode read rate  10% 
Transfer passenger not 
checked in 
10% 
Other  11% 
 
Source: IATA, RFID business case for baggage tagging, 2007 
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Most of the major causes can be reduced using RFID technology. The logical characteristics of 
baggage handling systems are well suited to RFID, which can help make the baggage handling 
process easier and efficient. 
 
8.4.2    RFID in Business Domains 
 
Passive tags are low-cost, have no on-board power and work in unused frequency ranges which are 
suitable for implementation in business enterprises and also in the aviation industry. RFID is widely 
used in many business areas [Zhang et al. 2008]. It has a significant benefit to supply chain 
management due to its low cost and flexibility.  RFID has comparative advantages over other 
technologies such as barcodes, because it is, for example, contact-less, has multi-object recognition, 
does not require line-of-sight, and has long-distance reading capabilities.  The demand for RFID is 
increasing day by day. In [Harrop 2006] the author points out that the RFID industry will increase 
by US $2.8 billion in 2006 to $26 in 2016.  Large organizations like Wal-Mart, Procter and Gamble, 
and the United States Department of Defence are employing RFID tags for automated oversight of 
their supply chains [Jules 2005]. The UK retailer Marks and Spencer has also initiated the use of 
RFID tagging of individual items of apparel [Collins 2004]. The potential offered by RFID 
technology is that all existing physical objects can be managed by a virtual world created by a 
distributed database in a distributed networked RFID system.  
 
8.4.3   Current Usage of RFID in Aviation for Baggage Control 
 
A number of airports have started to use RFID on a trial basis to handle baggage [White paper by 
AeroAssist 2008]. Hong Kong International Airport is the first airport in the world to have 
implemented RFID baggage tagging which has been fully functional since 2005. Bag-tag read 
success rates were improved to 95% with estimated cost savings of US$ 3.8 million. Later, the read 
rate increased to more than 97%, much higher than the barcode rate [Hong Airport Press release 
2008]. Beijing, Narita and six other Korean airports have also undertaken successful RFID trials. 
McCarran Airport in Los Angeles was the first airport in USA to adopt RFID tags in baggage 
handling. Amsterdam Schiphol Airport was the first airport in Europe to make a large scale attempt 
to introduce RFID baggage control in 2007.  
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IATA has published some results based on the trials that have been conducted between airports, 
airlines and manufacturers during the last few years [IATA 2007]. The main objective of the trials 
was to test the read rate success. The results are summarized in Table 8-9  
 
Table 8-9 RFID Trial Read Rate 
Trials  Date Read-Rate 
Kuala Lumpur Airport 2005-2006 100% (Gen 2) 
98% (Gen 1) 
Kansai-Hong Kong Airport 2005 95.4% 
98.78% 
Asiana- Korean Airport 
Corporation 
2004-2005 97.00% 
TSA World-wide Trial 2004-2005 ~99% 
Narita Airport 2004 - 
British Airways at 
Heathrow T1 
1999 96.40% 
 
Compiled by author (see [IATA 2007]) 
 
The objective of the trial in Kuala Lumpur International Airport was to study the characteristics of 
UHF tags placed on the test baggage in various situations to identify when reading would become 
difficult, to study the recognition rate by placing the UHF tags on passenger’s baggage in the actual 
airport environment, and to verify the effectiveness of the baggage tags during operations between 
airports and the effects on the UHF band by the airport facility materials. In this trial a large amount 
of RFID materials have been tested and performances analyzed in detail. 
 
The objective of the trial in Kansai Airport- Hong Kong Airport was to carry out a basic 
performance validation in an operational environment different from Narita Airport and  
 
 to verify the international interoperability of Japan’s UHF-band airline baggage tag  
 to confirm the data recognition at Kansai International Airport of the airport baggage tags 
that were attached in Hong Kong  
 to verify the UHF band radio frequency characteristics 
 to verify the electric intensity measurement inside the airport.  
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The trial by the Asiana-Korean Airport Corporation used six Korean airports. Tags for baggage 
were issued at check-in and were read at a number of points in the baggage process. RFID was used 
to track the baggage through security, reconciliation and finally to verify its arrival. When the 
baggage arrived in the claiming section, the passenger received a Short Message Service (SMS) 
about the location of the baggage. Passengers could also see the information on the Flight 
Information Display System (FIDS). The trial also focused many new processes. RFID systems 
enabled the creation of a link between the security screening station and the airline security 
database, allowing the passenger owning a piece of reported baggage to be identified and security 
staff notified. This baggage could then be manually searched after an x-ray. RFID was also used for 
the enhancement of the manual sortation process. RFID systems also gave the baggage loaders the 
right flight information for the baggage to be loaded. This was a successful trial with a read rate of 
97%. The trial also showed the way in which RFID can be used to enhance processes and improve 
customer service.  
 
The aim of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) world-wide trial was to demonstrate 
the interoperability of UHF RFID baggage tag systems between worldwide geographic regions 
having different UHF transmission regulations.  
 
8.4.4    Baggage  Handling Using RFID: A Proposed Architecture 
 
RFID can help the baggage handling system in aviation in many ways. It can enhance the 
automation of baggage handling and can simplify the baggage handling system [Motorola 2007]. It 
can also identify the place and people correctly related to this baggage thus it can significantly 
reduce the number of mishandled bags. The flowchart of the baggage handling process is given 
below (Figure 8-10).  
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         Departure Airport            Arrival Airport 
 
Figure 8-10: Logical Flow of Baggage in Airport 
 
8.4.4.1 Making Zones for Identification 
 
During air travel, baggage goes through various paths and places, and it is not possible to track the 
baggage at every point. For this reason various key points of the route are needed to identify. To 
identify the key points and track the baggage, the area passed by the baggage will be divided into 
several zones to determine its location, where it is kept or where it may be mishandled. The total 
area for the baggage can be classified into the following zones [Motorola 2007] at the departure 
airport as shown in Figure 8-11 and outlined as follows: 
 
1. Check-in area 
2. Conveyor 
3. Distribution area 
4. Trolley 
Each zone will be implemented with an RFID system in such a way that any baggage passing 
through will be tracked correctly. The incoming, outgoing and duration of stay of the tags can be 
determined from the system. All the data will be recorded in the back-end database. 
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Figure 8-11: Baggage in Different Zones 
 
Each member of staffs will carry an RFID tag in his batch and an identity card. Responsibility will 
be distributed between different zones and employees of each zone will be responsible for their 
respective zone. So, in each zone the staff will be identified by RFID tag. During duty time, staffs 
are required to keep their identity card with them and they should wear a uniform with an RFID 
batch. Staffs are allocated in each zone for different time schedules. In each zone there are RFID 
readers to scan the RFID tag of the baggage and the staff. The staff will also be responsible for 
handling and controlling the RFID readers. The total process can be described in several phases of 
zones: 
 Check-in area: In the check-in areas, RFID printers enable the instant encoding of an RFID 
tag including required information such as flight information and any specific sortation 
directions. Before placing the bag on the conveyor an RFID reader captures the tag 
information and stores in the middleware database. 
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 Conveyor: As baggage moves to the conveyor belt an RFID reader can track the bag 
through the RFID tag and capture the available information from it, providing the 
information required to ensure delivery of the right bag to the right gate, right airline and 
right flight. 
 Distribution area: Throughout the routing area, RFID readers capture the location of bags at 
key check points that help to identify the baggage and verify if it is moving in the right 
direction at real time to ensure timely and correct delivery to the airline. 
 Trolley: Also, RFID readers can capture the information from the baggage to check that it is 
loaded onto the right trolley for delivery to the right plane. If any bag is mistakenly placed 
on the trolley it can easily be identified before it leaves, thus saving time.  
The zones in the arrival airport are: 
 Trolley: Baggage is loaded from the airplane and shifted to the right distribution area using 
the help of the RFID system. The arrival information will then be updated to the arrival 
airport database. 
 Distribution area: In the distribution area the baggage will be sorted and distributed to the 
right conveyor using RFID system. Baggage loaders will be informed if any wrong 
placements of baggages are done. 
 Conveyor: When the baggages are forwarded to conveyor it also takes the help of RFID 
system to move in a right direction. Databases will be automatically updated with the latest 
status.   
 Reclaiming belt area: Passengers will receive an SMS to their mobile phones so that they 
are sure about their baggage arrival.  Passengers can also search in the internet about their 
baggage with a password. If the baggage arrives correctly then systems will automatically 
send the SMS to the passenger’s mobile informing them of the location of their baggage. 
Also, an email will be sent to the passenger with details of the baggage status. Airport 
authority will provide computers with internet and browsing facilities near the baggage 
receiving section. Passengers can also get information from the baggage query section of the 
information desk. The baggage query section can find information on the baggage from their 
database or online internet service and the scenario is shown in Figure 8-12. 
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Figure 8-12: Passengers Receive Information in Various Ways 
 
Utilization of RFID in Airport Baggage Handling IATA in [Das 2007] reported that the major 
reason why baggage is mislaid is due to the problem of reading barcodes properly on the baggage. 
RFID technology can offer a number of significant advantages over barcode solutions:  
 Flexibility: Barcodes require line-of-sight contact with readers. In contrast, RFID tags are 
readable without line-of-sight contact and without precise positioning [Jules 2006].  
 Ability: RFID can scan multiple bags simultaneously and distinguish from other items; it 
identifies the object as opposed to bar code, which is used for a single scan at a time. 
 Reliability and accuracy:  RFID is suitable for a fully automated system and can read 
reliably with up to 100% accuracy [Motorola 2007].  
 
RFID technology can offer many opportunities in luggage handling in an airport terminal. Some 
typical scenarios and solutions using RFID technology are outlined as follows: 
 Real time tracking and management: RFID can ensure real time information about the 
baggage. The current location of the tag is always available on the database. The passenger 
can get information on his baggage anytime and from anywhere.  Using RFID, it is possible 
to identify exactly which baggage is in which container and in which place. Checking the 
baggage against the passenger ‘aboard aircraft’ status, and locating the container which 
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holds the passenger baggage is very important from the point of view of both security and 
operational efficiency [Celino and Walsh 2000].  
 
 Cross checking: Cross checking is very easy and efficient using RFID technology. The 
movement of both the baggage and the passenger can be tracked. It can easily be checked if 
a passenger is on the board but the baggage is not and vice versa.  
 
 Digital imagery: It is now possible by using an RFID tag attached to an identity card and 
air ticket to identify who is travelling.  An X-Ray picture of the suitcase with RFID tag can 
identify what is being carried by different passengers (Figure 8-13). 
 
 
 
Figure 8-13:  RFID Information with Digital Image. 
 
 Safety against new crimes: In this era of RFID technology different types of crime are 
emerging, for example changing or killing the RFID tag information by RFID reader. Some 
adversaries can change the RFID tag of a bag in order to mislead the owner. This can be 
done without physical evidence using RFID reader from any covert place such as his pocket. 
In this case, a video camera cannot identify the adversary. RFID systems can trace this event 
if the tag seems absent due to unauthorised killing. 
 
 Identify who handled the baggage last: Using RFID technology it is possible to identify 
the zone and the people group who handled the baggage last. From the database it is 
possible to identify approximately who was near the baggage in that location. This 
information can be used, with video cameras, to identify who mishandled or stole the 
baggage. 
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8.4.4.2    RFID Privacy and Security Protection 
 
The baggage handling and passport system are similar and consequently the protocol has been 
outlined to avoid repetition.  Some baggage may contain items that may be private and valuable and 
could be tracked by its RFID tag anywhere in the world. The owner of the baggage may not wish to 
expose the information to others and adversary could try to track the baggage.   To protect the 
reading of the RFID serial number and tracking of the baggage data encryption protocol can be used. 
Appropriate RFID protocol can be chosen to protect the privacy and security of the RFID tag used 
in the baggage.  Since the baggage moves many countries the RFID protocol should support 
ubiquitous computing environment.  Due to this reason the proposed SUAP2 RFID authentication 
protocols may be suitable for the RFID system for the airport baggage handling. The SUAP2 
protocol requires three fields in the tag side ID, GID and x. The ID is unique for all tags. GID may 
be used for the group and can be used to identify the Airline.  The reader communicates with the 
tags using the data stored in the database. The conceptual framework is shown in Figure 8-14.  
 
          Database for Tags 
                                                                                                                    Tags 
                                                 Readers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-14:  The Data Framework of the Baggage using SUAP2 Protocol 
 
SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 protocols work in ubiquitous environment.  However SUAP1 is 
suitable for small system (several thousands of tags) where the numbers of RFID tags are not too 
high and not distributed much. Hence SUAP1 is not suitable for baggage handling system. SUAP2 
is suitable for this purpose. The protocol supports many groups that can be implemented for many 
countries or states. In this case GID will be used for country or state ID. The SUAP3 also support 
Reader 1 
Reader 2 
....... 
....... 
Reader K 
Tag 2 (ID2, GID1, X2) 
Tag 3 (ID3, GID2, X3) 
... 
..... 
......... 
Tag N (IDN, GIDK, XN) 
Tag 1 (ID1, GID1, X1) 
           (Had2, ID2 X2) 
....... 
GID2: (Had3, ID3, X3) 
....... 
GID3: (Hadp, IDp, Xp) 
..... 
GIDk:(HadN, IDN, XN) 
 
GID1: (Had1, ID1, X1) 
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many groups but for better security SUAP2 is preferred since it uses an extra secret value which 
will protect the baggage form all the identified threats effectively.  
 
The GAPVI will not be suitable for the RFID system of baggage handling since this protocol is not 
designed for distributed system. It will not work properly in ubiquitous computing environment.  
 
8.5   Conclusion 
 
In this chapter privacy and security problems in the RFID systems are analyzed for e-passport and 
hospital. This chapter also analyzed the uses of RFID technology in baggage handling in airport and 
the possible privacy protection of the baggage in RFID technology.  
 
In e-passport a protection scheme using an efficient and secure authentication protocol CPAP is 
proposed. CPAP is used to protect privacy for low-cost RFID system in pervasive computing 
environment. The proposed scheme requires only two one-way hash function operations that make 
it very efficient. The storage requirement for tag and the database is small. The comparison shows 
that the protocol described is both secure and efficient than other schemes. It also has practical 
advantages over them because it is simple and provides greater number of privacy and security 
protection. From simulation experiment it was found that for 12 and 16 bits data the RFID system is 
fully vulnerable to adversary attack. For 32 bits it also sometimes failed to give privacy protection. 
It was found to give good security and privacy for 64 bits. In our experiment data was always 
protected from privacy attack for 64 bits. So it is recommended for 64 or higher bits for proper 
security of the RFID systems. Most of the RFID standard support 96 bit EPC tag. Some standards 
support 128 bits for EPC memory. In that case our recommendation is for 96 or 128 bits of secret in 
RFID tag and reader.  
 
The chapter also analyzed the privacy and security problems in RFID systems in a hospital 
environment. A proposed protection scheme NAPHS is proposed to protect privacy for low-cost 
RFID system in a hospital. The proposed scheme requires only one one-way hash function 
operation in database that makes it highly efficient. The storage requirement for the tag and 
database is also low in comparison to the other protocols. The comparison shows that the protocol is 
both secure and efficient than these protocols and it has many practical advantages like simplicity, 
privacy and security protection. Simulation experiment indicated that for 16 bits data the RFID 
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system is fully vulnerable to adversary attack. For 32 bits it also failed sometimes to ensure privacy 
protection. The results indicated appropriate security and privacy for 64 bits data and is suggested 
that 64 or higher bits is required for appropriate   security of an RFID systems. Most RFID 
standards support 96 bit for EPC tag memory. Consequently it is recommendation that 96 or 128 
bits data and secret would be fully secured in RFID tag and reader systems.  
 
Finally RFID technology is considered in airports for baggage handling purposes. RFID can be used 
for sortation, identification, automation and location tracking. The read rate of RFID is much higher 
than the barcode read rate. RFID technology will reduce labour costs and strengthen automation. It 
can reduce the time for baggage sortation and distribution. The different activities required in the 
baggage handling process are very well suited for RFID technology. If RFID technology is 
implemented properly then passengers and airlines as well as airports will benefit. The passenger 
can get the information about their baggage’s current location, expected arrival time etc. Moreover 
latest technologies like Internet web facilities, SMS, databases and interactive televisions can be 
used to identify and enhance the performance of the system to better handle the baggage in airport. 
Airlines can reduce their costs if they eliminate the charges for mishandling and mismanagement of 
baggage. It is possible to identify the employees responsible for handling baggage before it is lost or 
mishandled. Airports also enhance their efficiency and thus ensure better customer services. The 
trials in different airports also gave very positive results and opened up a window for the future. 
There are also some challenges in the implementation of RFID in airports. Many airports may not 
take this technology in the near future due to the initial investment and proper initiative needed. So, 
profit and benefits cannot be maximized until most of the airports use a common RFID-based 
network system. Most RFID technologies need to be integrated with existing systems like barcodes. 
Another challenge of RFID is the privacy and security of the tag, because the content of the tag is 
vulnerable to an adversary.  To protect the baggage from tracking RFID authentication protocols are 
also proposed to implement in the RFID system. 
 
Part of the substance of this chapter has been published or accepted in the following conferences. 
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 Chapter 9   Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 
 
9.1    Introduction 
 
In this chapter the overall conclusions are made from the work carried out in this thesis. It outlines 
the summaries of the findings. It also suggests directions of future work. 
 
This thesis focuses on the privacy and security threats of RFID systems in many applications. The 
RFID tag contains unique identifier that can be easily tracked. The RFID systems exert its data to 
the air that are vulnerable to the adversary. The thesis also investigates various existing RFID 
privacy and security protocols and also identifies various problems in the existing RFID 
authentication protocols. This aim of the research work is to overcome the identified privacy and 
security problems and offers various RFID authentication protocols. 
 
9.2    Revisiting the Objectives 
 
The primary objective of the research was to develop authentication protocols to ensure privacy and 
security of the RFID systems that would be suitable for different applications for example, 
healthcare systems, e-passport, baggage handling in airports and supply chain operations. This 
research outlined the specific objectives in Section 1.2 and are re-examined as follows: 
 
      “To identify the challenges through literature review with the relevant fields of RFID 
systems, application, privacy and security problems and the basic cryptographic techniques 
that can be used in low-cost RFID systems.” 
 
Chapter 2 gives a review of RFID systems and also discusses the components of RFID systems 
including the readers, tags and backend database. This chapter also discusses the classification of 
RFID tags. It outlined RFID standards and the details of different types of EPC classes. This chapter 
discusses some application and advantages of RFID systems compared to bar code etc. It identified 
many advantages of RFID tags over the optical barcode. Barcodes require line-of-sight contact with 
readers. In contrast, RFID tags are readable without line-of-sight contact and without precise 
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positioning. RFID readers can scan tags at rates of hundreds per second. A barcode indicates the 
type of object on which it is used. An RFID tag emits a unique serial number that distinguishes 
among many millions of identically manufactured objects.  However in RFID systems there are 
issues regarding privacy and security. The information in these systems is vulnerable to various 
attacks. This chapter also presented these types of attacks and indicated the security requirements of 
RFID systems.  This chapter further discusses general cryptographic techniques that are used in 
network communication and information systems security. Modern cryptographic techniques are 
divided into two main classes, symmetric and asymmetric techniques. Some cryptographic data 
integrity algorithms such as cryptographic hash functions, message authentication codes and digital 
signatures are also discussed for data security.  
 
“To investigate the existing protocols for privacy and security of RFID system.” 
 
Chapter 3 has reviewed a number of existing security approach and authentication protocols for 
RFID systems. It classified the authentication protocols according to their implementation. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the protocols are also outlined for each protocol.  The protocols 
are classified based on hash-based varying identifier, static identifier and light-weight encryption 
based protocols for RFID systems.  The protocols with hash-based varying identifiers ensure 
privacy and security of the information by updating it after every authentication session so that the 
response is unpredictable. In this case the adversary cannot use any response in future to 
authenticate the system since the identifier and the secret value are no longer similar. However it 
requires synchronization in the tag side and the database side which involves computational and 
storage overhead. This approach is not suitable in the ubiquitous computing environment since the 
synchronization of the updated values is difficult to ensure in the distributed environment.  The 
protocols with static identifiers are suitable for ubiquitous computing environment but it requires 
more storage. Finally the light-weight encryption protocols require less complex operations than 
hash-based protocols since hash functions are complex and computation intensive. 
 
The privacy, security and efficiency problems in different existing protocols are also identified in 
this chapter. It is a challenge to ensure all the identified privacy and security threats effectively and 
efficiently. The concepts of the existing protocols are used as the foundation for the proposed 
protocols. The proposed protocols identified the various techniques in the existing protocols that 
can be combined and used to overcome the privacy and security problems in RFID systems.  
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“To develop new protocols for RFID privacy and security to improve efficiency and 
reliability.” 
 
  “To develop simulation software and carry out experiment using the simulation 
software based on the   developed   protocols.” 
 
“To evaluate the performance of the developed protocols and algorithms against other 
privacy and security protocols in terms of potential benefits and effects to justify the 
adoption of proposed work. “ 
 
Chapter 4 proposed four hash-based ubiquitous authentication protocols for the privacy and security 
of the RFID systems. The protocols are SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EMAP.  
 
SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 uses group-based approach using hash function, random numbers to 
protect the privacy for the low-cost RFID system. The privacy and security problem of OHLCAP is 
overcome in these protocols.  SUAP1 is suitable for the organization having small number of tags. 
SUAP2 and SUAP3 are for medium and large organizations having several departments. All the 
proposed schemes require only two one-way hash function operations that make them very 
efficient. The tag search time in the database is reduced by using the hash value as the address of 
the corresponding tag. The proposed protocol is compared with four other protocols LCAP, CRAP, 
OHLCAP and EOHLCAP. LCAP updates the identifier after each authentication process and hence 
it is not suitable for ubiquitous computing. The protocol also has location privacy problem until 
authentication process is successful. The CRAP and the OHLCAP work in ubiquitous computing 
environment however, CRAP requires a large number of hash computations and the OPHLCAP has 
privacy and security problems. The proposed protocol eliminates the privacy, security and 
efficiency problems in these protocols.  The EOHLCAP also overcomes the problem in OHLCAP 
and protects the RFID system from most of the attacks however it requires many complex hash 
operations in the database side. In the proposed protocols the number of hash operations has been 
reduced on the database side and ensure both privacy and security protections from the identified 
threats. The storage requirements in SUAP1 and SUAP3 are also less than the other protocols. The 
privacy and security comparison shows that the proposed protocols are both secure and efficient 
than LCAP, CRAP, OHLCAP and EOHLCAP schemes since the protocols are protected from all 
the identified privacy and security threats like information leakage, location privacy, impersonation 
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and replay attack, message interception and tracing with lower storages, computations and 
communication costs.   
 
The protocol EMAP in Chapter 4 is proposed using individual secret for each tag to protect privacy 
for low-cost RFID systems. It also uses static identifier so that it can work in a ubiquitous 
computing system. The proposed EMAP requires two one-way hash functions. The storage 
requirements for the tag and database are also low. Due to the two random numbers, one generated 
in the reader and the other generated in the tag, a tracing attack and impersonation attack become 
impossible. It has practical advantages over other protocols because it is simple and provides a 
larger range of privacy and security protections. The proposed protocol is robust to the identified 
threats, such as information leakage, an impersonation attack, replay attack, DoS attack and location 
tracing problem. 
 
Chapter 5 presented a new efficient and secure authentication protocol ESAP to protect privacy for 
low-cost RFID systems. The protocol uses a static identifier to provide effective privacy and 
security in a ubiquitous environment using hash functions, a timestamp and a random number. The 
strength of this protocol is the use of a monotonically increasing timestamp and a random number 
effectively to make the response more unidentifiable. This protocol stores the current timestamp 
after each successful authentication. This protocol uses the search index IDX to search the tag 
records in the database. It reduces the tag search time substantially in the database. The simulation 
experiment also proved that, the responses during the experiment were unique for both the 64 and 
96 bits long secret and data length.  It is also secured from an adversary from all the identified 
attacks such as information leakage, location privacy, impersonation and replay attack, message 
interception and tracing. Specific privacy and security protections from an adversary appropriate to 
simulation experiment were tested and found to be satisfactory. The privacy and security 
protections were also analyzed and the analysis verified that this protocol is protected from the 
identified threats. The proposed scheme requires only two one-way hash functions making it highly 
efficient. The storage requirements for the tag and database are also cost efficient. The comparison 
outlined in the analysis and experiment result shows that the proposed protocol is secure and 
efficient in compared to the other protocols. It has practical advantages over these protocols because 
it is simple and provides a larger range of privacy and security protections. This protocol will be 
suitable in the RFID systems of healthcare industry, supply chain management etc. 
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Chapter 6 proposed a new efficient and secure authentication protocol GAPVI to protect privacy for 
low-cost RFID systems using a varying identifier to provide effective privacy and security with 
recovery of the identifier to maintain synchronization. It is secured from an adversary by 
maintaining location privacy. It also protects the systems from an adversary for both privacy and 
security attacks as it was tested in the simulation experiment and analysis. The proposed scheme 
requires two one-way hash functions making it highly efficient. The storage requirement for the tag 
and database is also cost efficient. The comparison outlined in the analysis of the protocol is both 
secure and efficient compared to the other protocols outlined. It has practical advantages over these 
protocols because it is simple and provides a larger range of privacy and security protections.  
 
Chapter 7 proposed a new efficient and secure authentication protocol EHB-MP using light-weight 
encryption technique to protect privacy for low-cost RFID system in pervasive computing 
environment. The proposed protocol derived from HB+ and HB-MP protocols by removing the 
existing privacy and security problems. The proposed scheme requires only lightweight 
cryptography which is more suitable than hash function for low-cost RFID tag. The storage 
requirements for tag and the reader are also very low. The comparison shows that the protocol 
described here is both secure and efficient than HB+ and HB-MP protocols.  A mathematical proof 
is given to show that the proposed EHB-MP protocol is fully protected from the man-in-the-middle 
attack. 
 
“To propose architectures for the implementation of the developed protocols in real life 
applications like healthcare systems and e-passport.” 
 
The Chapter 8 investigated the privacy and security problems in e-passport and also outlined the 
present privacy and security measure for the RFID data in it.  A protection scheme using a secure 
authentication protocol CPAP is proposed to ensure the privacy and security of the RFID data more 
efficiently. CPAP is used to protect privacy for low-cost RFID system in pervasive computing 
environment. The proposed scheme requires only two one-way hash function operations that make 
it highly efficient. The storage requirement for tag and the database is relatively small. The 
proposed protocol is compared with three other protocols LCAP, CRAP and OHLCAP. The 
privacy, security and efficiency comparison shows that the protocol described is both secure and 
efficient than these schemes. The protocol is also secured form the identified privacy and security 
threats. It also has practical advantages over them because it is simple and it provides greater 
192 
 
number of privacy and security protection with low storage, computation and communications 
costs.  
 
The Chapter also analyzed the privacy and security problems in RFID systems in a hospital 
environment. A proposed protection scheme NAPHS is proposed to protect privacy for low-cost 
RFID system in a hospital. The proposed scheme requires only one one-way hash function 
operation that makes it highly efficient. The storage requirement for the tag and database is also low 
in comparison to the other protocols. The comparison shows that the protocol is both secure and 
efficient than these protocols and it has many practical advantages like simplicity, privacy and 
security protection.  
 
This Chapter further investigates the scope of RFID technology in airports for baggage handling 
purposes. RFID can be used for sortation, identification, automation and location tracking. RFID 
technology will reduce labour costs and strengthen automation. It can reduce the time for baggage 
sortation and distribution. The different activities required in the baggage handling process are very 
well suited for RFID technology. If RFID technology is implemented properly then passengers and 
airlines as well as airports will benefit. The passenger can get the information about their baggage’s 
current location, expected arrival time etc. Latest technologies like Internet web facilities, SMS, 
databases and interactive televisions can be used to identify and enhance the performance of the 
system to better handle the baggage in airport. Airlines can reduce their costs if they eliminate the 
charges for mishandling and mismanagement of baggage. It is possible to identify the employees 
responsible for handling baggage before it is lost or mishandled. Airports also enhance their 
efficiency and thus ensure better customer services. The trials in different airports also gave very 
positive results and opened up a window for the future. There are also some challenges in the 
implementation of RFID in airports. Many airports may not invest to this technology in the near 
future due to the initial investment and proper initiative needed. Therefore, profit and benefits 
cannot be maximized until most of the airports use a common RFID-based network system. Most 
RFID technologies  system need to be integrated with existing systems like barcodes because in 
some cases an organisation may not have invested in RFID systems . Another challenge of RFID is 
the privacy and security of the tag, because the content of the tag is vulnerable to an adversary.  To 
protect the baggage from tracking RFID authentication protocols are also proposed to implement in 
the RFID system. 
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9.3    Summary of Contributions of this Research 
 
The contributions of this research are categorized as two ways. Firstly is the major contribution in 
the development of seven new protocols. This includes improvements in the privacy and security of 
the RFID systems with lower storage, computation and communication costs.  Secondly the other 
contribution includes the common requirements for any privacy and security protection research 
work. These are the privacy and security identification in RFID applications, reviews of the existing 
research work to protect the RFID systems from various threats, the challenge and problems in the 
existing authentication protocols, and the performance comparisons with the proposed protocols and 
other well known protocols.  The contributions of this research are given as follows: 
 
9.3.1   Major Contributions 
 
The major Contributions of this research are as follows: 
 
 The thesis proposes 7 new RFID authentication protocols for RFID systems. The protocols 
are SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3, EMAP, ESAP, GAPVI, EHB-MP respectively. It identifies 
that different protocols are suitable for different situations. Different protocols also have 
different advantages and disadvantages.  All the proposed protocols protect the RFID 
systems from all the identified privacy and security threats: information leakage, location 
privacy, impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, DoS attack, forward 
privacy and backward privacy. 
 Features of SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3  
 Group based protocols 
 SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 use hash function and hash address to ensure the privacy 
and security in ubiquitous computing environment. Two random numbers in hash 
function ensures the better privacy and security of the transmitted message. 
 No message or hash address transmitted in plaintext. 
  Hash address reduces the searching time of the RFID tag in the database. 
 SUAP1 is suitable for small system and SUAP2 and SUAP3 are suitable for true 
ubiquitous large RFID systems. These are actually suitable for a system where the 
tags may be divided into different groups. 
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  All these protocols protect the identified privacy and security of the RFID systems 
with storage and computation cost suitable for low-cost tags. 
 
 Features of EMAP  
 EMAP uses individual tag secret instead of group secret to ensure privacy and 
security efficiently. 
 No message transmitted in plaintext. 
 Suitable for ubiquitous computing environment where the number of tags are not too 
high. 
 The protocol protect the identified privacy and security of the RFID systems with 
storage and computation cost suitable for low-cost tags. 
 
 Features of ESAP  
 ESAP is also efficient authentication protocols that efficiently protect the privacy 
and security of the RFID systems.  
 It uses a monotonically increasing timestamp and a random number to ensure the 
privacy and security efficiently. 
 No message transmitted in plaintext. 
 ESAP is suitable for ubiquitous computing environment where the number of tags 
are not too high.  
 The protocol protect the identified privacy and security of the RFID systems with 
storage and computation cost suitable for low-cost tags. 
 
 Features of GAPVI  
 GAPVI is an efficient authentication protocol using varying identifier and hash 
address. 
 Reduces hash computations 
 Not suitable for ubiquitous computing environment. 
 No message transmitted in plaintext. 
 The protocol protects the identified privacy and security of the RFID systems with 
storage and computation cost suitable for low-cost tags. 
. 
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 Features of EHB-MP 
 EHB-MP uses xor-based light-weight encryption method to ensure privacy and 
security. 
 It removes the privacy problem of previous xor-based light-weight authentication 
protocols. It shows that it is protected from the man-in-the-middle attack which is a 
big challenge in the RFID authentication protocol in light-weight encryption 
technology.  
 Requires low storages 
 Suitable for ubiquitous computing environment. 
 No message transmitted in plaintext. 
 The protocol protects the identified privacy and security of the RFID systems with 
less storage and computation cost. 
 
This research conducted some simulation experiments for the proposed and some existing well 
known RFID authentication protocols. The experiments mainly test if the response can be reused to 
break the privacy and security of the RFID systems. For this purpose it checks if any response for a 
tag is recurred in a specified number of attempts. If the same response is generated it can be used to 
break the privacy and security of the RFID systems. The key achievement of this research is that the 
proposed RFID authentication protocols protect the system from all the identified privacy and 
security threats. This research also has investigated the implementation of the proposed RFID 
authentication protocols in some applications. It proposed proper privacy and security of RFID 
systems for e-passport, healthcare system and baggage handling system in airport. It is observed 
that each RFID application has its own specific requirements. For example e-passport and baggage 
handling in airport require distributed system where the RFID protocol should support ubiquitous 
computing environment. However in some cases such as  a hospital may use an RFID system which 
may be implemented in a computing environment that is not much distributed compared to passport 
systems where the individual my travel globally to many countries.    
 
9.3.2   Other Contributions 
 
The other achievements of this research are summarized as follows: 
 It identifies the privacy and security requirements in RFID systems. It identifies privacy and 
security requirements for both the tag and database. The tag privacy covers both the 
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information and location privacy.  Two types of security attacks are covered- the weak 
attacks and strong attacks. Tag impersonation, cloning, replay attack, man-in-the-middle 
attack and DoS attack are identified as weak attacks. On the other hand backward 
traceability, forward traceability and server impersonation attack are identified as strong 
attack. 
 It also identifies the performance requirements for RFID protocols. The performance 
requirements are identified as storage costs, computation costs, communication costs and 
scalability.  
 This research reviewed varieties of existing RFID authentication protocols. It includes a 
number of hash-based and xor-based lightweight authentication protocols. It also identifies 
the privacy and security problems in the existing RFID authentication protocols. 
 It also compared the privacy and security properties with related existing RFID protocols.  
 
9.4    Limitations and Future Work                                       
 
One limitation of this thesis is that it only considers hash based encryption and lightweight 
encryption to ensure the privacy and security of the RFID systems. It did not consider other 
encryptions like AES and DES which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Another limitation of this 
thesis is that it did not perform any experiment for lightweight protocols EHB-MP to test how many 
times a reader wrongly authenticate a tag or how many times it does not authenticate a valid tag 
because of time constraints. 
 
The privacy and security concern in RFID systems is new and emerging as an important issue in 
wireless technology.   
 
This research identifies various existing privacy and security problems with RFID systems which 
still in its ‘infancy stage’. In future more privacy and security threats may be identified in different 
sections of the RFID systems and consequently privacy and security threats will inevitably be an 
important research issue.  
 
This research basically proposes two ways to design the protocols for RFID privacy and security: 1. 
hash function based authentication protocols and 2. xor based light-weight authentication protocols.  
In future other cryptographic methods can be investigated to develop lightweight authentication 
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protocols. Also the tag capacity will also be increased in future. More computation and storage 
intensive protocols also may be considered for future work. 
 
This thesis uses the symmetric cryptography to develop the privacy and security protocols. In future 
asymmetric cryptography may be considered to develop new RFID privacy and security protocols. 
The asymmetric cryptography requires more storages and it is more complex computational 
intensive. At present the low-cost tag is not suitable to use asymmetric cryptography due to its 
storages and processing limitations.  
 
The proposed protocols can be implemented in the real scenario of e-passport, healthcare systems 
and in baggage handling system in airport in future.  The real performance of the systems can be 
verified with the research results.  
 
An important research problem is that though it is possible to design a ubiquitous design for the 
privacy and security of the RFID systems but it is really difficult to manage it in a true distributed 
computing environment.  The first problem is that it requires a large common database to store the 
information of the tags. In this case some RFID readers may need to communicate a long distance 
for the data stored in the database. Another alternative is to replicate all the RFID tag information in 
many databases in many places. This requires large storages space for a billion numbers of tags. To 
reduce the replication the scope of the RFID tags can be defined for some specific places and 
databases. The information of the relevant RFID tags will only be stored in the associated 
databases. That means a group of databases and systems can only handle the RFID tags at any 
instance. One of the database servers will act as an owner of the tags in this group. This server will 
be called Administrative Centre (AC). The ownership means only the one trusted database server 
AC will have the authority to manage and control all the information of the RFID tags under this 
system [Song 2008]. It also manages the privacy and security policies for the associated tags. It can 
delegate access to the tags to the other database systems and readers.   Other database systems and 
readers can only authenticate the tags using secret and tag information but cannot control or even 
update the secret values of the tags.  The AC can directly communicate with the readers or it can 
communicate with the other databases. Figure 9-1 shows a basic architecture of an ownership model 
for an Administrative Centre (AC) with other databases and readers.  
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Figure 9-1:  Ownership Architecture of an Administrative Centre 
 
There may be several Administrative Centres say AC1, AC2 ... ACn etc. If these tags require 
travelling further from this system of one Administrative Centre to the range of the other 
Administrative Centre then the ownership of these tags can be transferred to that centre with the 
permission of the present owner Administrative Centre.   For example if it moves from AC1 to AC2 
then the ownership will be transferred to AC2. In that case only the AC2 can control the tag and the 
AC1 can no more manage or control the tag. In ideal case it cannot even authenticate the tag 
anymore. To be able to authenticate the tag the AC2 may delegate access permission to AC1. The 
advantage of this design is that it does not require storing the information of all the tags in many 
databases. It will reduce the storage requirements for redundant information. It will also reduce the 
administrative overhead to manage the large number of tags. The ownership transfer scenario is 
shown in Figure 9-2.  
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Figure 9-2:  Ownership Transfer of the Tag  
 
Few researchers worked in the field of ownership transfer but it is still in initial stage. There is a 
complex relationship of different counterparts along the supply chains: tag holders, subcontractors, 
service providers, etc. with different requirements and interests.  Therefore the ownership 
delegation may be an important research area near future [Molnar et al 2005, Song 2008, Henrici 
and Muller 2008]. Neural network may be a promising model to enhance the performance for the 
ownership transfer architecture.  This is an interconnected group of natural or artificial neurons that 
uses a computational model for information processing based on a connectionistic approach to 
computation. Neural network can be a useful model to search and classify the large number of tags 
that are distributed worldwide. 
 
Another very important research area for privacy and security of the RFID systems is the Internet of 
Things (IoT). The Internet of Things refers to uniquely identifiable objects and their virtual 
representations in an Internet-like structure. The very primary definition of IoT comes from the 
things oriented perception such as sensors with unique IDs or RFID tags and the term “Internet of 
Things” attributed to renowned networks of academic research laboratories [Auto-Id Labs]. Their 
key focus has been to support the proliferation of RFID tags using the standard EPC.  For the full 
deployment of IoT it requires the central focus on the things’ intelligence. Smart things or objects 
are able to interact and communicate among them and with the environment by exchanging data 
and information and can react autonomously with physical world, trigger action, create service 
Administrative 
Centre (AC1) 
 
Administrative 
 Centre (AC2) 
 Tag 
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without human interaction and has context awareness capability [Atzori et al. 2010].  In the IoT 
platform numerous services should be available to interact with smart things through standard 
interfaces that will provide link via internet, to retrieve inform changes of state. IoT should be built 
in such a way that it should easy to use and secure for the user. In the IoT smart things could be 
connected to the Internet superhighway to communicate with other objects which may create the 
privacy and security problems for the users. The IoT is vulnerable because of various reasons such 
as [Atzori et al. 2010]: 
 
 Due to the pervasiveness of the IoT applications the privacy and security threats are also 
pervasive.  
  In most of the cases the components of the IoT are kept unattended which are easy to attack 
by the attacker. 
 The components of IoT mostly use wireless technology such as RFID tags, sensors which 
make information leakage and spoofing very easy. 
 Most of the RFID components like passive RFID tags and sensors have low storage, 
computation and communication capabilities and do not support traditional complex privacy 
and security schemes. 
 
It is a major challenge to ensure privacy and security in IoT applications as the authentication and 
data integrity are difficult to achieve. This requires appropriate authentication infrastructures and 
servers that might require authentication from the remote place. These approaches are not feasible 
for IoT application as the passive RFID tags cannot transmit too many messages with the servers.  
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